Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

214. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 2, 1967, 1:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Non-Proliferation Treaty

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR
• Mr. William C. Foster, Director, ACDA

Mr. Foster told Ambassador Dobrynin that Mr. Fisher had presented a copy of the Five Principles of the five non-nuclear weapon Euratom countries and a draft Article III embodying these principles to Ambassador Roshchin in Geneva on November 2.²

Mr. Foster said that the U.S. was authorized by its allies to work out an Article III with the Soviet on this basis. However, our allies wish to be consulted before an Article III is tabled. We will try to conduct such consultations in Geneva, but the Soviets should be aware that another meeting of the NATO Council may be necessary.

Mr. Foster pointed out that the last two months have involved difficult and intensive consultations. We regret the delay in the ENDC’s work, but the difficulties we ran into were genuine. These difficulties arose not only from the FRG but also from other Euratom countries. It should be stressed that the “five principles” are backed by all “Five.”³ The French apparently played a passive role.

Mr. Foster also pointed out that if the Soviets would accept safeguards in some fashion they would find that other countries would be able to accept safeguards much more readily. A lot of objections to particular provisions of Article III would be forgotten if the Soviets themselves were prepared to accept safeguards on their peaceful activities.

Mr. Foster expressed the hope that the Soviets can be flexible in considering our proposals for a compromise Article III. He said there would be no need to alter the basic framework of the September 1 draft.⁴ The Soviets should assume the meaning of Article III realistically and be flexible about wording.

Mr. Foster then said he understood that Committee I in New York can be kept occupied with non-disarmament items at least until November 15. Perhaps breaking out the Secretary General’s report on nuclear weapons would provide additional time. In any event, there is need for speed in working out an agreed Article III. We should aim to complete the NPT by November 20 at the very latest since the U.S. and U.S.S.R. share an interest in having it passed through the UNGA this year and signed as soon as possible thereafter.

Mr. Foster then read the first sentence of the draft Article III presented by Mr. Fisher to Ambassador Roshchin. He said that Ambassador Roshchin had told Mr. Fisher that the omission of “IAEA” before safeguards was impossible for the Soviets to accept and represented a major stumbling block. Mr. Foster argued that inclusion of “IAEA” would not alter the fact that agreements between the IAEA and Parties to the Treaty would have to be concluded. He stressed the importance of making Article III acceptable to the Euratom countries. Ambassador Dobrynin copied down this first sentence and said he would report the issue to Gromyko.

Mr. Foster then read the rest of the first paragraph and noted that Ambassador Roshchin had objected to Mr. Fisher over the absence of any reference to facilities. Mr. Foster pointed out that reference to facilities was not essential since this aspect of the problem of effective safeguards is covered by reference to a statute of the IAEA and the IAEA safeguards system. Mr. Foster then outlined the problem concerning the phrase “or carried out under its control anywhere” as a substitute for “carried out by it anywhere.” Ambassador Dobrynin did not seem to think this was an important issue but he noted that this was a matter for experts.

Mr. Foster then raised the question of the treaty’s duration and said that “1,000 years” does not seem reasonable to many countries. Likewise there are genuine objections to the amendments provision which is too rigid and in practical effect would mean that no amendments to the NPT probably could ever be adopted. Moreover, politically speaking we had encountered objections to giving a veto to states who were members of the IAEA Board of Governors on the score that some important countries are not permanent members of this Board. Mr. Foster thought that the provision in the first alternative amendment’s provision discussed last summer, which would not make amendments apply to states which did not accept them, was better.⁵ Ambassador Dobrynin made no response to these points.

Mr. Foster then raised the subject of the Soviet draft convention on non-use. He asked whether the U.S.S.R. could really deny itself the option to use of nuclear weapons in a major war. Apart from the circumstances of the Soviet draft convention which will create difficulties for us, we think it is not advisable to raise this subject at the present time when we shall need to cooperate in order to smooth the path for the presentation of the NPT at the UNGA. It would be very important for both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to avoid having the NPT go back to the ENDC next year. This would mean that the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States would convene in the spring of 1968 and that further difficulties for the nuclear weapon states in connection with the NPT would be created.

Ambassador Dobrynin asked whether we thought that India and Brazil would go along with the NPT. Mr. Foster replied that he did not know. It is possible that the security assurances which we are already discussing with the Soviets would make it easier for India to sign.

Ambassador Dobrynin said he recognized the urgency of completing the NPT and hoped that there would be a Soviet response to the proposals presented by Mr. Foster in Geneva, after November 7th.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Foster on November 2 and approved in S/S by Walsh on November 10. The meeting took place in Foster’s office.
2. See Document 216.
3. See Document 216.
4. Not further identified.
5. See footnote 3, Document 201.