Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

220. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson, in Texas¹

Washington, December 6, 1965, 7:03 p.m.

CAP 65828. 1. Joe Califano has told me that you wonder if we are really ready for the meeting tomorrow.² It is a fair question, and this message aims to answer it. In the largest sense, we are not fully ready, but nevertheless there are immediate decisions that cannot wait, and on these we believe we are ready.

2. We do not have a complete and fully developed political, economic and social program to match the major new military deployments proposed for 1966. We can and will develop such a program, but we have to understand that unless and until there can be military victories, this program is irrelevant. Moreover, we are making major non-military efforts now which should produce results with victories, although they will come to nothing without them.

3. A strengthened political and economic program can and will include such items as the following:

A. New economic programs to prevent inflation.

B. Intensified countrywide health programs.

C. Highlighted educational efforts.

D. Stronger propaganda, including television.

E. Strengthened defector programs.

F. Establishment of model pacification districts and provinces.

G. Economic warfare denial program.

H. Streamlined organization for peace actions both in Saigon and in Washington.

I. Appointment of outstanding executives for peace in both capitals.

J. Redeveloped political action efforts leading toward strengthened anti-Communist political organization and to pave the way for elections.

K. Wider and stronger agricultural reform programs.

Lodge and company would say that they are doing much of this now, but we all know it can be done better, and in any event it should be a major part of your 1966 Vietnam policy.

4. But with or without this stronger non-military program, we face major immediate military and diplomatic decisions. McNamara and the Chiefs are already engaged in detailed planning for the additional deployments and expenditures Westmoreland’s program requires. Thus the issues presented in the military paper which was sent to you earlier today (CAP 65822)³ have to be decided this week.

5. We also have to decide now on a pause, if we are to have one before January. Advocates and opponents of a pause agree that it must be about three weeks in length to have any value. It is also agreed that it must have preliminary diplomatic preparation in Saigon and other capitals if it is not to backfire. We also agree that you should have freedom to end the pause before Congress returns, if you wish. In combination, these requirements mean that we must decide to go ahead now, if we are to go ahead at all before Congress returns. It is the calendar and not a lot of insistent subordinates that is forcing the hour of decision.

6. Next following messages contain three papers relating to a pause.⁴ The first is State Department’s statement of a plan, with a summary of the pros and cons. Second is suggested points for Presidential statement announcing a pause. The third is a paper giving questions and answers that might be used by U.S. spokesman in the wake of a Presidential announcement.

7. We have discussed these papers at length today with Clark Clifford, and he sides with Raborn, Wheeler and the Joint Chiefs against a pause. The rest of us are for it. I will be prepared to summarize arguments pro and con tomorrow. Two basic arguments against a pause are, first, that it suggests that bombing is wrong, and second, that it exposes us to diplomatic entrapment which would make resumption very difficult.

8. My own conviction is still that the best preparation for the tough programs of January is a peace offensive in December, and that the pause is the necessary centerpiece of that effort.

PAPER NO. 1

A PLAN FOR A PAUSE

In view of the major additional effort required to continue the South Vietnam conflict along present lines during 1966, we can and should take a major new initiative at an early date both (A) to make another bona fide effort to find a peaceful solution; and (B) to convince the American public and all the key nations that we have in fact exhausted all possibilities before stepping up our effort.

The public and private exchange of negotiating positions between Hanoi and ourselves has been most active in the last nine months. We have gone as far as we can in verbal messages, and only some major new element in the form of a “pause” offers real hope toward either (A) or (B).

Need for a Pause:

1. A pause may be essential to achieve either successful negotiations or a tapering-off of military action in South Vietnam. There is a significant difference between our activities in the south and our bombing of the north. For reasons of face, the Hanoi regime may find it difficult to begin negotiations while its own territory is being bombed. For reasons of prestige in the Communist world, Peiping—and perhaps even Moscow—may feel compelled to prevent any negotiations while a fellow socialist state is under air attack by the United States.

2. This thesis has been reinforced by Ambassador Dobrynin, who has made it clear to McGeorge Bundy that the Soviets would really make an effort if we undertook a pause of “12-20 days”⁵—although he made it equally clear that the Soviets could give no assurance of Hanoi’s response.

3. In addition to improving (although by no means guaranteeing) the chances for a possible successful negotiation, a pause could improve our peace-seeking posture throughout the world, which has been significantly weakened by the Sevareid story in Look.⁶

4. A pause could also make it easier for the American people to accept the substantial increase in our 1966 effort, since it would further demonstrate that, before committing more American lives and resources to Vietnam, we are doing everything possible to find a peaceful solution.

