129. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk1
SUBJECT
- General Taylorʼs Memorandum of April 27 on Negotiation Blue Chips
General Taylorʼs memorandum2 is an excellent summary of the problems of a negotiating sequence and particularly of the problem of determining what we would accept in return for a cessation of bombing the North. You may recall that this issue was extensively reviewed last March and April, when Max Taylor himself was here on consultation and we had a fairly thorough discussion of the problem.
Essentially, the issue has always been whether we would trade a cessation of bombing in the North for some degree of reduction or elimination of Viet Cong and now North Vietnamese activity in the South or a cessation of filtration from the North, or a combination of both. In his memorandum, Max argues for combining cessation of bombing and GVN/US offensive military operations in the South, as a trade for a complete cessation of VC/NVA incidents and military operations in the South. He would then trade cessation of infiltration against our stopping any further increases in our forces, and move thereafter to reciprocal withdrawals and finally to the necessary solutions, somehow absorbing the remaining Viet Cong into the life of the South on some amnesty basis.
The present Taylor proposal has the great virtue of simplicity and ready verification. At the same time, it might permit the VC/NVA forces to form solid hunks of territory in the South and reinforce them so that they became major bargaining counters for an NLF explicit role in government. Moreover, it would be most difficult under these circumstances to define exactly what the GVN was free to do about extending its writ in the countryside.
For these reasons, I have myself been more inclined to an asking price, at least, that would include both a declared cessation of infiltration and a sharp reduction in VC/NVA military operations in the South. Even though we could not truly verify the cessation of infiltration, the present volume and routes are such that we could readily ascertain whether there was any significant movement, using our own air. Moreover, DRV [Page 372] action concerning infiltration would be a tremendous psychological blow to the VC and would constitute an admission which they have always declined really to make.
Whichever form of trade might be pursued if the issue ever arose—as it conceivably might through such nibbles as the present Ronning effort—I fully agree with General Taylor that we should do all we can to avoid the pitfalls of ceasing bombing in return simply for a willingness to talk. Yet we must recall that during our long pause in January, we pretty much agreed among ourselves that as a practical matter, if Hanoi started to play negotiating games that even seemed to be serious, we would have great difficulty in resuming bombing for some time. This was and is a built-in weakness of the “pause” approach. It does not apply to informal talks with the DRV, directly or indirectly, on the conditions under which we would stop bombing, nor does it apply to possible third country suggestions. As to the latter, I myself believe that our past record sufficiently stresses that we could stop the bombing only if the other did something in response. Thus, I would not at this moment favor any additional public statement by us, which might simply highlight the issue and bring about the very pressures we seek to avoid.
As you can see, these reactions are tentative as to the form of the trade, but quite firm that there must in fact be a trade and that we should not consider another “pause” under existing circumstances. If we agree merely to these points, I think we will have made some progress. But it may also be highly useful to get Ambassador Lodgeʼs thinking on the Taylor form of trade versus some alternative such as I have suggested. I agree with Max that this would be a useful topic to discuss with Lodge while he is here, and we should at the same time inform him fully on the Ronning effort, which directly involves this issue.
I am sending a copy of this memorandum to Walt Rostow for his personal use, and also to Mr. Ball and Ambassador Johnson.
- Source: Johnson Library, Warnke Papers, McNaughton Papers, McNTN II. Secret; Nodis.↩
- Document 127.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