Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969

122. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Washington, October 25, 1968, 9 p.m.

Mr. President:

I received Amb. Dobrynin at my house at 5:00 p.m. today, October 25. After brief amenities, I told him that the President wished me to review with him, on the same basis that we had earlier met, his concerns about the present situation with respect to the Vietnam negotiations. I explained that the document I was about to give him was a personal oral communication reflecting what was on the President’s mind.

He read the document carefully (Tab A).

With respect to para. 1, he said that only he, Dobrynin, knows fully about the Paris negotiations and communications between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Tcherniakov, his DCM, knows half the story. No one else in the Embassy has the knowledge to speak with any authority on what is happening about Vietnam. When I pointed out to him that we had stories alleged to be from diplomatic sources in London, he said he could not assume responsibility for the Embassy in London. I said that I had no doubt about the correctness of his own behavior in this matter but we were confronted with a fact; namely, that stories were appearing, allegedly from Soviet sources; and we were confronted with a second fact; namely, that almost every newspaper man who came into my office told me that his favorite Soviet contact was telling him hopeful things about the negotiations and how peace was about to break out due to the role of the Soviet Union. He said that he had issued instructions to everyone in his Embassy not to talk about Vietnam. We ended by my underlining what the memorandum said; namely, that this was a problem for the President for the reasons indicated.

Dobrynin then turned to substance. He said that he found the memorandum very “disappointing.” He thought we were going back to matters which had long since been settled. As he understood the situation in Paris, there were three questions:

• —First, how we refer to the participation of those who would take part in the talks. On this matter we had raised a “new point” by want-ing to get into the secret minute that participation “would not involve recognition.” Everyone agreed that “recognition” was not involved.
• —Second, there was the question that the bombing cessation would be “unconditional.” He said this was not a matter, in his judgment, of great importance. It was not worth sacrificing the whole meeting on this matter. I interrupted to point out that my memorandum to him explained fully why we took the question of “unconditional” so seriously. Dobrynin said he now recognized that we attached great importance to the matter and would so report.
• —Third, there was the question of the date of cessation of the bombardment. He attached great importance to the fact that the North Vietnamese had set a date; namely, November 2. He could not understand why a few days one way or the other were so important to us when there were such great issues at stake. We have been arguing, he said, for two weeks over the question of 2 days.

I said to him it was not quite so simple. From our point of view, we had in good faith put in a proposal in mid-October. We had chosen “the next day” because of what they had said about beginning serious talks the day after the bombing cessation. (Dobrynin said this was a new idea to him. He had not known that they had mentioned the next day.) I went on to say that having geared ourselves to a final decision on the basis of what had been exchanged, Hanoi negotiators had then unleashed a great many “rabbits”: a four-power conference; a communiqué; a secret minute; several weeks “as a gap between the bombing cessation and the first meeting”; no conditions; etc. It was Hanoi’s behavior with respect to these matters which had deeply concerned the President, because they might reflect a lack of understanding of the “facts of life” and a lack of understanding of the seriousness of the problems that we faced in moving forward, especially at so sensitive a political time.

After some elaboration by me of the kinds of pressures represented by recent items on the ticker in our political life, Dobrynin said: “I now understand better. I thought that this message would take us back very far to where we began some months ago; but I should like to clear up one serious point: in communicating this message to my government, should I say that the President will not proceed with the Paris negotiations until he gets a response from the Soviet government on the question raised?” I said that it was my impression that the President had merely asked me to convey to Ambassador Dobrynin and his government his present concerns. The question he was asking, however, was a serious diplomatic question and I would seek an answer.

I then called the President and put the issue to him. The President said, no. I do not wish to be that hard. I do not wish to commit myself to holding up the Paris negotiations. I would wish to know the reaction of the Soviet government to this situation.