5. A pause should reduce the likelihood of further Soviet involvement and stimulate further dissension between Moscow and Peiping.

The Dangers and Disadvantages of a Pause:

1. The peace demonstrations in this country and the first heavy U.S. casualties have increased the danger that Hanoi might interpret a pause as a signal of weakness. Continued large U.S. deployments during the pause period would partially offset the chances of such an interpretation.

2. There is no assurance that a pause would lead to significant negotiations; the chances are much less than fifty percent.

3. What Hanoi is seeking is not a pause, but a complete cessation of bombing. They could be expected to do everything possible to prevent our resumption of bombing—and in this effort they would probably be joined not only by the Soviet Union and Peiping, but by many of our friends around the world.

4. Ambassador Lodge foresees great dangers in a pause and it would certainly be hard to persuade the GVN that a pause is necessary. We must, therefore, assume that a pause would create considerable concern in Saigon.

Recommendation for a Pause:

After balancing these considerations, we recommend that you approve a pause as soon as possible this month. This decision would, of course, be subject to consultation and joint action with the GVN.

Action Issues:

The two main issues that need to be faced in carrying out a pause are:

1. The conditions under which we would resume bombing or continue the pause.

2. A timing scenario for a pause now.

1. Conditions of resumption or continuation. We have all along taken the position that we could suspend or cease bombing only in return for reciprocal actions by Hanoi. We all believe that this must be the way in which we present the pause both publicly and through diplomatic channels.

Nonetheless, the question arises whether we would in fact be prepared to continue the suspension of bombing if Hanoi were to drop its present conditions for negotiation, specifically its insistence on the acceptance of the “NLF program.” Such a switch in Hanoi’s position would make it difficult for us to resume bombing at an early date. But it would also represent a really major concession by Hanoi that would tend to create sharp frictions and loss of morale as between Hanoi and the Liberation Front. The latter would see the concession as the possible start of a sell-out of their position. This is a possibility to which both Hanoi and the NLF are most sensitive because of the general belief of Vietnamese Communists that Hanoi itself was sold out in similar fashion by the Soviets in 1954.

We now believe we should be prepared to continue the suspension if Hanoi makes this concession, provided, however, that we would reserve the right to resume bombing if Hanoi in fact kept up the infiltration and high levels of military activity in the south, particularly by regulars. So we are talking of a suspension that might be continued while we fully explore the new possibilities of negotiation, but we would maintain our freedom to resume bombing even while negotiating efforts were still underway.

There is a third Hanoi response that might cause us difficulty: agreeing to negotiate only if the NLF were accepted as a principal party. We believe that your July 28 statement, offering the NLF the chance to present its views but not as a principal party, has gone as far as we can go. We would have to accept the difficulties and criticism of refusing to go further.

2. Timing scenario. We estimate that it would take 12-15 days to complete the preparatory actions after decision, before a pause could be begun. The key elements are:

A. Consultation with Lodge. We would need to bring him carefully aboard, probably in Saigon, and this would take 3-4 days, with an emissary far preferable to attempting to handle it by cable. We have to go over with him carefully just how he would handle it with Ky, and we have to bring him into all our reasoning.

B. Lodge’s consultation with GVN. This will certainly encounter some initial skepticism or resistance, and we may have to make quite firm commitments on our future ground force deployments. Moreover, the group nature of the GVN means that at least four and possibly more senior leaders have to be brought in. We cannot estimate less than four days for this process.

C. Notification of the Soviets and key allies, and consultation with Congress. We believe this must take place not less than 2 days before the announcement.

The scenario would also provide for a message to Hanoi just before the announcements, and for a short public announcement by the South Vietnamese and U.S. Governments jointly on the day the pause starts, probably supplemented by a fuller statement by you.

PAPER NO. 2

SUGGESTED POINTS FOR PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ANNOUNCING SUSPENSION OF BOMBING OF NORTHVIETNAM

1. Aggression in Vietnam continues to be gravest current threat to peace of world.

2. Brief review of basic U.S. position as stated July 28—

A. Firmness against aggression;

B. Readiness to do all that is necessary to turn it back;

C. Strengthened economic and social action in South Vietnam;

D. Energetic efforts to move toward peace.

3. Events since July have shown—

A. Gallantry and effectiveness of U.S. combat forces;

B. Persistent and increasing aggression from the north;

C. Need for still further strengthening of nonmilitary effort; and

D. Continued complete rejection of peace efforts by Hanoi and Peking.

4. The continuing and increasing Communist infiltration and aggression now produce the prospect of further sharp increases in the level of fighting, with mounting losses and suffering for all concerned.

