274. Editorial Note
On January 6, 1969, Secretary of Defense Clifford met with representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the service secretaries, and nearly two dozen other Department of Defense officials. The Vietnam-related portions of the notes of the meeting drafted by R. Eugene Livesay, Staff Secretary to Clifford, read:
[Page 800]“2. Paris Talks.
“Mr. Clifford said that today marks about the 66th day that has passed since the President stopped the bombing of North Vietnam on 1 November. The President stated that he was willing to stop the bombing if prompt and productive talks started. So far there haven’t been any prompt or productive talks. In behalf of the Saigon Government we have submitted to Hanoi 9 proposed table shapes and in each case the table is divided into two sides. Each has been refused by Hanoi who insists that there are 4 rather than 2 representatives. They have, however, come forward with a proposal along the following lines. Let’s agree on a table which will, as soon as possible, eliminate the entire controversy—an unmarked round table. Mr. Clifford’s view is that it will be ultimately impossible to turn this proposal down, first because it does not divide the parties and second, it is so traditional and historical an approach to a conference. Hanoi has also suggested other plans to get the talks started which appear quite reasonable. Mr. Clifford is personally concerned about Saigon’s attitude. They continue to find reasons to delay. He feels that Hanoi’s new proposals are reasonable and he feels that when they are known, the world opinion will also think them so. Saigon proposes that they will have to submit them to their National Security Council and after that to their National Assembly. He thinks our hope of getting the talks started prior to 20 January is diminishing. He feels it is still important to get them started. If the present negotiating teams have the talks started we should be able to make headway more promptly. We would have the procedural basis for the talks out of the way and be able to proceed on substantive issues. He would assume that Mr. Nixon’s Administration would rather have the talks going with the procedural controversies behind them. There will be a whole new team, Harriman will be out and Lodge in, the current State team will be out and the new one in, and these cannot help but run into natural delays while they become acquainted will all the elements of the controversies. Mr. Clifford finds it difficult to know what to do about it.
“He has said publicly and privately that the talks should proceed along two lines—one between Hanoi and the U.S. on military matters and towards mutual disengagement and the second between Hanoi, the National Liberation Front and Saigon on political matters. There has been an editorial or two this past week saying that this would constitute a move on our part to ‘cut and run.’ There is nothing further from the truth. These two efforts could be conducted simultaneously. There is a clear difference between the goals of the Saigon and the U.S. Government. He doubts they would start negotiating until they are convinced that a mutual withdrawal of troops would occur. If we wait until a political settlement is reached he could see our troops in Vietnam for years.
[Page 801]“Mr. Clifford noted with interest and comfort that Mr. Rusk in his Friday [January 3] press conference emphasized that there was no personal feud between him and Mr. Clifford, as some have suggested. He wants everyone here to know that there is no personal animosity between the two. When the President consults with him and other advisors, there are differences of opinions expressed. If not, the President would be in the unfortunate position of not hearing various sides of issues. He emphasized that there is no personal animosity whatsoever.
“3. Military Situation in Southeast Asia.
“General McConnell reported that this past week that 104 U.S. were killed compared to 113 the week before. Total Allied killed is 270 and North Vietnamese/Viet Cong 1,957. This is a ratio of 7.25 to 1 in favor of the Allies. During the week ending 28 December 2,253 enemy were killed, a ratio of 6 to 1 in the Allies’ favor. We continue to destroy extremely valuable caches of food and ammunition. In November 1968, we found 62 caches, totaling 380 tons; in December, 65 caches totaling 311 tons; and so far in January 1969, 14 caches totaling 98 tons.
