130. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1

3343. Ref. Embtel 4453.2

1.
Press here giving wide play to Kyʼs blunt remarks to journalists in Cantho, particularly his statement that he expects his government to stay in power for another year, until national assembly elected in 1967. Kyʼs plain talk in this regard, and his statement that constituent assembly will not be transformed into national assembly but kept only for drafting constitution, touch on two key issues with Buddhist militants. We can understand that Ky may wish to take strong position privately for negotiating purposes to counter Buddhist militant pressure. However, his placing it on public record cannot but be red flag to latter and will undoubtedly render their truce with GVN even more fragile than it already is. His comments to Buu (Embtel 4412, para D)3 reinforce our concern on this score. Moreover, such statements by Ky get wide international play and add to existing skepticism in international circles regarding Kyʼs intentions to carry through with elections.
2.
You should get these points across to Ky, making it clear that we are not taking any position regarding life of his government or of constituent assembly, but simply arguing for his not complicating political picture by ill-advised public statements.
3.
We are also concerned at Mission spokesmanʼs comment on Kyʼs statement to effect it not unexpected, plus background elaboration (Embtel 4449, paragraph 3).4 Spokesman should not comment on matters which are clearly sensitive issues in way suggesting U.S. has taken position on them. If queried on Kyʼs statements, Department spokesman will reply: “GVN and representatives from leading political and religious groups in Viet-Nam outlined a program on April 15 for a return to civilian government. We assume that as they proceed step by step a schedule will be worked out which will include, among other things, the matter of governmental succession. Obviously, this is a matter for decision by the Vietnamese.”
Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 VIET S. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Miller and approved by Unger.
  2. Dated May 7. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)
  3. Dated May 6. Paragraph D reported that Ky confided to Tran Quoc Buu that he now realized that the Buddhists were the “‘dirtiest of all’ and that their actions ‘lead to Communist takeover’ and he intends to crush them.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LII)
  4. Dated May 7. (Department of State, Central Files, PPB 9–5 VIET S)