Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

219. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, December 6, 1965, 6:10 p.m.

1576. Literally eyes only for the Ambassador from the Secretary. I was much interested in your Nodis 2024.² While one must be skeptical for a lot of reasons, the possibility of any significant defection from the liberation front has great potential importance. I would suggest that you follow up along the lines of your telegram.

It may be that such a group is only a splinter. There would be great advantage, however, if such a splinter had any territorial base which opens up the possibility of a rapid peace in even two or three provinces. Amnesty arrangements might be made and through full cooperation with intelligence, police activities, etc., North Vietnamese elements could be prevented from punishing the splinter group. Depending upon the circumstances, some tacit understanding might even be thinkable which would leave the splinter group certain privileges in a particular area provided the writ of the government ran on other matters. I have in mind the arrangements worked out with the two sects in the Southwest.

You would have to be a little careful about a commitment not to negotiate with Hanoi unless the dimensions of the breakaway are far greater than you and we presently believe. In view of the public position of the President, a commitment on negotiations would need checking with us.

I leave to your judgment the complex question as to when and whether General Ky ought to be informed very privately of such a contact.³ I should think that he would be tempted by the possibility of a major defection and there is always the possibility that he would learn about a contact through channels other than your own.

We are not allowing our hopes to rise on this matter but a significant split within the Viet Cong would be a most welcome Christmas present.

With warm regards.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Rusk and cleared by William Bundy.
2. Document 217.
3. In telegram 2037 from Saigon, December 7, Lodge agreed fully about avoiding any commitment to negotiate with Hanoi and said he would “agree to nothing” at any meeting with an “Ambassador” from the National Liberation Front. Lodge wanted to tell Tran Van Do, rather than Ky, after the meeting took place. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)