Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

78. Memorandum From George Reedy to President Johnson¹

Washington, February 17, 1966.

1. The unfortunate aspect of the current public debate on Viet Nam is less the impact it is having on Peking and Hanoi than the effect that it is having on the American people. Persons are being swept by the force of the debate into categories where they do not belong and if the current trend continues, deep divisions will result which will hamper the President in the conduct of foreign policy and perhaps make it impossible to act intelligently.

2. At the present time, the debate is being conducted in the tone of a “hawks” and “doves” clash with the “hawks” convinced that anyone outside of their ranks is a “chicken” and the “doves” convinced that anyone outside of their ranks is a “vulture.” In reality, this is a very subtle problem with many fine shadings of emphasis and it is probable that except for the extremists on both sides it would be difficult to find a clear cut position that commands a national majority on all major points. In a situation like this, however, people who are in between find themselves pushed into one camp or the other. And it really does not matter which camp wins—because either way, the Nation loses.

3. The current debate has also, to some extent, limited the Administrationʼs freedom of action. At the present time, the “doves” are having their innings and therefore the Administration is being presented to the public as a “hawk.” Somewhere along the line the “hawks” will come up to bat and at that point the scene will shift and the Administration will look like a “dove.” Nothing good can come from this as in either role the Administration is forced on the defensive and distracted from its primary purpose—finding an honorable way to close out the situation in Viet Nam.

4. In this case, the situation is not helped by the unanimity among the Presidentʼs advisors. This is an honest unanimity but to the public it presents the picture of a President who is listening only to advice from a group of men who are so deeply involved themselves in an enterprise that they have no alternative other than to agree with him. It would, of course, be foolish to create an artificial discord among competent and conscientious men where it does not, in fact, exist. But it would be reassuring to the public if it were thought that the President was giving a real audience to the more respectable and responsible voices of dissent.

5. The testimony of General Gavin and George Kennan before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee² offers an excellent example of men being placed in categories of opinion which they do not really hold. In reality, they approached the issue from a moderate standpoint and in a sensible tone. They made clear their uneasiness and expressed some opinions that are worth considering. They did not indulge in any personalities or vituperation. Yet, they have become the darlings of the “doves” who are anxiously hoping that the Administration will blast Gavin and Kennan and thus drive them into the “dove” camp, which now lacks really respectable leadership.

6. It would appear (although it is difficult to discern amidst the current partisan bickering) that the Gavin-Kennan concern really centers about one point—whether the operation in Viet Nam is being conducted properly as an integral part of an overall United States world strategy. It is possible that they have a point, in which case somebody should listen to it quietly and reflectively and come up with a reasoned evaluation. It is possible that they donʼt have a point—and if this could be demonstrated to them in a calm, orderly atmosphere, they would be removed as a potential rallying point for the “doves.” In either case, however, neither one of them has said anything unforgiveable and both are responsible, reputable men to whom any President can turn for advice without demeaning himself.

7. It would have a good effect upon the country if the President were to invite Gavin and Kennan to the White House for a quiet, but lengthy and thorough, luncheon conference.³ It may be that out of such a conference there could come a continuing arrangement in which their advice would be available to the Government on a continuing basis. If this could be arranged, it would have the following benefits:

a. They might have some thoughts that are well worth having.

b. They might have even better thoughts if they had continuing, day-to-day contact with the realities of the situation.

c. The country would have an example of a President seeking, on a personal basis, advice from men of demonstrated independence of thought.

d. The “doves” would lose a rallying point that could present some difficulties.

e. The frantic tone of the present debate would be ameliorated and Viet Nam could be discussed in a calmer atmosphere.

1. Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Ex CO 312. No classification marking. Reedy served on Johnsonʼs Senate and Vice Presidential staffs and was Press Secretary to the President from March 1964 to July 1965.
2. See Document 64.
3. The President did not meet with either Kennan or Gavin during 1966. (Johnson Library, Presidentʼs Daily Diary)