Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

218. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

• Status of NPT Negotiations

We have reached a point in our NPT negotiations where we are faced with several alternatives. The treaty is almost complete, except for the difficult safeguards article, Article III, and the question of the NPT’s duration, which we shall want to reopen. I am bringing the matter to your attention at this time because, at the end of this week or the beginning of the next, there may be some public indications by the non-aligned that the Geneva Conference is failing because of our inability to make progress on this issue.

With respect to the safeguards article, the Soviets have accepted all the changes which we have proposed, except one. They have agreed that safeguards under the NPT should be applied pursuant to an agreement with the IAEA concluded pursuant to the IAEA Statute. Their position, however, is that the safeguards to be established pursuant to a Treaty should be characterized in the Treaty as “IAEA safeguards.” I have urged Gromyko to reconsider this position but the Soviets are sticking to it. Mr. Foster is of the opinion that their position on this is definitive (see attachment 1—Geneva telegram 1861).²

The area of disagreement is reflected in three possible formulations of the first sentence of Article III (see attachment 2). We have asked urgently to have the views of our Allies on these formulations.

Alternative courses of action now open to us appear to be as follows:

A. We could press the Soviets to accept our November 2 formulation (which does not so clearly characterize as “IAEA” safeguards the safeguards to be established pursuant to agreement with the IAEA) indicating that this is essential to us and that we must continue to insist on it despite Soviet rejection.³

B. We could yield to strong non-aligned pressure to interrupt negotiations at Geneva and present an incomplete NPT to the UNGA with a blank Article III.

C. We could tell our Allies that only the second or third formulations in attachment 2 (which more clearly characterize the safeguards to be established pursuant to agreement with the IAEA and “IAEA” safeguards) offer a realistic basis for negotiations. We could add that prompt agreement along such lines would improve prospects for getting Soviet agreement to a limited duration clause.

Implicit in the selection of the language for Article III is the problem of what sort of an agreement we contemplate between IAEA and Euratom, or, for that matter, between IAEA and the various countries whose nuclear activities are to be put under IAEA inspection. It is my view that such an agreement should provide for full use of existing safeguards systems, such as those of Euratom or those of our own AEC safeguards system, but that it should involve more than a mere examination of the paper records of those systems; it should be deep enough so that IAEA could satisfy itself that no diversion was taking place.

Alternative A, insisting on our November 2 draft which does not so clearly characterize the safeguards as IAEA safeguards, will be the most acceptable course to the FRG, Italy and, apparently, Belgium among our NATO allies as it would strengthen the hand of Euratom negotiating with IAEA. None of these states (with the possible exception of the FRG) has indicated that we should insist upon this formulation even if it means the failure of the negotiations for a non-proliferation treaty. On the other hand, our allies who are not in Euratom, as well as the non-aligned, are not interested in pressing for treaty language which appears to preserve a special position for Euratom which has overtones of self-inspection. Many of them have indicated that the U.S. should not press this position to the point of deadlock in the negotiations.

Insistence on alternative A to the point of deadlock might lead to alternative B if an apparent stalemate in Geneva leads to pressure to break off the negotiations there and to take the issue to the UN General Assembly with a safeguards Article left blank. This alternative carries a risk that the Article III ultimately agreed upon would offer less protection to Euratom than the formulations currently under discussion. It probably would touch off a round of propaganda recriminations which would not promote prospects for early agreement on an NPT.

Following the third alternative, characterizing the safeguards system as IAEA safeguards, would permit the prompt conclusion of the negotiations with the Soviets and prevent any talk of deadlock in the negotiations at Geneva. It would cause difficulties with the FRG, and to a lesser extent with our other allies who are in Euratom because of their feeling that this characterization would drastically weaken Euratom’s bargaining position in the future negotiations with IAEA. The difficulties with the FRG might be particularly acute as the FRG would be forced to decide, on its own responsibility, whether it could accept a characterization of safeguards as IAEA safeguards.

Accepting the characterization of the safeguards as IAEA safeguards, however, would be in the long range U.S. interest as far as the countries outside of Euratom are concerned. We have a long range interest in promoting IAEA safeguards as such. It is this interest which underlies our own willingness to place our own peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards and it is not served by a refusal to characterize the safeguards of an NPT as IAEA safeguards.

Dean Rusk ⁴

Attachment 2⁵

November 28, 1967.

Alternatives for First Sentence of Article III

1. November 2 US Draft (rejected by Soviets but most acceptable to Euratom Allies)

“1…. Undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA and the Agency’s safeguards system ….”

2. Modification of a UK Proposal (most likely to be acceptable to Soviets; rejected by FRG; less acceptable than 1 to Italy but more acceptable to UK and Dutch than 3)

“1…. undertakes to accept IAEA safeguards, as set forth in agreement to be concluded with the IAEA in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA ….”

3. November 9 Soviet Delegation Proposal (not clear whether later rejected by Soviets; not clear whether acceptable to FRG and Italy)

“1…. undertakes to accept safeguards in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA and the Agency’s safeguards system, as set forth in an agreement to be concluded with the IAEA ….”

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Exdis.
2. Telegram 1861 from Geneva, November 25, drafted by Foster for Secretary Rusk, is not printed. (Ibid.) In this telegram, in addition to a discussion of failed U.S. efforts to convince the Soviets to omit mention of “IAEA Safeguards” from their draft Article III proposal, Foster expressed the following about our European allies, particularly the FRG: “I recognize and support the strong feeling of Euratom members that their safeguards must continue and that Euratom, as such, must have the right to negotiate whatever verification procedures by IAEA are ultimately applied. Nonetheless, it seems to me that as a Co-Chairman we are now being asked to fight mainly for the interests of only one of our allies, as against our own national interests and those of the most of the rest of our allies and most of the rest of the world.”
3. For text of November 2 U.S. Article III draft, see Document 216.
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
5. Secret; Exdis.