262. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
Johnson1
Washington,
June
5, 1968, 10:32 p.m.
The attached letter to you from Kosygin will require careful consideration tomorrow.
The key points appear to be:
- 1.
- Kosygin’s statement that
“we have grounds to believe” that a full cessation of bombing
would “promote a breakthrough.”
- 2.
- Such a U.S. act would not involve “a loss for the interests of
their safety” or for U.S. prestige.
- 3.
- Soviet commitment that they have urged, in effect, “unofficial
contacts” on Hanoi.
- 4.
- The final reference to the “decisive significance” of the
“essence of the position” taken.
Obviously, we must come to grips with Moscow bilaterally to clarify these
matters.
But it could be a breakthrough.
It may, incidentally, explain the one week delay in Paris.2
Attachment
Letter From Chairman Kosygin
to President Johnson4
Dear Mr. President:
There is hardly a necessity to speak in detail of how crucial is the
present moment when, at last, direct official contacts between the
representatives
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of the USA
and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam have been established. In
our firm opinion the beginning official talks between highranking
representatives of the USA and DRV
in Paris present a real possibility to find a way out of the
situation which has developed in Viet-Nam with the aim of halting
the many-years-old and bloody war being conducted there. I think you
will agree that the peoples of the entire world expect positive
results from the American-Vietnamese meetings in Paris since to a
large extent not only the restoration of peace in the region of
Indo-China but also the relaxation of international tension as a
whole depend on the outcome of these meetings.
According to information which comes to us both from represent-atives
of the DRV and from representatives
of the USA thus far progress has not been attained at the talks in
Paris. And is it possible seriously to expect such progress under
conditions when the U.S.A. continues the bombardment of a
significant part of the territory of the Democratic Republic of
Viet-Nam? We have more than once already expressed to you personally
and to your representatives our opinion that a full and
unconditional cessation by the United States of bombardments and
other acts of war against the DRV
can open the path to peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam. And if the
Government of the DRV gave its
agreement to the beginning of official talks with representatives of
the U.S.A. even before a full cessation of bombings of the territory
of the DRV, that does not signify at
all that it is possible to hope for further progress of the talks
without such a cessation. These bombardments and other acts of war
by the U.S.A. against the DRV are
now the main obstacle hindering movement forward at the meetings in
Paris.
I and my colleagues believe—and we have grounds for this—that a full
cessation by the United States of bombardments and other acts of war
in relation to the DRV could promote
a breakthrough in the situation that would open perspectives for
peaceful settlement. Such a step cannot bring about any adverse
consequences whatever for the United States neither in the sense of
a loss for the interests of their safety nor even in the sense of a
loss for their prestige. For a great world power the ultimate
positive result of one or other act outweighs many times all other
considerations to which an excessively exaggerated meaning is
sometimes given. We decided, Mr. President, candidly to express to
you these considerations, in view of the great significance that a
peaceful settlement of the Viet-Nam problem and an end to the
bloodshed would have. One would like to hope that opportunities that
are presenting themselves will not be missed.
I would like to express one more thought. Mr. A. Harriman expressed the wish that
on our part some assistance be given to the
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establishment of unofficial contacts between
the delegations of the U.S.A. and DRV in Paris and that this point of view be brought to
the cognizance of the Viet-Nam representative. I take this
opportunity to advise you that we brought this to the cognizance of
our Vietnamese friends since we for our part consider that all forms
of contact between the sides must be used. It is important that this
serve the success of the talks. But you, Mr. President, cannot but
agree that the forms of contacts by themselves decide nothing. The
decisive significance lies with the essence of the position which is
taken by one side or the other.
Respectfully,