5. The U.S. remains strong and determined and can meet any challenge at any necessary level.

6. But the U.S. wants peace and will leave no path unexplored.

7. The President has therefore decided to suspend air attack on North Vietnam in order to see whether parallel actions by others can open the way to peace.

8. Meanwhile, our joint effort in South Vietnam will continue. Our peaceful photographic surveillance of North Vietnam will continue, the effort for political progress in the south will continue, and our search for unconditional discussions will continue.

9. This action is based on strength, not weakness. Bombing was and is amply justified, but the object of the bombing is peace, and if a suspension can move us in that direction, no one will be more pleased than the United States.

10. The responsibility for aggression rests with others. The responsibility for action in response to the new decision also rests with them. It is for them to decide whether to move now toward peace or whether their continued aggression will force upon all concerned the additional costs of still more violent war in 1966.

11. Designation of Ambassador Harriman as U.S. plenipotentiary for peace talks at any time, at any place.

12. Designation of Vice President Humphrey to undertake a diplomatic mission to friendly countries explaining both this initiative for peace and the determination of the United States to move forward firmly if there is no adequate response.

PAPER NO. 3

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOR APPROPRIATE U.S. SPOKESMAN IN THE WAKE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF A SUSPENSION OF BOMBING

1. The Military Consequence of the Suspension.

Q. Does this suspension increase the danger to U.S. fighting men in South Vietnam?

A. No. There is only a slow and indirect relation between bombing activity in the north and the level of battle in the south, and it will be quite practicable to make up the time lost in the pause by intensified air attack afterwards if necessary. Moreover, the whole purpose of the suspension is to induce matching action by the other side to back off from its infiltration and aggression, and any such back-off would itself greatly decrease the dangers facing U.S. forces in South Vietnam.

Q. Will not the pause allow dangerous time for reconstruction in the north?

A. No. Any repairs which are effected during a pause can be dealt with afterwards. Our reconnaissance will continue, and our forces will be ready to renew their attacks promptly if necessary.

Q. But you have claimed the bombing is effective. Surely it must follow that the suspension gives an advantage to the enemy.

A. Obviously, the suspension does give a respite while it lasts. But we have never believed or asserted that the bombing of the north is the central part of our activity. To put it another way, we have been bombing the north for 40 weeks. Each week of suspension loses for us only a small proportion of the overall effect of our bombing so far. This is an acceptable loss in order to demonstrate our good faith in seeking peace and in order to open the door to peace if possible.

2. Political Terms and Conditions of the Suspension.

Q. Under what conditions do you plan to resume the bombing?

A. The President has said that this decision will be determined by the actions of others, and we do not wish to lay down precise conditions or to make any sort of ultimatum. We are trying to make it easy for others to respond—not hard.

Q. Are you in communication with Hanoi and Moscow and Peking about this matter?

A. We are making appropriate diplomatic communications on a very wide scale but we think it more productive to do this privately, and we do not expect to discuss these private communications. All of them are governed by the policy declaration of the President.

Q. You used to say that you would only suspend the bombing if there were evidence that others would respond by action on their side. Do you have persuasive evidence or have you changed your position?

A. We have no clear evidence, but the situation has changed in one important respect. The increasing infiltration from the north, and increasing Communist violence in the south have made it clear that unless there is a change in the situation, there will be much intensified warfare in 1966. In this situation the President thinks it right to explore every opportunity for peace, and it is in that spirit that he has suspended the bombing.

Q. Would you keep up suspension in return for unconditional discussions?

A. We could certainly welcome unconditional discussion, and that would be a very encouraging development. But we could hardly sustain this pause for a protracted time if aggression and infiltration from the north are continued as at present.

Q. Is the designation of Governor Harriman indication that you expect another Geneva Conference?

A. The designation of Governor Harriman is designed to underline the sincerity and determination of the United States in seeking to move to the peace table. The form and membership of such a conference are not important to the United States, which will meet with any interested government at any time.

Q. The Communists will undoubtedly now press you on the question of negotiations with the Viet Cong. Are you ready to soften your position on this as you have apparently softened your position on a pause in the bombing?

A. We continue to stand on the President’s statement of July 28. “If Hanoi is ready to negotiate, the Viet Cong would have no difficulty in being represented and having their views presented. We would not think that would be an insurmountable problem at all.”

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLIII, Cables. Top Secret; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to Austin for Moyers.
2. See Document 223.
3. CAP 65822, December 6, sent to the President in Texas, transmitted a draft of McNamara’s memorandum, Document 222. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Situation Room File, Outgoing Traffic)
4. These papers were not sent separately but are included in this telegram.
5. See footnote 5, Document 208.
6. See footnote 2, Document 203.