Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969

277. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, January 10, 1969, 1250Z.

527. Subject: Morning Meeting with President Thieu January 10.

1. Before handing President Thieu the letter from President Johnson,² I briefly reviewed with him what had happened since the Vance-Lau meeting in Paris on January 2,³ especially how we had unsuccessfully tried to engage a dialogue about next steps with Foreign Minister Thanh, and I recalled that I had tried to see Thieu since January 6.

2. I then handed him the President’s letter, which he read carefully. When he had finished I said to him that President-elect Nixon and Mr. Rogers associate themselves with what I would now be saying.

3. There is no basic disagreement between the US and GVN, I said, on procedural issues. Both of us want to get the best possible deal. Where we have a disagreement is on the assessments of our mutual interests in making the next tactical move.⁴ If I was not mistaken, I said, Thieu seemed to feel that he has a problem with Vietnamese opinion while President Johnson has a problem with American opinion. I suggested that this is not the way to look at the matter. Both of us, the USG and the GVN, have the same urgent problem—to avoid a situation where American opinion will make it impossible to continue our commitment here.

4. This problem is totally unrelated to the changeover from one administration to another on January 20, I said. Mr. Nixon will be faced with it just as much as the present President, and Mr. Nixon had asked me to inform Thieu that he regards a round table, and any formula for speaking order based on two sides, as acceptable. He wants to get the preliminaries out of the way so that we can move to substantive negotiations immediately after January 20 if they have not started before that time.

5. I then said, further drawing on instructions, that Mr. Nixon’s reason for taking this stand is as follows: the deal in getting substantive negotiations started is so rapidly eroding American Congressional and public opinion that if we are to stay in Viet-Nam and continue to give the GVN our support, we simply have to move to substantive negotiations at once. We mean to continue to negotiate and fight at the same time, and to stand firm with the GVN on matters of principle, but the American public and Congress will not at this stage tolerate fighting alone when there is an opportunity to negotiate, and they have no patience with arguments over procedure that seem to them unreasonable. The Government of Viet-Nam must be careful not to drive the United States Government into a position where it is compelled to move ahead on its own.

6. I said as Thieu had seen from the President’s message, he supports the GVN completely on the principle that the meetings must be two-sided, but he points out that the arrangements that we propose protect their essentially two sided character. I called Thieu’s attention to one key passage of the letter in which President Johnson said that the situation in the Congress and in the American public “is as dangerous and volatile as I have seen it at any time in the last 4 years, or indeed in my 40 years in public service,” and I also read to Thieu the next following sentence which warns against a “real avalanche of criticism directed in part at the American Government, but far more acutely damaging to the image of your government in the American Congress and with the American people.” I also called special attention to the last two sentences of President Johnson’s personal message. For good measure I added a remark, which I characterized as a personal one, that Thieu will very much need Mr. Johnson’s support also after the President leaves office. I reminded him that the President has been a great friend of South Viet-Nam, and I said Thieu should be careful to keep him as a friend.

7. Because Foreign Minister Thanh (Saigon 245)⁵ had favorably referred to Secretary Rusk’s January 3 statement⁶ that procedural problems contain elements of substance, I stressed that Mr. Rusk likewise personally believes that it is imperative that we resolve the procedural impasse immediately, noting again that Mr. Rusk’s successor takes the same position. I then read to Thieu the key passage of the Secretary’s personal message to me including the sentence: “I hope the Vietnamese Government is not taking undue comfort from the fact that (the time being saved in Paris) may be well used on the battlefield, because the damage to their cause by adverse reactions here could be irreparable.”⁷

8. Next I turned to the decision that now needs to be made. I explained that we propose a package deal of which the most important element is to nail down the two-sided nature of the talks through the order of speaking AABB. The drawing of lots is to be by sides. There are to be no nameplates and flags, and we would accept the unmarked circular table at which they arrange themselves on their half and we arrange ourselves as we want on our half. I said this is what we propose to put up to the other side if they are not forthcoming at the next meeting.

9. I emphasized that we are not in any way receding from our statements of November 13 and November 27,⁸ that these are two-sided meetings. (I noted that the two-sides principle would also be maintained if we had to fall back on the ABBA order of speaking.) We will take measures to make clear that the table arrangement is essentially two-sided. This can be done in several ways. One way, which we had discussed earlier, involves leaving a space between our side and their side, by removing one chair at each mid-point or leaving it unoccupied. Another way is to put a pile of books or files of briefing papers on top of the table between our side and their side. Both of these things, and others as well, such as our addressing them as “your side” or speaking of “the other side,” would further mark the two-sided nature of the new meetings. I said the total package which I had described is certainly more two-sided than anything else. By Hanoi’s own admission the round table does not reflect their contention that the talks are four-sided. If they do not accept our package, we will have placed them on the defensive. At the present time, no matter what we may say publicly, it is we who are on the defensive. Hanoi wants to keep us in this position. We have to break out of it.

10. Winding up my presentation, I said it is now more than two months since the final bombing halt, over a month since the GVN delegation arrived in Paris, eight months since the talks began in Paris between the United States and DRV, and in the view of my government the time has definitely come when we must move to substantive matters on which we can together present a firm united front. The issue of the shape of the table is a liability for both of us.

11. Thieu, who had taken careful notes of my presentation, replied that I knew him to be no “super-hawk”. He recalled that as long as two years ago, he had outlined to me how he saw the evolution of the conflict, that he did not expect it to end with a clear military victory and that eventually there would have to be political settlement involving competition with the Communists, a competition which would be decisive. He had then said that the people had to be prepared for that contest and that that would take time. Many issues would have to be resolved, and one of them would be how to arrange the contest. Meanwhile he had steadily moved ahead, he publicly enunciated the principle of “one man, one vote.” This showed how far we had come in those two years. The Vietnamese people now understand that there will be peace without victory, that they must expect a difficult contest with the Communists, and that the US also wants and expects this.

