Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

77. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson¹

Washington, February 16, 1966, 5:30 p.m.

Non-Military Organization for Vietnam—in Saigon and in Washington

1. The Ambassador

Lodge has weaknesses and blind spots, but their effects can be minimized by proper staff support. He has outstanding qualities which are not easily replaced. They make him a very valuable man in Saigon. He is 64 and he talks of resignation when he is tired or irritated. Since we have to accept the risk of bothering him on the big things, he should be humored on the little ones

His qualities are these: First and foremost, he is a determined, perceptive, and disinterested servant of the President and the Secretary of State. He has no axes left to grind. This direct and disciplined loyalty is of great importance. It means that he always backs up a clearly explained decision and never tries to undercut. He can be less helpful when he does not know just what is wanted, but that is only to say that we need to be sure to keep him fully informed. On matters marked as truly sensitive, I believe him to be reasonably discreet.

Second, Lodge has a clear and strong—if somewhat simplified—view of the war. He knows and respects its military aspects, but he also knows that it is fundamentally a political and social struggle. He is receptive to good advice when it comes from men he trusts. He gives strong men wide discretion.

Third, Lodge is trusted and admired by the Vietnamese. He is popular because he stood up to the hated Diem (this may or may not have been wise as a matter of U.S. policy, but Diem had few Vietnamese friends in his last days—he had become hated, and his family more so.) He is respected because of his personal dignity and courtesy (he has never affronted their pride as Max Taylor unintentionally did.) If he does not make full use of his influence, he does at least work hard for continuity, and he avoids the error of forcing splits by undue pressure. He is entitled to much of the credit for the relative stability and good sense of the Ky Government.

Fourth, Lodge has unusual human rapport with the U.S. military. In a country where fully 90% of all U. S. resources are under Westmoreland, this easy relationship is of great importance. It is not automatic. When Lodge was first appointed, in 1963, one important point in his favor was that he was presumed to be able to get along easily with his old friend General Paul Harkins. In fact, the two men did not get on at all, because they had radically different views of the real situation in Vietnam. (Lodge may not have been right, but Harkins was surely wrong, and his prolonged tenure was one of our major mistakes.)But now, with Westmoreland, all is changed. The two men see eye to eye on all fundamentals. They like each other as well. And now Lodge gets the full advantage of the fact that he did well in World War II, and knows the Armyʼs ways. He gets much more cooperation from them than he would if he began with a chip on his shoulder, as too many civilians do.

Fifth, Lodge has the real—if exasperated—affection of nearly all of his staff. His weaknesses can make him a very difficult boss, but his dedication and decency come through.

Finally, Lodge understands the care and feeding of important visitors, especially Congressmen and U.S. newspapermen. He spends too much time on this—as he does on diplomatic luncheons—but he does it well, and he is right about its importance.

His weaknesses are equally real.

• First, he has little taste for the hard work that lies between a general assertion of purpose and a concrete administrative achievement. The only things in Saigon that he really administers are the arrangements for comfort and security at his own house (they are excellent). He does not manage the U.S. program himself, and he does not insist that others do it. Because he does not watch details, he thinks many things are easier than they are (although he is more realistic today than he was a few months back).
• Second, his energy level is not high. He can spend two days on a single cable, with time out for social activity and a daily swim and a couple of diplomatic visits.
• Third, he gravely underrates the importance of economics. The subject bores him, and he does not make it easy for his senior economic advisers to press their concerns. As a result, the voice of the U.S. is slow and weak at the highest levels on what is now a problem of the first urgency.
• Fourth, Lodge frets over trivia. Many great men have this weakness, but Lodge is not a great man, and he does not have the strength to spare. Seen against the stakes of Vietnam and the sacrifices of the fighting men (not the Saigon staffs), the matter of wives is a small one, at least for a man whose wife can take it, but it is never out of his mind and seldom out of his talk. He is loyal to the Rusk-Lodge understanding, but he frets about it. And the same characteristic shows in many other smaller matters.

This combination of qualities and defects makes Lodge the very model of a man who needs staff support. He needs a chief of staff; he needs a handholder on political affairs; he needs a second-level factotum; and he needs a bright young personal assistant—and he needs the sympathetic understanding of all the top men on the American team. The wonder of the matter is that with the arrangements that the President has successfully pressed upon him, Lodge will now have exactly this kind of help (with a single exception noted below).

The first indispensable man in this enterprise is William Porter. Porter is shrewd, cool, strong, experienced and determined. He understands the war. He is admired throughout the mission. Lodge trusts him entirely. He knows and is known by Washington. He likes and understands management.

