Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

47. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, July 3, 1965, 3:13 p.m.

42. Deptel 41.² In coming weeks or months, in circumstances where it would not signal weakness, we may wish to make quiet effort to establish contact also with DRV in order explore more actively possibilities of some kind of negotiated settlement Vietnam situation. In spite of several rebuffs we and others have received to more formal, official overtures there have been indications that DRV might welcome opportunity to talk. This might be worked out through official but quiet and confidential lower level contact such as Mai Van Bo in Paris. It is possible though far from certain that North Vietnamese might wish and be able in this way to discuss position independent of Chinese. There may also be honest misapprehension on DRV part as to what is precisely our position on certain questions and direct dialogue might serve to dispel such.

We would not be prepared to pay price of formal recognition of DRV which Hanoi may very well demand. This might, however, be a price we would be willing to pay for an acceptable resolution of overall problem of Vietnam, but this would be a possibility to be acknowledged only much later should it ever be possible to get fruitful discussions underway.

As in case our possible contact with NLF, we recognize GVN would be immediately suspicious and most uneasy if it becomes aware of our contact with DRV. Nevertheless we presume that, as Quat once hinted to us, contact with DRV not really so great political problem and we have after all long since declared ourselves prepared to enter into discussions with any government.

Therefore we believe that we should keep GVN informed if any contact established, reassuring them that this being undertaken for purpose of making sure no avenue to settlement left untried and that possibility of settlement not being obstructed by misunderstanding which could be corrected; at same time we have no intention negotiating behind their back any arrangements they could not accept and we will keep in constant consultation with them. Furthermore, they might wish to consider themselves possible utility of their making contact independent of ours, in which case we would of course also expect be kept informed.

For contact with DRV we envisage some appropriate US official, depending upon locality, who could conduct conversations inconspicuously. On initial contact we would envisage he would follow line something like following:

1. US has been deeply disappointed at negative responses from Hanoi to numerous efforts made in recent months to explore peaceful means of settling unhappy Vietnam situation.

2. US position remains unchanged in that we are determined to help South Vietnam as long as this is necessary preserve that country’s independence. At same time we are ready without preconditions to discuss ways of moving toward a peaceful settlement and bringing military activity to an end.

3. We have said and we mean without qualification that we seek no bases in South Vietnam and are prepared to withdraw our forces from that country as soon as its continuing independent existence is assured. We favor a neutral Vietnam. We have no designs whatsoever on North Vietnam and no intention of trying to change its kind of government. We believe the question of unification of the two parts of Vietnam is a matter for the North and South to decide when each is in a position to make a free decision; otherwise we take no position on whether Vietnam should be unified or remain at least for some time divided.

4. We have noted the four points put forward by Premier Pham Van Dong on April 8³ and frequently pressed since that time. We have also noted the four points put forward by the Government of South Vietnam on June 22.⁴

We regard all of these and other statements of objectives put forward from other sources as worthy of our attention and suitable subjects for discussion. Naturally we would not enter into discussion on any understanding that the resulting conclusion would be fixed in advance and would presume this would also be the DRV position.

5. There are many elements in Premier Pham Van Dong’s four points which appear to be acceptable, assuming that further discussion would confirm our understanding of what is intended. There are others which, if we correctly interpret their purport, would in our view jeopardize the independence of South Vietnam and therefore not be acceptable.

6. Thus we return again to our initial thought that free and open discussion without preconditions might prove to be useful and we hope that the DRV would agree to undertake these.

Your early comments requested on proposal for approach to DRV on lines set forth above.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Unger, cleared by William Bundy, and approved by Ball. Repeated to Paris.
2. Document 46.
3. For text, see vol. II, Document 245.
4. The GVN’s four points were announced in an address by Foreign Minister Tran Van Do on July 22; for text of his address, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, p. 883.