278. Memorandum From the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk1
SUBJECT
- Strategic Missile Talks
I have rather hurriedly examined the position papers and instructions for the strategic missile talks2 and submit the following observations.
[Page 714]Although I realize that because of the vital security interest involved, there cannot be much give in our position, the Soviets will recognize that our initial position is loaded in our favor. In general, it will permit us to continue with our own plans while restricting them in carrying out some of their own programs.
I am troubled by the position which prohibits hardening of medium range launchers but allows hardening of ICBMs. Not only will this inconsistent position be hard to defend, but it would not seem to be in our interest since the Soviets have a number of soft ICBM launchers, whereas we do not. Since at best it would be some time before any agreement could go into effect, it would seem to me far preferable for us to do any additional hardening we wish to do now and work for an agreement which would prevent any hardening of either MRBMs or ICBMs.
I am particularly troubled by the position on the Tallinn system. It will probably be impossible to get any satisfactory evidence from the Soviets on what this system is. They are already suspicious that our purpose in starting these talks is simply to elicit information.
I would anticipate that the Soviets would press hard for the inclusion of bombers on the ground that they constitute a delivery system with a range greater than 1,000 kilometers.
The instructions provide no argumentation for handling a Soviet move to include the French and British in any agreement reached. I suggest that we should have a clear position on this matter before the talks begin.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Top Secret. Sent through Ambassador Bohlen.↩
- See Tab A and Tab B, Document 277.↩