The second indispensable man is Westmoreland—and if I put him second it is only because he has now set the shape of MACV so firmly that any successor will be guided by many of his standards. Westmoreland has made 200,000 Americans understand that they must make the Vietnamese be glad of their presence and not hate it. He has also made his large and strong-minded military command remarkably responsive to the needs of half a dozen other agencies, all of which would be gravely hampered if MACV should give them only grudging support. Finally, Westmoreland has never neglected the critically important task of persistent effort to strengthen the forces of the GVN (in this last respect his officers are not all as determined as he, and if he were replaced by a more single-minded U.S. fighting man, the future of the GVN forces could become bleak).

The appointment of Porter to be Chief of Staff for all aspects of pacification/rural construction is a major forward step. Several valuable secondary changes are already planned. The most important will put Philip Habib and Sam Wilson on Lodgeʼs small floor of the revamped chancery, in place of Porter (who will have a staff of his own) and Chadbourn (transferred). The more gently these changes are handled, the less Lodge will fret—and the less the Vietnamese will gossip about “coups” among the Americans (the rapid turnover among senior Americans—especially in AID—has been a topic of Vietnamese talk). But the fact of change is more important than its manner, and the most important thing is speed. Lodge will fuss about all this until it is done. Then he will like it very much.

The one remaining weakness in the Saigon staff is in Economic advice and resource management. No easy remedy is at hand. The present head of USAID is Charles Mann, and he is the best officer to hold this assignment so far. Moreover, he has an excellent economic deputy, Roy Wehrle, who is fully competent to give good advice both to Mann and the Ambassador. But neither Mann nor Wehrle is really able to make Lodge listen. Economics irritate him, and so do Mannʼs teutonisms and Wehrleʼs dire warnings (though the latter are fully justified). It would be a mistake to change Mann now (he has many virtues and would be hard to replace), but Wehrle leaves in June and it is a matter of great urgency to find an economist to replace him who will have the tact and rank and persistence to make Lodge do what only he can do—keep a steady and top priority pressure on the GVN. Meanwhile in this field (unlike others) there is a continuous need for prodding from Washington.

2. Organization in Washington

The best way to attack this problem is to look at it first from Saigon.

The new arrangements in Saigon make a triangle. At the apex is Lodge. He is the Presidentʼs representative and the senior American in Vietnam. In particular, he is charged with political advice both to Washington and to the GVN. He has direct access to the President, but he normally communicates through the Department of State. The staff agency which supports him is the Far Eastern Bureau of the State Department. He is currently well served.

One line of the triangle goes from Lodge to Westmoreland. West-moreland is the top military commander and he has a special responsibility to the President through the Secretary of Defense (the charts make it more complicated, but on major policy matters this is how it really is and how Westy thinks of it). He is responsible for U.S. military operations and for military advice to Washington. On day-to-day matters, he gets his support from CINCPAC and from the JCS. He too is well served.

Porter will now be at the end of the other side of the triangle. He will get overall guidance from Lodge and from the President. He will have local authority over agency heads. But who will give him prompt executive support in Washington? That man does not now exist. It cannot be done by any one agency alone—not AID and not the State Department; it cannot be done by a Committee of Assistant Secretaries; it cannot be done by the President himself; it certainly cannot be done by the Pentagon (though all of these means have been tried at one time or another).

My own belief is that we need a Director of Non-Military Operations in Vietnam (DINOMO?) appointed by the President and responsible to him through the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense together—with advice from the Director of CIA, the Director of USIA, the Administrator of AID. This officer should keep his military flank clear with DOD and his diplomatic and policy line clear with State—but as far as possible he should stay out of both areas. His responsibility should be for non-military operations only. He should have the right of direct communication with Porter, and he should be charged with assuring that no needed action is delayed, for any reason, without a prompt report to the President. He should be an officer who prefers action to excuses and management to contemplation. He should count himself successful when both the President and Porter are happy. He will not be successful at once.

I recommend that the President request the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and myself to prepare and submit a list of candidates for this appointment before the close of business on Friday, February 18.²

McG. B.³

Yes⁴

No

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 20. Secret. In a covering memorandum to the President, Bundy indicated that he had written this memorandum on the airplane, presumably while returning from his Asian trip following the Honolulu Conference. (Ibid.) Bundy provided an interim report on his visit to Saigon, during which he discussed “strengthened administrative arrangements with Embassy officers,” in a memorandum to the President on February 11. (Ibid.)
2. In his covering memorandum, Bundy indicated that this procedure was deliberately designed to give Johnson “a Presidential result,” since both Bundy and McNamara had reluctantly concluded that “this operation cannot be managed through State Department channels alone.”
3. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
4. The President checked this option and wrote: “This is excellent.”