Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

269. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson¹

Washington, August 15, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Strategic Arms Talks with the Soviets

The Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals has developed and evaluated a U.S. proposal for Strategic Arms Limitation for discussion with the Soviets (Tab A). The recommended proposal would prohibit the initiation of further deployments of offensive strategic missile systems and limit the deployment of ballistic missile defensive systems. No reductions in forces would be called for, and qualitative improvements would be permitted. No limitation would be placed on strategic aircraft or on defenses against aircraft. The limitations in the proposal are proposed to be verified by external means.

The Executive Committee has unanimously concurred in this proposal as a basis for discussion with the USSR. They have concluded that within the terms of such an agreement the U.S. would be able to:

a. maintain the U.S. deterrent posture;

b. leave the Soviet Government and world opinion in no doubt as to the adequacy of the U.S. deterrent posture;

c. be confident within the terms of the agreement that our deterrent posture could not be eroded by the action of the Soviet Union, or any other nuclear power, alone or in combination;

d. maintain a U.S. capability to limit damage to the United States by Soviet forces if deterrence fails, at least as effective as that which we can expect to obtain in the absence of an agreement; and

e. provide a strategic capability that would prevent nuclear powers other than the Soviet Union from threatening the stability of the agreement.

The specific views of the Department of State and ACDA are appended at Tab B. The views of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff are appended at Tab C.²

I am preparing instructions for the U.S. Delegation based on this recommended proposal and would forward those instructions to you if you concur with the recommended proposal.

Recommendation

That you approve the attached proposal as a basis for discussion with the Soviet Union.³

Dean Rusk

Tab A⁴

Washington, August 14, 1968.

Paper Approved by the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals⁵

STRATEGIC MISSILE TALKS PROPOSAL

The elements of a U.S. proposal for the proposed U.S.-USSR strategic missile talks are outlined below. This proposal should be viewed as an entity since that is the basis on which it has been evaluated.

I. Fixed Land-Based ICBM Launchers

The proposal would require cessation of the initiation of construction of any additional strategic offensive land-based missile launchers as of September 1, 1968. The Soviet Union would be permitted to complete the launchers which it is constructing as of that date. Beyond that date, however, it would not be allowed to initiate further deployment of fixed ICBM launchers. Under no circumstances would either side be permitted to deploy more than 1,200 ICBM launchers. Building of additional silos, enlarging of existing silos, changing basic external configuration of silos and other launchers, and the relocation of launchers would be prohibited. No additional restrictions would be imposed upon technological improvements of launchers or missiles already deployed including increasing the hardness of existing silos and deployment of MIRV’s, or the retrofitting of existing launchers with new missiles.

II. Fixed Land-Based IRBM/MRBM Launchers

Further construction of fixed land-based launchers for IRBM/MRBM (ranges greater than 1,000 km) would be prohibited. The retrofitting of existing IRBM/MRBM launchers to accommodate ICBM missiles would be prohibited. The installation of ICBM missiles on IRBM/MRBM launchers would be prohibited as would the conversion of IRBM/MRBM missiles to ICBM missiles. Building of additional silos, enlarging of existing silos, changing basic external configuration of silos and other launchers, further hardening of launchers and the relocation of launchers would be prohibited. No additional restrictions would be imposed upon technological improvements of launchers or missiles already deployed or the retrofitting of existing launchers with new missiles of intermediate or medium range.

III. Mobile Land-Based Strategic Offensive Missile Systems

The proposal would impose a complete ban on mobile land-based, strategic offensive missile systems (ranges greater than 1,000 km). Missile systems with such ranges carried by waterborne vehicles on inland waterways would also be prohibited. Any such existing systems would be destroyed.

IV. Mobile Sea-Based Strategic Offensive Missile Systems

A. The proposal would ban the construction of additional strategic offensive missile launching submarines or of additional launchers in existing submarines. This prohibition should apply to all submarines with ballistic missile or cruise missile launchers. Such submarines under construction as of September 1, 1968, could be completed, subject to agreement on their number. There would be no limitation on the characteristics of SLBMs or SLCMs, or on retrofitting missile submarines with new or larger missiles of the type with which they are equipped. The fitting out of surface ships with facilities for firing offensive ballistic missiles would be prohibited.

