Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

76. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Burma¹

Washington, February 16, 1966, 11:38 a.m.

267. You should seek appointment with DRV Consul General to deliver following aide-memoire:

Begin Text:

1. The USG has taken note of the Aide-Memoire delivered to American Ambassador in Rangoon on January 31, 1966.²

2. The USG fully respects the basic rights of the Vietnamese people to peace, independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, as set forth in the Geneva Accords of 1954. As the USG has repeatedly said, it believes that these Accords, together with the 1962 Accords concerning Laos, are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia or for negotiations looking toward a peaceful settlement.

3. The USG has repeatedly stated and hereby reaffirms that it is prepared to withdraw its forces from South Viet-Nam when peace is restored. The US has never stated that it must be the sole judge of when this condition exists. Plainly, the restoration of peace requires the adherence of all concerned to the essential provisions of the Geneva Accords dealing with the regroupment of opposing forces to their respective areas, and dealing with the obligations that the two zones shall not be utilized for the resumption of hostilities or in the service of an aggressive policy. It is the view of the USG that the DRV, in introducing armed forces, military equipment, and political cadres into South Viet-Nam, has breached the provisions of the Accords, and has thus made necessary the actions undertaken by the USG in support of the legitimate right of the Republic of Viet-Nam to self-defense. The withdrawal of US forces would be undertaken in the light of the actions taken by the DRV in this regard, and would necessarily be subject also to the existence of adequate measures of verification.

The USG seeks no military bases of any kind in South Viet-Nam and has no desire whatever to retain its forces in South Viet-Nam after peace is secured.

4. With respect to the third of the DRVʼs four points, the US takes note that Chairman Ho Chi Minh in his letter of January 29³ described the program of the NLF as seeking “to achieve independence, democracy, peace and neutrality in South Viet-Nam and to advance toward peaceful reunification.” If this is all that is intended when it is stated that the affairs of the South Vietnamese be settled “in accordance with the program of the NLF,” the third point would not be an obstacle to negotiations.

However, it appears that in referring to the program of the NLF the DRV may contemplate that the NLF arbitrarily be accorded integral participation in a coalition government or be accepted as the “sole genuine representative of the entire South Vietnamese people” prior to, and without regard to, an election. If this is what is meant by the third point, we would consider it in contradiction of the very objectives specified above, and quite without warrant in the Geneva Accords of 1954.

It remains the essence of the USG view that the future political structure in South Viet-Nam should be determined by the South Vietnamese people themselves through truly free elections. The USG is categorically prepared to accept the results of elections held in an atmosphere free from force, intimidation or outside interference.

5. In the light of the foregoing and to make clear our understanding of a possible basis for discussions leading to a peaceful settlement, we submit for consideration of the DRV the following:

• Point I—The basic rights of the Vietnamese people to peace, independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity are recognized as set forth in the Geneva Accords of 1954. Obtaining compliance with the essential principles in the Accords is an appropriate subject for immediate, international discussions or negotiations without preconditions. Such discussions or negotiations should consider, among other things, appropriate means, including agreed stages, for the withdrawal of military and quasi-military personnel and weapons introduced into South Viet-Nam or North Viet-Nam from one area to the other or into either area from any other outside source; the dismantling of any military bases in either area, and the cancellation of any military alliances, that may contravene the Accords; and the regrouping and redeployment of indigenous forces.
• Point II—Strict compliance with the military provisions of the Geneva Accords must be achieved in accordance with schedules and appropriate safeguards to be agreed upon in the said discussions or negotiations.
• Point III—The internal affairs of South and North Viet-Nam must be settled respectively by the South and North Vietnamese peoples themselves in conformity with the principles of self-determination. Neither shall interfere in the affairs of the other nor shall there be any interference from any outside source.
• Point IV—The issue of reunification of Viet-Nam must be decided peacefully, on the basis of free determination by the peoples of South and North Viet-Nam without outside interference. End Text.

6. In delivering text, you should take care not to go beyond its terms in providing explanation to any questions asked. Naturally, we would be most interested in any comments he may care to make then or at future date.

7. FYI: Bundy will bring to Baguio some additional material for your background in case of future contacts. However, for time being, we do not wish to be drawn into extended oral discussion which might be misunderstood. End FYI.

8. In arranging appointment, you should avoid any impression of undue urgency.⁴

Ball

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by Ball and Bromley Smith, and approved by Rusk. Also printed in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 154–156.
2. See footnote 6, Document 51.
3. Printed in The New York Times, January 29, 1966.
4. In telegram 433 from Rangoon, February 19, Byroade reported that he presented the aide-memoire to DRV Representative Vu on February 18, who responded that because the United States had resumed the bombing, it was “inappropriate to continue our contacts.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET; printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 28–29) In telegram 436 from Rangoon, February 21, Byroade transmitted an aide-memoire from Vu, dated February 19, explaining why the DRV was discontinuing contact. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET; printed in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 29–30)