Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

273. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Washington, August 16, 1968, 3:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

In the attached memorandum, Secretary Rusk submits for your approval a strategic arms limitation proposal (Tab A)² for discussion with the Soviets. The proposal has been unanimously agreed upon by the Committee of Principals (Rusk, Clifford, Wheeler, Foster, Helms, Tape for Seaborg, Hornig, and myself).

In the JCS review, Generals Wheeler, Westmoreland, and McConnell concurred in the proposal as submitted to you; however, Admiral Moore and General Chapman recommended certain modifications favorable to the Navy that were not acceptable to the other Chiefs. Paul Nitze and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force also concur in the proposal as submitted.

I regard the agreement reached—and the collegial way it was accomplished, on a most difficult issue—as the functioning of the U.S. Government at its best.

Attached to Rusk’s memorandum are more detailed memoranda to you from Rusk and Foster (Tab B)³ and Clifford (Tab C)⁴ to which are also attached the Chiefs’ position and General Wheeler’s personal recommendation against the Navy position.

In view of the great importance of this proposal, I urge that you read these attachments in their entirety.

I have also attached, for your information, SNIE 11-13-68⁵ concerning U.S. intelligence capabilities to monitor such an agreement, which is a critical issue in evaluating this proposal.

This proposal represents the coordinated effort of the community to define a reasonable package, which might be negotiable with the Soviets, within the following basic ground-rule: that the agreement be verifiable by external means alone to the extent necessary to protect U.S. security interests; that is, it goes as far as we can safely go without on-the-ground inspection.

Although there is now agreement that the proposal is in a form that can be discussed with the Soviets, there are still certain important unresolved features of the proposal and underlying issues of which you should be aware:

• —The most important unresolved aspect of the proposal is the level of limitations that would be placed on ABM deployments. Our present position calls only for a “set and equivalent number” of ABM launchers, and we have not yet agreed internally on a preferred number. Our final decision will be influenced by the Soviet position on this subject.
• —Closely related to this is the very difficult underlying intelligence problem of how we should deal with the Tallinn SAM system in defining its present capabilities and controlling future upgrading that might give it some ABM capability. While it is agreed that the relationship of radars to this question will have to be studied further and discussed with the Soviets, it is not yet agreed precisely how this should be handled and whether it should be formally dealt with in an agreement.
• —There are also difficult tactical problems yet to be resolved, such as how to deal with “on-site inspections” in the proposal. Although the proposal has been developed on the assumption that it could be monitored by external means alone, there is no question that on-site inspection would be very helpful in building mutual confidence and greatly help unresolved issues such as those presented by the Tallinn system. Secretary Clifford and the JCS have asked that an effort be made to include on-site inspection in the agreement we finally reach with the Soviets. How this can be done effectively with any chance of success without jeopardizing the prospects for the talks presents a major challenge to our negotiators. The community is now working on basic instructions for the negotiating delegation which will deal with this and other tactical problems.

As I noted earlier, I believe that the preparation of this proposal is an example of intra-governmental cooperation at its best. If the talks prove fruitful, we will face many difficult issues that can only be successfully resolved if this cooperative attitude is sustained.

I recommend that you tentatively approve the proposal as a basis for additional preparations for the talks, subject to a meeting with the Principals as soon as we obtain agreement from the Soviets on the nature and timing of the talks.

Walt

Approve proposal subject to final meeting with Principals

Disapprove

Call me⁶

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Limitation Talk, Box 11. Top Secret; Sensitive.
2. Document 269, including Tab A.
3. Printed as Tab B, Document 269.
4. Document 268.
5. Document 257.
6. None of these options is checked.