B. There would be no replacement of ballistic or cruise missile submarines within the first five years of the agreement. During that period the two sides would undertake to reach agreement on rules governing subsequent replacement of submarines. In the absence of a supplementary agreement on such rules, each side may replace submarines after five years from the date of the initiation of the agreement provided that replacement does not increase the total number of submarines or of submarine-launched ballistic missiles or cruise missiles.

V. ABMs

The proposal would ban the deployment of more than a set and equivalent number of fixed, land-based anti-ballistic missile launchers and associated anti-ballistic missiles including reload missiles. A total prohibition on deployment of mobile ABM systems, both land-based and sea-based, would be imposed. There would be no other constraints on the characteristics of the ABM systems deployed.

VI. Aircraft and Anti-aircraft Systems

The proposal would not include limitations on aircraft or anti-aircraft systems.

VII. Technological Improvements

There would be no prohibition of technological improvement within the constraints of the agreement.

VIII. Verification

The limitations described in paragraphs I through V are proposed to be verified by external means.

IX. Provisions for Revision and Withdrawal

A. Either party may propose revision of the agreement if it believes that conditions affecting the agreement have changed. The two parties shall meet from time to time to discuss the operation of the agreement and possible revisions.

B. Nine years after entry into force of this agreement the two parties shall meet for a formal review of the operation of the agreement with a view to assuring that the purposes of the agreement, with any revisions that may have been made during the period, are being realized. In the absence of agreement by the two parties on the continued operation of the agreement with necessary revisions, either party may withdraw by giving six months’ notice prior to ten years from the day of entry into force of the agreement. Otherwise, the agreement shall be automatically renewed for another ten years, at which time this review procedure shall be repeated.

C. Either party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the agreement at any time if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the agreement, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.

Tab B⁶

Washington, August 15, 1968.

Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to President Johnson

SUBJECT

• Strategic Arms Talks with the Soviets

The proposed strategic missile limitation agreement which has been concurred in by the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals, would, if successfully negotiated, be demonstrably in the net interest of the United States and, we believe, in the interest of the Soviet Union as well. By imposing limitations on the numbers of strategic offensive and defensive missiles which each side could deploy, the proposed agreement would contain the strategic arms competition and avert a likely dangerous and costly new spiral in the arms race between the two superpowers.

The achievement of such an agreement would also demonstrate to others the common determination of the U.S. and the USSR to fulfill their obligations under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and thus contribute to the goal of preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional countries. It would increase the chances of reaching more comprehensive agreements involving reductions in strategic arms and, hopefully, facilitate agreement on other bilateral and multilateral arms control measures.

The agreement could be a major factor in reducing the risks of the outbreak of nuclear war and in promoting a meaningful detente. Above all, an agreement between the U.S. and the USSR of this nature could profoundly alter the complexion of East-West relationships and provide a climate wherein cooperative efforts could be directed toward solving other critical world problems.

The agreement would specifically enhance strategic stability between the U.S. and the USSR because of two primary factors:

1. Each side would retain a secure deterrent force, with minimum incentive for launching a first strike in times of crises;

2. The foundation would be laid for a continuing exchange of views on strategic matters, thus helping to avert the mutual suspicions and overreactions which have characterized the past strategic situation.

The effect of the proposed agreement on the strategic balance should be compared with the future strategic environment which is most likely to prevail in the absence of such an agreement. Without the constraints imposed by the agreement, we estimate that the Soviet Union, by the middle 1970’s, could have deployed at least 1,500 ICBM’s, a submarine-launched ballistic missile fleet comparable to our present Polaris force, some new land-mobile offensive missiles, and an ABM system containing almost three times as many interceptor missiles as the planned U.S. Sentinel system. The Soviets are, of course, capable of deploying a strategic force even larger and more powerful.

While our presently programmed strategic forces are adequate to cope with the probable future Soviet threat, we might be obliged to procure substantial qualitative and quantitative additions to maintain our deterrent if we were to see signs that the Soviets were moving towards more extensive offensive and defensive programs.