After this clarification, Dobrynin returned to the three points at stake in the Paris talks. He said: You and I can talk with brutal frankness and if I understand what you are telling me, it is that on one point you are prepared to compromise. That is, you are prepared to see the participants listed. But on two points you intend to hold firm; that is, on “without conditions” and time. At about this point I received a telephone call from Ben Read who told me that we would be prepared to tell the North Vietnamese in the context of the secret minute that we did not plan to use in formal statements the phrase “conditions.” I informed Ambassador Dobrynin of this fact and said that now we were prepared to compromise on one and a half of the three points. It was time for them to clear this underbrush away.

At this point Dobrynin volunteered the following. He had been privileged to get the reports from both our side and from the Hanoi delegation. He could attest from his personal knowledge that we had “many, many times” made clear the “facts of life.” I asked: “Are you, Ambassador Dobrynin, prepared to tell me that they understand the ‘facts of life’?” He said, “I can only say that from their reports to me as well as your reports to our people in Paris, you have expressed yourselves very clearly.”

At almost exactly 6:00 p.m., as Ambassador Dobrynin was about to leave, he received at my home a telephone call from Tcherniakov, his DCM. Tcherniakov reported that a message to the President from Kosygin had just arrived, on Vietnam. We consulted together as to where the message should be delivered. We decided to minimize the chances of a leak about our contact and Tcherniakov would deliver the message to my house. Dobrynin then dispatched his car to pick up Tcherniakov, and we settled down to await him. (Up to this point, contrary to his custom, Dobrynin did not have a Scotch. He accepted, while awaiting Tcherniakov.)

During the interval, Dobrynin raised with me the question of missile talks. Where do we stand? I said that while the matter was still on the President’s mind, he was much concentrated on the question of Vietnam. I then asked: “Was it true that the Warsaw Pact forces are moving out of Czechoslovakia?” He hastened to tell me that Bulgarian, Hungarian and Polish as well as some Soviet forces were moving out of Czechoslovakia. He added, gratuitously, that there never had been any German forces in Czechoslovakia—which, I take it, will be the Soviet mythology in the face of protests of the other occupying powers of Germany.

He indicated his view that it would be a good thing if we could get on with the missile talks.

I took the occasion of the break to say that, on a strictly personal basis, if I had any advice to give the leaders in Hanoi, it would be to go very rapidly for a definitive settlement in Southeast Asia once the new phase of talks opened, assuming we could surmount present problems. I recalled that it only took a month’s hard work in Geneva in 1954. He asked me why I thought there was urgency. I said there were two reasons:

• —First, there would be a wave of expectation and goodwill in the U.S. in the wake of a bombing cessation, quiet at the DMZ, quiet in the cities, and GVN participation in Paris. But he had to remember that this was a country which had a scar on its heart over Panmunjom. If the talks dragged on, there would be grave disappointment.
• —Second, as he could see from the polls, this country was undergoing a swing towards conservatism. This has happened before in our history, but it was clear that something like 60% of the people were for Nixon or Wallace. I could not predict what would happen if there was protracted frustration in the movement towards peace. It was my personal judgment, however, that there would be strong pressures to apply more military power in Vietnam rather than less.

I concluded by saying that in my quite objective judgment, it would be wise for the leaders of Hanoi to seize this moment and work with President Johnson towards the position he first outlined in his Johns Hopkins speech;² namely, a position in which an independent North Vietnam associated itself not with China but with the other countries of Southeast Asia in constructive efforts at development. Only in this way was North Vietnam likely to maintain its independence. (Dobrynin showed surprising interest and concentration as I made this point.)

Tcherniakov then came in with the attached letter to the President from Kosygin (Tab B).³

Dobrynin then gave me the following informal translation.

“Mr. President:

“Information we are receiving from official representatives of the United States as well as from the representatives of the DRV, shows that there is now beginning a very important movement in the U.S.-Vietnamese negotiations in Paris.

“Judging from this information, the position of the two sides on the cessation of bombardment, etc., is much closer. And the possibility of reaching an agreement on this question is quite real.

