50. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
41. Deptels 41 and 42.2 The following are Alex Johnson’s and my comments on plans for approach to NLF and DRV contained in reftels.
In a sentence, we are vigorously opposed to these proposed approaches because (1) they are premature now or in any short term future; (2) they are highly dangerous because of the effect on the GVN of a leak, either fortuitous or deliberate on the part of Communists; and (3) by our overeagerness to negotiate, they will nullify our past and present efforts to convince the VC/DRV that we have the will and determination to turn the tide against them sooner or later—so that they had better come to terms sooner rather than later.
We are convinced that we are on a sound course now and should stay on it without letting ourselves be diverted to untimely actions on either the political or the military front. We are now engaged in the early phases of the ascending military confrontation of the monsoon season. We are taking losses and will take more; the same goes for the VC. At the end of this season, it should be our purpose to have so blunted and bloodied the monsoon offensive and to have so punished the approved targets of our bombing in NVN that the VC/DRV can no longer hope for a military victory and must admit it to themselves. If we can create that picture and in addition one of readiness for a counter-offensive in 1966, we would then think Hanoi might be ready for useful contacts. But it appears highly risky to seek shortcuts such as the reftels propose, as they will encourage and stiffen the resistance of the enemy and, if known, will be disastrous to our relations with the GVN. Apart from all the foregoing considerations, this evidence of overeagerness to negotiate will tend to defeat our purpose of leading Hanoi to the conference table if only because the Communist leaders must necessarily oppose anything that we are seeking.
With regard to specifics within the two proposals, we have further comments which we would like to make if, in spite of the reasons set forth above, it is decided to pursue one or both of these proposals.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 12:39 a.m. on July 5.↩
- Documents 46 and 47.↩