Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

203. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State¹

Rio de Janeiro, November 18, 1965.

Secto 16. Eyes only for the President and the Acting Secretary from the Secretary. I deeply regret that I am not in Washington to assist in handling press problems deriving from Sevareid story.² Here are my comments and suggestions as seen from here. You may wish to draft a suggested statement for me to make, taking into account issues which have been raised up there.

1. I am confident that Adlai Stevenson would not have written the Look article.³ That is why he put his talk off the record. Nor am I confident that the article fairly represents the long conversation. I do not suggest we get into a pitched battle with Sevareid on veracity when the referee is dead. But I note that Sevareid did not report his conversation as a working reporter through his normal channel (television) but wrote a special article for which he probably received a very substantial fee. Under these circumstances, such an article is not likely to avoid the temptation of dramatic effect. But those of us who have spent long hours over a period of many years with Adlai know that one of his charms was a touch of Hamlet. On the subject of resigning, he and I had just had a long talk before his departure for Europe about his plans and arrangements and travel for the rest of the year and the handling of the General Assembly. He was reluctant to accept the job in December 1960 and every few months since then said something about perhaps staying through the “next General Assembly.”

2. On the Hanoi matter, my recollection is that there was some discussion of some such contact before November but I would have to check my own calendar for my own visits to New York and Adlai’s visits to Washington to help my memory.⁴

3. At no time did Adlai Stevenson and I talk about this problem in connection with the US election. We discussed (a) the third-hand nature of the contact and U Thant’s warning that Soviet official representatives in New York and Washington were not informed; (b) the absence of any indication as to substance; (c) the difficulties of contact in a relatively small country where diplomatic representatives are under many eyes; (d) the negative results of other contacts of which we were then aware.

4. You might consider, after checking with Paul Martin, surfacing the timing of the first Seaborn contact in Hanoi. The Canadians have already surfaced a part of them and the negative reactions which Seaborn encountered were a part of this problem.

5. Most compelling concern in my own mind was the possibility of a trap in the absence of any indication of a forthcoming attitude on any point of substance. I was concerned that bilateral contact in Rangoon would be made the basis for spreading the word among the South Vietnamese that the US was dickering for a settlement behind the backs of Saigon. Recalling the then situation in Saigon, this could well have been disastrous.

6. In diplomacy there is a difference between rejecting a proposal and not accepting it. This is illustrated by Stevenson’s remark to Cleveland about “there may be a time—but not now.” I did not think that we should use this particular channel at that time but, on the other hand, did not wish to foreclose that or any other channel for the future. This distinction was made to U Thant but was apparently lost on him.

7. Bob McNamara had nothing whatever to do with these particular conversations. Why Adlai Stevenson (or Sevareid) attributed a negative reaction to him is beyond my comprehension.

8. I recall that Stevenson and I together had a brief exchange with U Thant on this matter but I would have to check my calendar carefully to try to identify the date. In that conversation, I affirmed to U Thant our interest in a peaceful settlement and suggested to him that he use the same channel to probe the substance. He was very reluctant to do so and I do not wish to get into the problem of veracity with U Thant with Stevenson no longer here.

9. The President and I early this year discussed one aspect of this matter on which I believe an error was made and by me. U Thant, Stevenson and I were so concerned with secrecy that neither Stevenson nor I kept a written account of the conversations of last year. The President quite rightly suggested that anything in the nature of proposals coming from or through Stevenson be reduced to writing and that our response and reaction also be in writing in order to avoid misunderstanding.

10. U Thant’s own recollections as reflected in Tosec 39⁵ seem to remove the idea that we on our side discussed this in relation to our elections although apparently he himself took such elections into account.

11. I would have to say that neither U Thant nor Stevenson would lose the chance to believe that peace was about to break out and that they themselves had played an important part in it. But I would add that, at the time, Adlai did not express disagreement to me but seemed fully in accord with the idea that the possibility should be left open but that it should not be acted upon under the then existing circumstances.

12. It might be well to review the chronology of Hanoi’s attitude beginning with their contempt for the Laos Agreements of 1962. It is ridiculous to suppose that Hanoi’s attitude toward continuing or stopping the war turned upon whether one particular channel out of all of the channels which have been attempted was to be used. They have had literally dozens of opportunities to bring this matter to discussion or conference. Instead, they continue their infiltration, including regular army units, and have been resistant to suggestions for a peaceful settlement which have come to them even from within the Communist world.

13. Please let me know whether you think it is well for me to make a statement on this subject. I am appalled that Eric Sevareid would feel that the off-the-record nature of this discussion was canceled by Stevenson’s death. But, I would have to say in his behalf that under the circumstances of off the record, Adlai could say things, as a scintillating conversationalist, which he himself would not say under conditions of complete context and responsibility.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 10:13 a.m.
2. In the November 30 issue of Look magazine (on the newstands by November 16) Eric Sevareid wrote an account of a conversation with Adlai Stevenson, held just 2 days before Stevenson died. Sevareid’s article, entitled “The Final Troubled Hours of Adlai Stevenson,” claimed that U.N. Secretary-General Thant obtained agreement from North Vietnam in early autumn 1964 to send an emissary to Rangoon to discuss with U.S. representatives possible peace terms. According to the Sevareid article, “someone in Washington” insisted on postponing the meeting until after the Presidential election. When the matter was pursued after the election, Sevareid stated that Hanoi was still willing to talk, but McNamara was opposed to the idea. Thant supposedly offered to let Washington write the terms of a cease-fire, but McNamara turned him down and Rusk did not respond.
3. Ball discussed the Sevareid article on the telephone with Yost, Goldberg, Rusk, and McGeorge Bundy on the morning of November 17. Transcripts of Ball’s telephone calls of 9:15 (with Yost), 10:45 (Goldberg), 11 (Rusk), 11 (Yost), and 11:15 a.m. (McGeorge Bundy) are in the Johnson Library, Papers of George Ball, Telephone Conversations, Vietnam.
4. See vol. I, pp. 957–958.
5. In Tosec 39, November 18, the Department of State reconstructed the Rusk-U Thant discussions from August 1964 to March 1965 on the Secretary-General’s suggestion that the United States and the DRV meet in Rangoon to discuss peace in Vietnam. Ball told Rusk that the “highest authority” wanted Rusk’s “best recollection of private talks with Stevenson on this subject,” as well as any comments on modification of the reconstructed chronology. (Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Vietnam—U Thant)