Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

131. Telegram From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson in Texas¹

Washington, May 9, 1966, 1515Z.²

CAP 66279. Before this next weekʼs Vietnam meetings and discussions with Lodge, here are my own private views on the uphill task of galvanizing the civil side. If I have not been much in evidence, it is because I have been trying to operate full tilt—as a flood of traffic and resulting anguished screams will attest.

This job badly needs doing,³ because in a word the civil side is a mess. The reasons are illuminating. First and foremost, our emergency military buildup simply preempted most of the port space, resources, and manpower in Vietnam, Westy has the big battalions and the top priority, while the civil side makes do with what is left.

Second, unlike our largely self-contained US military effort, the civil side has to work through a weak and apathetic GVN. Nor would I urge otherwise. Suggestions that we just take over Vietnam miss the very purpose of the exercise, though a lot more can be done behind the scenes. But we have to recognize the limits of the possible in a country divided and torn by war, where the Governmentʼs writ is ignored in over half the countryside.

Third, our US civilian agencies (unlike our military) are just not geared up to wartime emergency operations. Soldiers go where they are told, but about three key civilians turn us down (funny how they develop physical disabilities) for every one who accepts. Our best FSO candidate for Economic Counselor in Saigon suddenly turns out to have diabetes. AID, which has the biggest job, is in the worst shape—it was never set up to handle emergencies of this sort.

Fourth and least, Lodge is no manager, and has little interest in or knowledge of the civilian side. He has failed to arbitrate civil US military operations. Let me warn candidly that his grandiose proposals—e.g. a whole PX/commissary system for ARVN officers and civil servants—just wonʼt fly. If I sound bitter, I just pushed the town hard on the new land reform program Lodge so enthusiastically endorsed till I found it so vague and half-formed that it will require complete redoing.

This is not a tale of woe. Porter and I can and will bring order out of chaos on the civil side—and maintain good relations with Lodge in the process. But as your man on Vietnam, I owe you a candid picture of what Iʼve discovered in a month on the job.

As I see it, our continuing military buildup will prevent disaster but cannot guarantee a win in a largely “political” war. It buys us time, and it may convince Hanoi that it canʼt win and better negotiate. But at present the enemy is just about matching our own buildup.

Meanwhile our military buildup is generating some quite dangerous side effects. First is the inevitable anti-Americanism induced by an ever more visible US presence. Adding to this is the growing pressure of inflation, created primarily by our own buildup. We could end up sinking this feeble country under our weight.

I am 100 per cent behind the decisions we have taken. There was no other sensible option in 1964–1966. But what I see as needed is a better balance between a military effort of $15 billion (added cost only) and a civil effort of only $500 million odd in FY 1966. You emphasized this “second war” at Honolulu, but Porter and I can point to mighty little progress as yet. Of course the recent political unrest—which will continue—got in the way. But it only points up the need for measures to generate more popular commitment to our side.

The papers coming to you via Walt Rustow contain my recommendations. But they naturally lack the real flavor of my private view.

A. Lodge must be told to insist on a better balance between military and civil needs. He must back Porter in getting port space, cadging MACV resources, and competing for a bigger share of GVN manpower.

B. We must borrow heavily from our own military till we get the civil side rolling under its own steam. Crudely put, borrowing five percent of Westyʼs resources might beef up Porterʼs effectiveness by 50 percent. McNamara is eager to help, but the gun-shy civilians in Saigon are reluctant to ask (here is where Lodge comes in). And it must be effective help. In February MACV agreed to provide aid with 1800 tons a month of in-country airlift, but less than a third was used because it wasnʼt available when USAID wanted it.

C. We must come to grips with inflation before it undermines our whole effort. I am trying to overscare everyone in town right now, because weʼve lost six months in grasping this nettle and I know that it will take months more in lead time before results will show.

D. To flood the country with goods requires that we get them in through the ports, warehoused, and delivered in-country. McNamara licked his port congestion problem partly by giving military cargo priority and preempting port space. He was right, but it didnʼt make the civil side any easier.

E. As you well know, Iʼm cast in a role where Iʼll have lots of friendly fights with McNamara to cadge resources and elbow the military. Unless we can further limit the inflationary impact of the military buildup, I may have to argue for limiting it. There is a legitimate case that we may be robbing Peter to pay Paul.

F. Finally, given all the limits within which the civil side must operate, we must do first things first and do them more effectively before building monuments. I have on my desk many imaginative ideas for urban reconstruction, industrial development, people-to-people projects, educational schemes. These make sense in time, but not until we control inflation and pacify more of the countryside. At present a lot of our aid is servicing the VC. So while keeping a sharp eye out for dramatic initiatives and imaginative ideas, Porter and I feel that we must stress the basic building blocks. If we canʼt get pacification going in the villages and contain inflation, the rest wonʼt help much. Nor can we overload the GVN—it canʼt yet do the minimum weʼve already asked. So bold ideas that canʼt be carried out have little lasting value.

I earnestly hope that youʼll press these points on Lodge and back my hand in the inevitable fights with the Pentagon.

I also have some thoughts on the political side. We badly need a strategy to optimize the chances of coping with the open campaign season now upon us. Above all, we must take “the American issue” out of this campaign, so that we can live with whatever regime emerges. I am convinced that few Vietnamese want us to leave. This simply would mean that the VC would take over. Rather both the Directory and the factions are using the American issue to pressure us to favor them. In return for insisting on genuine elections, and proclaiming our willingness to work with whatever government emerges, we should be able to get all sides to lay off agitation. We should tell them privately that if they insist on making our presence an issue in the elections, nothing would be more likely to convince US opinion we ought to leave. There are risks in this approach, but even greater risks if we donʼt move.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Back Channel Cables Between Porter & Komer, May-June 1966. Secret. The President was at the LBJ Ranch.
2. Z refers to Greenwich Mean Time.
3. Komerʼs new job is described in NSAM No. 343, Document 102.