Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

217. Notes of Meeting¹

Washington, November 28, 1967, 12:10–1:20 p.m.

NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT’S MEETING ON PROJECT CABRIOLET

The President: We are confronted with a difficult decision here on “Cabriolet.”

Secretary Rusk: These are the issues: You are being asked to approve a “cratering” shot important to the future of “Plowshare” program.

This is directly related to the Interoceanic Canal and peaceful application of the atom. We first thought that the test ban treaty would not conflict with “Plowshare” program. Now we do not know.

We must ask if this shot is sensible only if it is to be followed by other shots which infringe on the test ban treaty. We must ask to what extent do we support Plowshare? There is a problem of possible violation of the test ban treaty. The President should know the parameters of the problem.

If there is a 50-50 chance of leakage, we could be in violation of the test ban treaty. We face a 50-50 chance of leakage on these tests. We are at a time when this could get in the way of NPT.

It is therefore a decision between “Plowshare” vs. the test ban treaty. The treaty requires you to keep the debris from these tests at home.

The President: The question is would Cabriolet violate the treaty?

Secretary Rusk: There is a 50-50 chance and a danger of a small degree of leakage on this test.

Chairman Seaborg: I gave assurance to the Senate the “Plowshare” experiments could be carried out. That was important to getting the treaty passed.²

Probably, there would not be “more hazardous” tests to follow. There would be a need for an amendment to the treaty at a later date for the test ban treaty.

On the matter of leakage, the first assumption is that we would have a 20 percent chance of leakage. At 50 hours after the test there might be ten picocuriers at the border with Canada. In the air normally were about 100 picocuriers. Of this would only be a very small amount which is way below any health hazard and below any sensible level to cause a problem.

This would be below the amounts which have resulted from the Soviet test.

Chairman Seaborg said at the time of the treaty Secretary Rusk wrote the Congressional Committee that the U.S. would feel free to interpret the treaty more liberally if the Soviet were to.³ To drop Cabriolet would be to drop “Plowshare.” Brazil and India want a nuclear explosion system of their own. In order to prevent this, we have offered them the Plowshare program.

The President: Could you conduct Cabriolet without violation of the test ban treaty?

Chairman Seaborg: Yes, under a liberal interpretation of the treaty. If debris crosses the U.S. border, it would be detected by our own public health service.

The President: Is it your position that in order to keep faith with Secretary Rusk’s letter to the Senate we should conduct these tests?

Mr. Robert Anderson: The Congress will not give us any more money until this question is resolved. There is no agreed position on the level of radiation that will constitute a violation of the test ban treaty.

Mr. Anderson said if we postpone Cabriolet indefinitely then we postpone indefinitely the development of nuclear excavation.

He said if we start tomorrow it would take the next fifteen years before we could put the first ship through the proposed oceanic canal. “I do not want to debate what is in violation of the treaty. But it is unfortunate if we have gotten ourselves into the position where we cannot use this type of energy to do this work.”

“It will only be after all of these tests are completed that we will actually know if we can go through with a canal by nuclear excavation.”

“It is not reasonable for us to impose that fine distinction which will permit the Soviets to do what they have done and not permit us to conduct our test.”

“I propose that we announce these tests publicly and give the world time to prepare for it. We should be forthright and honest.”

(Inserted as an appendix to these notes is a summary of the recommendation by Mr. Anderson and the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission.)⁴

Dr. Hornig said he was opposed to the proposal. Dr. Hornig said that this test would require only 2,500 tons of explosive while about 10 million tons of explosive was needed for the canal.

Many think that a one million ton test and a 10 million ton test will be necessary before we can actually decide to go ahead with the canal.

Chairman Seaborg: But these tests would not be for more than three years.

Dr. Hornig: In any case you cannot go further with these tests without modifying the test ban treaty.

Secretary Rusk: Why don’t we go to the Soviets now or to the Security Council and work this thing out for the first test? Why not get international participation including asking the Soviets to come over here and deal with us in this program.

Mr. Robert Anderson: The Corps of Engineers say we must conduct these tests before we can determine whether to build a canal. We need this first test so we can learn from it what will be necessary to avoid another delay.

Director Schultze: These tests escalate as you go along. I question whether we should invest money in the research and development test that you recommend when you ultimately know you are going to have to ask for changes in the treaty. It does not make sense economically to spend this money on tests when you are uncertain whether or not you will be able to make meaningful use of this when larger shots are required.

The most responsible estimates show that it would not hurt to have a two to three year delay on this. I believe, Mr. President, that we should get the diplomatic problem out of the way first.

Chairman Seaborg: We’ve tried to talk to the Soviets for two years and we haven’t gotten anywhere.

Mr. Adrian Fisher: Ambassador Kohler has been in touch with the Soviets on this and has gotten nowhere.

Director Helms: The Soviets have conducted 14 tests between March 1964 and February 1967. We are talking about only kilotons in this test. The Soviets have conducted tests ranging as follows: 450 kilotons, 200 kilotons, 85 kilotons, and 220 kilotons.

Dr. Hornig: But the Soviet tests were well below the surface. Their seepage was highly fractional. These U.S. tests will be near the surface with a better than 50 percent chance of seepage.

Undersecretary Katzenbach: There will be a radioactive cloud. We would be violating the treaty. The fact this cloud would go over Canada would make it extremely difficult politically.

The Soviets have never taken another interpretation. They have never admitted their actions.

Dr. Hornig: There will be two types of reaction. Here in this country I know the reaction will be that we have violated the treaty. If the test is detected by other countries, the reaction by them also will be that we have violated the treaty.

Chairman Seaborg then read a statement which the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy had submitted. In this statement, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy expressed its deep concern over the fact that the Plowshare program had not been carried out as planned. The Committee said it did not like a strict interpretation being placed on the treaty. It pointed out that the Soviets have proceeded with testing very vigorously.

The meeting adjourned with no decision being reached.⁵

1. Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings, Box 1. No classification marking. An attached December 4 cover memorandum from Tom Johnson to the President notes the time of the meeting and lists the participants as McNamara, Katzenbach, Wheeler, Helms, Schultze, Hornig, Seaborg, Spurgeon Keeny, Robert Anderson, Tape, Fisher, and Foster.
2. Reference apparently is to Seaborg’s Congressional testimony in support of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. See, for example, his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 14, 1963, reproduced in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 6, pp. 162-226.
3. Not further identified.
4. Not found.
5. A detailed account of this meeting also appears in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 14, pp. 545-548, and in his book, Stemming the Tide, pp. 335-338. Cabriolet was eventually conducted at 11 a.m. on January 26, 1968, at the Nevada Test Site after the AEC had publicly announced that it planned to do so on January 25. (Ibid., pp. 338-339; United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 Through September 1992, p. 31) For further discussion of this test and others in 1968, see Document 227.