213. Editorial Note
In a letter, October 10, 1967, to Walt Rostow, Glenn Seaborg requested specific execution authority for Cabriolet. (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171) Regarding earlier delays of this Plowshare event, see Document 164.
Following the submission of Seaborg’s October 10 letter to Rostow, a lively debate ensued about the costs and benefits of granting the Atomic Energy Commission permission to execute Cabriolet. For example, Foster wrote a memorandum to Walt Rostow on October 17 recommending disapproval of Seaborg’s request. Foster feared that Cabriolet could violate the Limited Test Ban Treaty and complicate, perhaps fatally, current negotiations on the non-proliferation treaty. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Nuclear Testing—Plowshare Events, Volume 2, Box 29) For an extract from this memorandum, see Seaborg’s Stemming the Tide, page 335.
The following day, in an October 18 memorandum to Under Secretary Katzenbach, Leonard Meeker recommended an indefinite postponement of Cabriolet and underscored Foster’s reservations. Meeker argued, in part, “It is difficult to imagine a more unfortunate time for the conduct of Cabriolet. The situation at the General Assembly seems virtually certain to ensure that there will be well-publicized charges of treaty violation, with the U.S. being taxed for shaving its own obligations at the same time it was asking the non-nuclears to engage in a further round of self-denial. The domestic political repercussions could be substantial.” (Department of State, Central Files, AE 6)
However, on the same day, Herman Pollack, Director, Office of International Science and Technology Affairs, Department of State, wrote a memorandum, October 18, to Ambassador Kohler arguing that Cabriolet should be executed because it could help rather than impede the NPT negotiations. “Conduct of the Cabriolet test on an open basis would demonstrate that we are seriously proceeding with our plans for learning all that is necessary about the yet untested technology in order to make its benefits eventually available to the rest of the world. On the contrary, our sincerity might well be challenged if on the one hand we exhort other countries not to work on Plowshare because they will have access to our services as soon as we develop the technology, and then on the other hand we decline to follow the orderly path of experiments which many scientists throughout the world recognize as necessary to develop our capacity to provide the services we have offered.” (Ibid.)
Under Secretary Katzenbach, however, agreed with Foster and Meeker that Cabriolet should be postponed. In an October 20 memorandum to Walt Rostow, Katzenbach wrote: “The NPT negotiations are at a critical stage. We simply cannot chance giving the FRG, the Italians, [Page 520] Indians, etc., an opportunity to charge us with playing games with our own treaty obligations …. I am persuaded that the possible dangers to the NPT—which is vital to the President—and the hell we would probably catch in the UN (and at home) if we went through with the test, are simply not worth the price.” (Ibid.)
For Seaborg’s later critique of the several postponements of Cabriolet, see Stemming the Tide, pages 327-339. For the final decision on Cabriolet, see Document 217.