If, however, the agreement were acceptable to the Soviet Union, Soviet strategic forces would be constrained in four important ways:

1. The rapid recent expansion of Soviet ICBM deployments would be halted at numbers of launchers essentially equal to the U.S.;

2. The number of new-generation Soviet Polaris-type submarines would be held to a level well below half of the U.S. force;

3. The otherwise very likely deployment of Soviet land-mobile ICBM’s would be precluded;

4. The level of Soviet ABM’s would be limited to an equivalent of a U.S. deployment.

At the same time, the proposed agreement, if accepted in its present form, would have no significant effect on present U.S. plans regarding strategic weapons systems. We would still have the options of going ahead with the current programmed improvements in our capabilities, including advanced offensive missiles with MIRV’s (Poseidon and Minuteman III). However, with the constraints placed on Soviet strategic forces under the proposed agreement, the United States would not have to procure major new strategic offensive systems, or an extensive ABM system, in order to maintain an adequate deterrent.

Although we consider that limitations on radars for ABM systems is a most significant item in dealing with the ABM question, the present proposal does not provide any such limitation because of the JCS concern over possible erroneous categorization of radars. The Executive Committee agreed that the problems of limitations on ABM radars and the relationship of radars to preventing the upgrading of the Tallinn antiaircraft system to provide it with a significant ABM capability must be studied further and will have to be among the subjects discussed with the Soviets during the negotiations.

Because of the strategic situation which would exist under the agreement, both our absolute and relative strategic deterrent posture vis-a-vis the Soviet Union or any other nuclear power or combinations thereof—in terms of our assured destruction and damage-limitation criteria—would be at least as good as, and in many circumstances considerably better than, would probably be the case in the absence of an agreement.

The United States Intelligence Board has prepared a Special National Intelligence Estimate which evaluates our external capabilities; i.e., those that do not depend upon agreed access to the USSR, to verify strategic arms control agreements. Using external means alone, we have in some instances very high confidence of detecting Soviet violations at an early state; in all others, we are confident of detecting violations well before they could measurably alter the strategic balance. In those areas where our capabilities are lowest, it would still be in our interest to propose limitations since potential violations would not significantly affect our security and the limitations would provide inhibitions to Soviet actions which they might otherwise freely undertake if no agreement existed.

Thus, we conclude that our ability to verify the agreement by external means alone is adequate, even taking into account the margin of uncertainty in some of our external verification capabilities and our need for adequate safeguards against possible Soviet violation or abrogation. This is reinforced by the fact that the agreement would not affect present U.S. programs but would constrain Soviet forces below the threat levels used to justify these programs. Therefore, we estimate that the potential risks to our deterrent due to possible Soviet evasion of the terms of the agreement are less serious than the risks we would face in the absence of an agreement. All of this, however, does not exclude the possibility of probing Soviet receptivity to a supplementary verification arrangement which would increase confidence in the viability of the agreement.

No agreement dealing with the extraordinarily complicated question of limiting strategic armaments can be initially designed to solve all possible problems which could arise from technological or political changes which may occur after the agreement is reached. Recognizing this, the proposed agreement allows for mutually agreeable revisions to be made to the basic agreement in order to preserve its stability and satisfy the security interests of each party. It also contains a withdrawal provision in the event that one side comes to believe that its vital security interests have become endangered by the agreement. It may also be desirable to create some bilateral consultative machinery to ensure the viability of the agreement on a day-to-day basis.

No recommendations are made at present as to tactics on how this proposal will be negotiated with the Soviets, but we do not believe that all elements in it should be presented to them at once.

We recommend that you approve the attached proposal as a basis for the initial discussions with the USSR on limiting the strategic arms race.

Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
William C. Foster
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Limitation Talk, Box 11. Top Secret; Nodis.
2. Document 268.
3. There is no indication whether President Johnson approved or disapproved the recommendation.
4. Top Secret; Nodis.
5. This paper was agreed to at the August 14 meeting of the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals. No formal record of this meeting has been found, but an earlier draft of this paper, ACDA-2956/Rev. 4, August 13, is identical to the source text except for the substitution in Part VIII of the word “external” for “national” in the August 13 draft. An August 13 memorandum from Fisher to the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals attached to the August 13 draft lists the changes in the August 13 draft from a earlier unidentified draft and indicates that the changes were suggested by the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Limitation Talk, Box 11) For text of an earlier draft of this paper, dated July 31, see Document 264. Neither the July 31 or August 14 draft bears an ACDA document number.
6. Top Secret; Nodis.