“By such an agreement we could lay the basis for a beginning of a breakthrough towards a political settlement of the Vietnam problem.

“If this possibility which now exists is missed—the development of events could go in a different direction.

“We are convinced that it is necessary that both sides show understanding and responsibility at this moment.

“In this connection, we should like to tell you quite frankly, Mr. President, that we are not completely convinced that the American side’s actions in Paris have proceeded from this particular understanding of the situation.

“We are concerned that the achievement of an agreement in Paris on the cessation of the bombing of the DRV and the beginning of subsequent political talks with participation of the DRV, NLF, U.S. and the Saigon administration could be torpedoed because of details of third importance which, in reality, do not have any significance.

“We would like to hope that the government of the United States would understand its responsibility in connection with the present negotiations in Paris and would not let these negotiations to break but would use them to open the way to a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem, based on the respect of the legitimate rights and hopes of the Vietnamese people which correspond with the interest of the people of the United States and the peoples of the whole world.”

On a wholly personal basis, I made the following observations to Dobrynin on this letter.

First, I would, of course, promptly communicate it to the President and to Secretary Rusk. Second, I found it good that on both sides there was an impulse to communicate when a matter of concern arose affecting the peace. Third, as my communication to him revealed, the President felt concerns of first importance in the light of the positions taken by North Vietnam, which Chairman Kosygin had described as third importance. The question of conditions and of timing were, from our point of view, major matters.

He said that the communication, which I had given him, and our discussion had made this clear and he would so inform his government.

As we went out to our respective cars, I looked at my watch and said: “Anatoliy, it is now midnight in Paris. You’d better get to work to clear up these issues of third importance.” He said he would get busy but he didn’t know what he could accomplish before the morning meeting in Paris.

Upon returning to my office, I then reported to the President that we had received the message from Kosygin and briefly summarized its substance.

The President instructed me that, after checking with Sec. Rusk, I should make the following points to Dobrynin.

“I have informed the President of Chairman Kosygin’s message and he wished me to convey to you immediately the following points:

1. The President is gratified that both the Chairman and he were thinking of same problem at the same time.

2. The President has tried and is trying to find answers to these problems but has been unable to persuade the other side to meet us on acceptable terms. Perhaps Chairman Kosygin can help. Perhaps he can try to help move us closer.

3. The President wishes you to know that the points I made to you this afternoon are, in effect, his response to Chairman Kosygin. They represent the anxieties on the President’s mind.

4. The President agrees with Chairman Kosygin that this is a critical phase. He would welcome any assistance the Chairman can give us in getting these issues solved. The President believes that, with the passage of a few more days, this possibility for progress might move away from us.”

After briefing Sec. Rusk and reporting the President’s four-point message, he suggested that I add the following additional point.

5. Therefore, the President believes that both sides should push these issues of third importance quickly aside and get on with the real business, which is making peace.

I then telephoned Ambassador Dobrynin and twice repeated these five points for urgent transmission to Moscow.

W.W. Rostow ⁴

Tab A

Washington, October 25, 1968.

The President wished me to review with you personally the situation in which we now find ourselves with respect to the Vietnam negotiation in Paris.

I recall that Sec. Rusk told Foreign Minister Gromyko that we would concentrate on certain aspects of the negotiation and that it would be helpful if you could concentrate on the problem of GVN participation.⁵ But on this occasion the President wished me to review all the issues with you and to solicit your reaction and that of your government.

Here are the things that are most on the President’s mind.

The situation is made very difficult by reports to the press apparently or allegedly from Soviet diplomatic sources, stating that we are very close to an agreement. These reports have the effect not only of generating an optimism which may not prove justified. They also create in those groups which are most strongly anti-Communist in our country, a sense that we are being led into some kind of trap. It would be extremely helpful at this delicate moment if Soviet diplomatic sources would not encourage the press in any particular direction and, in fact, if possible, not comment at all on the negotiation and its prospects.

