Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969

278. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, January 10, 1968, 1500Z.

530. Ref Saigon 529.² Subj: Suggested Joint Instruction for Paris.

1. Following is the agreed text, confirmed by Foreign Minister Thanh, of what we undertook to submit to Washington for approval as joint instructions to US and GVN delegations in Paris, in an effort to resolve the procedural impasse:

2. Begin Text.

We have agreed on a two-stage strategy. We will make a serious effort to get the other side to agree to one of two proposals at the next following meeting. If that serious effort fails, and in agreement on the timing, we would fall back on the second stage proposal.

3. At the next US-DRV meeting in Paris to prepare for the new meetings, the US representative will first inquire whether the other side has given serious consideration to our most recent proposals (the final one of which was a circular table with baize strips, no flags and nameplates, and lots to decide which side is to begin under an AABB order of speaking, with two lots, possibly four, representing sides and not delegations, i.e. lots in two colors). Should the other side refuse to move, he may table two alternative proposals:

A. The circular table with baize strips, no flags and nameplates, but the other side to begin without any drawing of lots; or

B. Round or circular table with thin but visible line separating the two sides, no flags and nameplates, and drawing of lots by sides with two colors.

4. If efforts to obtain acceptance of these proposals prove unavailing, we would make a further proposal at a next meeting whose timing is to be decided by mutual agreement. At that meeting our representative would first make another attempt to get the other side to accept one of our previous proposals, and if this is unavailing, would propose the following fall-back position:

A. Unmarked circular table;

B. No flags or nameplates;

C. Order of speaking by sides, the side that begins to be decided by drawing from two lots, e.g. one red and one yellow. The drawing to be by a third party (possibly a French official), with the first lot drawn determining which side begins.

5. Should the other side accept our fall-back position, each of us will make a concerted effort to explain to our own public opinion and to world opinion that the agreed arrangements will be essentially two-sided. Should the other side not accept our fall-back position, we will make a concerted effort to explain to our opinion and to world opinion that we have proved our good faith and serious intent and that the other side is responsible for the failure of substantive talks to begin.

6. It is essential that complete security be preserved about the existence of a fall-back position. End Text.

7. In clearing foregoing with Thanh, Political Counselor elicited the following comments:

A. The terms “round or circular” in para 3B above are understood to mean that our representative will have flexibility to move from round to circular shape. (GVN had originally proposed round and we had argued in favor of circular shape.)

B. Absence of mention of the number of lots in paragraph 3 means that our representative should have flexibility enabling him to settle for four lots (of two colors) if this is helpful in obtaining agreement. This flexibility would not be given, however, if we go to the fall-back position in paragraph 4.

C. Most important, when we expressed concern that provision for timing of second meeting “by mutual agreement” might involve further delay, Thanh said it was his impression that Thieu was chiefly concerned that fall-back position not be used at the next meeting but that he would not expect to have a long interval between that meeting and the subsequent one if the positions outlined in paragraph 3 above do not result in agreement.³

Bunker

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN-Double Plus, Chronological Papers and other Misc. Material. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/HARVAN Plus. Received at 11:39 a.m. Repeated to Paris for the Vietnam Mission.
2. In telegram 529 from Saigon, January 10, the Embassy reported on that day’s consultative meeting to decide positions on procedural issues at the Paris negotiations. (Ibid.)
3. In telegram 4935 to Saigon and Paris, January 10, the Department instructed the delegation in Paris to proceed along the basis of the two-stage strategy, with the caveats that the marking system for lots would not necessarily be limited to colors and there would be no insistence that a third party draw these lots. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-January 1969) In a January 12 meeting with Lau, Vance proposed both the package proposals, first without the caveats and then with the caveats. Lau rejected the proposals as mere variations on a two-sided formula that the United States and Vietnam were attempting to impose upon the DRV and the NLF. (Telegram 434 from Paris, January 12; ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Paris Talks/Meetings, Paris Talks/Nodis/Paris Meetings Plus, Vol. I)