“With regard to the reconnaissance situation we have flown 453 tactical reconnaissance missions over North Vietnam since 1 November. A total of 108 have been fired upon with 4 aircraft lost. Of 77 drone missions flown during the same period, 10 were lost. This is not a bad ratio. Supplies continue to move down the North Vietnamese Panhandle and through Laos. The infiltration of personnel continues. We have identified 30,000 personnel on their way to South Vietnam from North Vietnam since 1 December. It appears that about 17,000 could reach the two Northern Provinces of South Vietnam between now and 1 April 1969. About 12,000 appear destined for the III Corps area and 3,500 for Kontum/Pleiku in Region V. The enemy continues to put antiaircraft sites into the Laotian Panhandle. We have identified 143 AAA threat areas. We think that there are some 85-mm guns there but have not confirmed their presence. The North Vietnamese still have 35 surface-to-air missile battalions, with 30 of the battalions still north of the 20th Parallel. We have indications of SAMs in Laos but no indications of radar capability.
“Yesterday the enemy attacked Qui Nhon tank farm. During the shelling and attack the enemy suffered 7 killed and 2 captured. We had 4 U.S. personnel wounded and 134,000 gallons of fuel destroyed. (At this point General McConnell discussed some other items listed below, after which the discussion returned to Vietnam, as follows.)
“General Walt said that morale continues high among the Marine Corps personnel in Vietnam. In December 1968, over 3,000 extended their tours of duty there. General McPherson said that the North [Page 802] Vietnamese and Viet Cong are beginning to zero in against our pacification actions. They are beginning to see its effects. General McConnell said they are beginning to send their own civilian teams into the various populated areas.
“Mr. Clifford said he asked the question last Monday [December 30] and will ask it again. Around 1 December we started getting full intelligence reports on an enemy winter-spring offensive. These reports were from unusually reliable sources. Dates were estimated for it to start and then the dates slipped. It is now 6 January 1969 and he is at a loss to know what has happened. Have they tried to get these attacks going and had them spoiled?
“General McConnell said that it is his personal opinion that they had tried to get these offensives going, particularly in the III Corps. They can’t get them underway because of their losses of matériel and food and the high casualties they are taking. General Abrams and his troops keep pounding the hell out of them. General McConnell personally feels that if they are going to attempt an attack before Tet that it would come about 20 January. Tet occurs around 15 February. However, he does not believe they will get it off the ground.
“Mr. Clifford said how are we doing with the bombing in Laos. General McConnell said that it is going well. We are not killing as many trucks but we have blocked the access routes. We have had a considerable number of secondary fires and explosions from the bombing. There have been over 3,800 secondary fires and 4,200 secondary explosions in the present campaign. He believes our bombing is quite effective. There is a lot of truck movement going on but it is mainly shuffling between supply points. Admiral Moorer said our analyses show that supply movements are running about 28 tons a day. With regard to the mounting of attacks, he would emphasize that the enemy does not have the kind of communications that we do. The authentic documents that we capture are probably plans rather than orders. He asked General Palmer if he wouldn’t agree. General Palmer said yes. General McConnell said that we also killed about 200,000 enemy last year and they haven’t recouped their losses. Dr. Brown said what they are saying is the documents that we capture are plans which they have been unable to execute.
“General Palmer said the enemy continues to overestimate his capabilities. He makes grandiose plans but they Don’t come to pass. He looks for the enemy to shift more and more to political type targets, particularly in III Corps, and do most of the fighting in I Corps.
“Mr. Clifford said that our casualties are following a hopeful trend. For the week ending 14 December, there were 222; 21 December—151; 28 December—113; and 4 January—104. We can all hope that they will continue downward.
[Page 803]“General McConnell reported that the car of the Minister of Education [Nguyen Van Tho] was attacked in Saigon. He was wounded and several other casualties occurred. The Minister was a strong anti-corruptionist and it is possible that the attackers may not have been Viet Cong.” (Johnson Library, Papers of Clark Clifford, Minutes of Secretary of Defense Staff Meetings, October 1968-January 1969)
At his January 3 news conference, Rusk had stated: “I don’t recall that I have ever wrestled on the rug with Secretary Clifford. The instructions which the President has sent to Ambassadors Harriman and Vance and to Ambassador Bunker go out with the full agreement of the Secretary of Defense and myself.” For full text of Rusk’s remarks, see Department of State Bulletin, January 20, 1969, pages 45-52.