2. Even more serious is this. The President is committed before his own people that a bombing cessation would not result in an increase in danger and casualties to US forces and those of our allies. It is for that reason that he has insisted that it is a fact of life that the bombing cessation could not be maintained if the DMZ were violated or the South Vietnamese cities attacked. We are not sure that Hanoi really understands how fundamental it is to the maintenance of a bombing cessation that these two operational conditions be observed. If we come to agreement in Paris, the President will issue standing instructions to General Abrams which would permit him to respond instantly to violations of the DMZ. The President and his colleagues are mutually committed to respond if the cities are attacked.

You know, Mr. Ambassador, that it has been and remains the President’s intent to deal with the Soviet Union on the basis of respect and trust and good faith.

He would like to be able to deal with Hanoi on the same basis; because making a stable peace in Southeast Asia is a most serious matter for all the nations of the area, including North Vietnam. It is, therefore, exceedingly important that the Soviet Government and the Government in Hanoi be quite clear that all three of the points we have made—including the facts of life about the DMZ and the cities—are firmly understood. If there is any doubt in the minds of the Soviet leaders on this point, it would be a matter of the utmost importance to us.

There could be no outcome worse for all our efforts than to have a resumption of the bombing and the break up of what we have tried to achieve since March 31.

3. The Ambassador should be aware of the cost imposed on us by Hanoi’s delay over minor matters such as a secret minute; its exact language; the form in which those participating in the conference will be mentioned. We tried to anticipate these problems by the your side-our side formula which, we believe, had advantages for everyone concerned. We tried to arrange it so that we moved very promptly from a bombing cessation into the substance of the search for peace. Now they move from a gap of the next day to a week. We have avoided in our conversations with North Vietnam the use of the word “conditions” by talking about “the facts of life.” Now we are losing day after day and coming closer to the election in the United States. If the bombing is stopped this close to a Presidential election, our people will debate for years whether it had an effect or no effect. A great divisive force will be let loose in this country. The President intends to proceed as he has thus far proceeded on Vietnam in a manner wholly free of domestic politics. He is not delaying the negotiation at the present time: Hanoi is delaying it by this haggle over words. The President has not expedited the negotiation nor will he expedite it on the basis of the election. He is taking each step on the merits. But you, Mr. Ambassador, should be aware of the burden imposed on the President by the tactics of the other side at this time.

4. So far as the substance is concerned, the phrase “without conditions” gives us grave difficulty. We take a minute between ourselves and another government seriously. We have not tried to force the word “conditions” on Hanoi. We do not intend to use the word “conditions” in governmental statements. But we do not wish to mislead Hanoi in substance—nor our own people—about the “facts of life.”

5. But the most important point the President wishes to leave with you, on which he invites your comment and that of your government, is the significance of all three of the points we have raised:

• —the participation of the GVN;
• —the maintenance of the DMZ;
• —and the absence of attacks on the cities.

There would be great danger to us all if there is any misunderstanding on these three points, if the negotiators in Paris should succeed in the days ahead in finding a formula.⁶

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Chlodnick File. Secret; HARVAN Double Plus; Literally Eyes Only for the President and Secretary of State.
2. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 394-399.
3. Not attached.
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
5. See Document 47.
6. In telegram 262321/Todel 1392 to Paris, October 26, the Department transmitted to Harriman and Vance a White House communication regarding the Rostow-Dobrynin meeting. It reads: “On the basis of Dobrynin’s reaction, there is a reasonable possibility that the Soviets will regard your present instructions as a fair balance and support that position. We do not know—and even doubt—if Soviet communications will permit Moscow’s influence to be brought to bear fully at the time of your morning session, taking into account the Dobrynin discussion. But Moscow may have sent a parallel general communication to Hanoi. In any case, we thought you should go into your morning session with this background and in reasonably good heart.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-October 1968)