12. The question, therefore, has become how to make South Viet-Nam politically strong enough to win that looming contest. In this situation, Thieu said, the battle of propaganda is of the utmost importance. This has become a crucial factor in the relationship between the GVN and its allies. If they will help to “push the enemy back,” both militarily and in the field of propaganda, they will make it possible for the South Vietnamese people to solve the political problems by themselves after the end of the war. This is not only a matter of substance, it is equally, and sometimes even more, a matter of appearances, of face, of prestige. Pushing back the enemy’s propaganda claims affects the morale of the people and of the troops, and the strength of the government depends on the support of the people and of the troops.

13. Thieu now turned to the question of the tables. Of course the shape itself is not important, he said. What is important is that the people must not get the impression that the NLF is accepted as an equal of the GVN in the forthcoming talks. If that should happen, it would have a very dangerous effect on morale in South Viet-Nam. If people feel that the North Vietnamese can get anything they ask for, that our side is giving ground before the enemy, that the enemy gets the table he wants by just holding out for it, what will be the effect? The people will come to feel that this may also happen in the issue of a coalition government, that our side may make concessions in such vital matters, too.

14. I interrupted the President. I certainly did not agree, I said, that the enemy has gotten everything he wants so far. He wanted Phnom Penh or Warsaw as meeting place, and he had to settle for Paris. He insisted that the bombing halt must be unconditional and then had to accept what are virtual conditions. He wanted nameplates and flags, and now he is ready to give in on them. In fact, we can get 90 percent of what we want in the matter of procedures. In negotiations one cannot expect to get 100 percent unless the other side surrenders. The order of speaking which we propose is clearly two-sided, and if we accept the round table we will have half the area and can arrange ourselves in such a way, and pile files at the ends of the diameter, so as to make still clearer that the talks are two-sided. I repeated that we stand by our public statements of November 13 and November 26. We intend to refer to the other side as “your side” or “the other side,” thus constantly emphasizing the two-sided character of the meetings. Again, I said the American people simply cannot understand why we should get hung up because of a dispute over a line on the table.

15. Thieu said the question is how all this can be explained to the Vietnamese people. He said he understood the problem with American opinion. I said I wasn’t sure that others understand it the same way. Some seemed to think it is just President Johnson’s problem. Actually the next President will have the same position. Thieu said our common problem is how to win the political war and how to develop a propaganda position that will support that war. I said there is no reason why we should be less effective than the Communists. The basic question that he and the Vietnamese have to ask themselves is this: How important is US support to them? Is it important? If it is, then they have to take American opinion into consideration.

16. Thieu said, of course American opinion is very important for American support is essential for a successful outcome, but he had to explain to his people. He said the time that was spent in November was well spent in preparing the ground to enable the GVN to send a delegation to Paris. If the GVN had rushed to Paris it would have created an exceedingly difficult position here. He said, “I don’t know how I could have governed the country. We needed that time.” I agreed that the delay in November was useful here, but it was not useful in the United States where it had a seriously adverse effect on the image of South Viet-Nam and its President. Thieu agreed. He also agreed when I said once more that we have mutual problem now and that we must solve it.

18. Thieu said he has a dilemma how to satisfy American opinion and at the same time maintain the morale of the Vietnamese people and armed forces in order to win in a political settlement. He again said the Vietnamese people had come a long way, but they had to be brought along gradually. He had to move carefully and skillfully in making the people face the need for political compromise. I said once more that Thieu need not feel that the American people wouldn’t support Viet-Nam on matters of basic principle. But they will not support continuation of the fighting when they see that an opportunity to negotiate is not being used. Thieu asked how we could be sure that the enemy would negotiate on matters of substance. I said the enemy would be forced to face up to questions of substance as soon as we got over this last remaining procedural hurdle. The negotiations will be long and arduous and complicated. We have to make a beginning now. Thieu said he agreed. I said: All right, what are we going to do?

19. Finally, Thieu said he wished to talk about the next move at our afternoon consultative meeting in the presence of his colleagues.⁹ He had asked for a report from Ambassador Lam in Paris on where we stand on the tables, speaking order and other matters after the last Vance-Lau meeting. He said he hoped we would be able to work up a package this afternoon.

Bunker

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN-Double Plus, Chronological Papers and other Misc. Material. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/HARVAN. Received at 10:15 a.m. Repeated to Paris for the Vietnam Mission.
2. See Document 276.
3. See footnote 2, Document 268.
4. In a conversation with a senior CIA officer in Saigon on January 9, Ky said that Thieu could not accept a round table without some sort of division, a point that Thieu would not concede. (CIA memorandum, January 9, attached to a memorandum from Helms to Rostow, also January 9; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 1 EE 9(a), 10/68-1/69, Post-Tet Political Activity) In a conversation on January 10, Ky’s Special Assistant Dang Duc Khoi told a CIA officer that he convinced Ky to try to persuade Thieu to accept the round table formula. (CIA memorandum, January 11; Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/IMO Files, Job 80-R01580R, Peace Talks)
5. See Document 273.
6. See Document 274.
7. See Document 276.
8. See footnote 8, Document 217 and footnote 3, Document 236.
9. The full report of the meeting was transmitted in telegram 592 from Saigon, January 11. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-January 1969)