130. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to
President Johnson1
Washington, October 27, 1968,
midnight.
Mr. President:
With the indicated typographical changes, I gave the attached to
Dobrynin tonight. I told him
they were rough notes and an oral communication,
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not in any sense formal governmental message. On
the other hand, he should understand that they accurately reflected how
the President feels at the moment.
I then explained bluntly the President’s dilemma in having to take such a
major step at such a critical political period in the U.S. with nothing more from Hanoi or Moscow
than assent by silence. I indicated the importance that the President
attached to some positive indication from the Soviet Union that there
was reason to believe that it was Hanoi’s intent to honor the
understanding on the DMZ and the cities.
I said this was not a matter of our forces being able to protect
themselves, but it did relate to the full consequences in the U.S., in Vietnam, and on the world scene of
our having to resume the bombing.
Dobrynin indicated that he
understood the problem; that he did not know what positively the
authorities in Moscow might be able to say to the President at this
time, but he would solicit an early response, if a response could be
given.
Dobrynin then reviewed the time
factor involved if we were to hold to a first meeting on November 2.
I underlined the urgency of a response from Moscow, as he left.
Attachment
Washington, October 27,
1968.
Letter From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin3
The President has not made any decision on the discussions and does
not intend to do so until he has talked to the leadership in
Congress and appropriate committees and to the candidates. He also
desires to have whatever understanding is reached carefully
evaluated by Amb. Bunker and
Gen. Abrams and expects to
have their comments and recommendation in connection therewith. He
is going back to Amb. Harriman and Amb. Vance tonight and urge them to make abundantly clear
to the North Vietnamese the three points: that we expect the South
Vietnamese to be received at the first meeting on Saturday,4 and that we
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will expect, while these
discussions continue, that the DMZ
and the cities will be respected. He is very anxious to have this
clearly and succinctly repeated to the North Vietnamese so as to
avoid any charge of deception and any risk of misunderstanding.
Although he does not expect them to agree this is a condition or
reciprocal action, he does expect them to understand that Gen.
Abrams has been issued
rules of engagement and that a failure to respect either the DMZ or the cities, that would trigger
retaliation and disrupt the conference. The President feels it is
better this understanding take place in advance before the bombing
stops rather than have it stop and start again because of alleged
misunderstanding.
In addition, the President, in spite of the incidents around the
37-day pause, desires that your Government be informed of the
assumption on which he is proceeding so as to avoid any deception or
misunderstanding with respect to your government. He is proceeding
on these assumptions in the belief that Mr. Kosygin understands them and “has
reason to believe” that if the bombing stopped productive
discussions could promptly follow. Of course productive discussions
could not continue if the DMZ and
the cities were not respected.
The President is very anxious to have any comments or reaction Mr.
Kosygin may have to these
three points, in light of Mr. Kosygin’s letters of June and the other day (October
25).5 The President will
carefully weigh Mr. Kosygin’s
observations before making a decision.
