272. Memorandum of Conversation1
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN OF THE USSR
In a relaxed and extensive informal talk with Ambassador Dobrynin on the evening of Thursday, August 15th, the following points emerged:
- 1.
- I pointed out that the alternatives which we had suggested as to the level at which offensive-defensive missile talks might begin were for the purpose of making a prompt reply by the Soviet Union somewhat easier if our original suggestion had caused complications. The alternatives were given in a rough order of priority as far as our own choices were concerned. The Ambassador said that he might have a reply on the 16th or 17th because the Soviet leadership has its meetings usually on Thursdays—similar to our Tuesday luncheons at the White House. I told him that I thought there would be advantage in our being able to announce the time and place of such talks before the convening of the Non-Nuclear Weapons Conference later this month in Geneva.2
- 2.
- On the substance of the offensive-defensive missile talks, Dobrynin reflected great earnestness in the importance of the talks and the seriousness with which he considered the subject. I told him that I thought that these talks might well be the most important talks between our two countries since World War II—and he agreed. He asked about our Poseidon and Minute Man Tests and I told him that it was not possible for us to proceed on the basis that we already had an agreement prior to reaching one. I said that these tests have been laid on for a long, long time and that the timing was not connected in any way with the timing of discussions. He seemed quite relaxed on this point.
[Here follows discussion of Vietnam, Czechoslovakia, and recent Soviet contacts with Senator Mansfield and Richard Nixon.]
6. I reminded the Ambassador that he had telephoned me last week expressing concern about the Euratom countries entering a “reservation” at the time of signing the NPT. I told him that my information was that these countries did not intend to enter a “reservation but were stating that the timing of the ratification of the NPT on their part would be related to an agreement between Euratom and IAEA on safeguards.
[Page 687][Here follows discussion of Gromyko’s upcoming visit to the U.N. General Assembly, ratification of the Consular Agreement, Soviet proposals for a communications satellite system, and U.S. domestic politics.]
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Strategic Missile Talks, Box 11. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Secretary Rusk on August 16.↩
- Regarding this conference, see footnote 3, Document 263, and Documents 284 and 286.↩