Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

144. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, September 18, 1965.

953. Ref: Deptel 753.² Following comments keyed to numbered paragraphs reftel:

Para 1

Agree with your feeling situation has more imponderables than usual. While US military presence appears to have blunted VC offensive, improved Vietnamese morale and given us great opportunity, exploiting this opportunity depends upon climate of mutual trust and confidence with young, inexperienced and highly sensitive government facing complicated political problems.

Para 2

A. Agree with you that increasing US ground strength may be driving VC to avoid major unit actions and to place primary emphasis on small scale actions. These must be dealt with successfully by the Vietnamese themselves making the main effort in conducting a combined politico-military campaign. The presence of American troops does provide the opportunity for thorough pacification of the areas in which they are stationed and full advantage should be taken of this opportunity. It isa very big dividend from our investment of men and money. For example, the Third Marine Division has scored impressive successes north, south and west of Danang, while the police in the city of Danang itself were doing a mediocre job. As I reported in another telegram,³ I directed that the USOM police advisor concentrate entirely on the city of Danang.

B. In this connection, consider the case of 1st Lt. Paul Ek, USMC, who commands a joint action company consisting of 60 Americans and 150 Vietnamese in Phu Bai. They are causing somewhat of a sensation in cleaning out the Viet Cong and, by their able political conduct, increasing the intelligence “take”. If our American troops can emulate this performance (and many are doing so now) in the ratio of 60 to 150, ought to get a tremendous amount of small unit nighttime effective pacification, and we would be neglecting an opportunity not to use American troops for this purpose, thereby pacifying the country and transforming the ARVN, making it into a much more vital and effective element of Vietnamese society, able at some not too remote date to carry on by themselves without outside help.

C. General Westmoreland has had under continuous study how he would use the increased ground and air strength; in fact, the determination of his Phase I troop request was based on a detailed analysis. The strategy and tactics that he contemplates employing have been discussed in detail with the Vietnamese JGS and a MACV concept paper is published for the guidance of US commanders. This policy publication is being forwarded by MACV through military channels.⁴ Westmoreland feels strongly that the full Phase I troop list should be deployed in accordance with the schedule worked out in Honolulu in August. It is noted that the 1st Division has been alerted but no public announcement has been made for its deployment. We believe this division should be deployed on schedule. In close coordination with the Vietnamese High Command, General Westmoreland proposes to follow the following broad strategy:

1. Halt the VC offensive—stem the tide.

2. Resume the offensive—destroy VC units where they can be found and pacify selected high priority areas.

3. Restore progressively the entire country to GVN control.

4. Support “rural construction” with comprehensive attention to the pacification process as regards regional and popular force units, the police, and the relationship therein between US and GVN regular forces. Emphasis should be accorded the role of civic action of which a police precinct program is a necessary prerequisite. Appreciation and support of political and psychological requirements would be stressed.

5. It is assumed that the air campaign will continue against the DRV and infiltration routes in Laos.

D. We need sufficient strength to insure the success of our strategy and tactics. As we succeed it becomes more difficult for the Viet Cong to marshal main-force units and the pressure will be on them to withdraw such units to more remote areas and/or to transform themselves into small units. This is a considerable triumph for us, because it means that the US presence has in effect fragmented the main force, prevented it from coming into being, or at least has forced it to play a lesser role. We will have kept the main force from becoming more akin to a regular army with which the enemy hoped to conquer the country militarily and without which he surely cannot do so. We will have to keep up the pressure on the main force whenever and wherever it appears to prevent its resurgence on a large scale.

E. General Westmoreland and I are intensively studying the question of “what concept and strategy we should follow against VC lie-low tactics”. With our bases secure and aggressive action against VC concentrations keeping them under pressure and off-balance, the lie-low tactics that the VC may adopt become more a problem for police-and-social-action-type program. We would expect to urge Vietnamese to use the police in the cities, and police-type operation by military forces working out from thoroughly pacified centers to pacify the environs as the basic element in what the Vietnamese call “rural construction”. We are already discussing with the Vietnamese the possibility of singling out areas that look like good prospects, that are potentially pretty much over on our side, and then pacifying them so as to get a little smell of across-the-board success in the air.

F. I also think it is prudent to expect increased VC terrorism, attempts to overthrow the government and economic warfare.

G. We have had no unfavorable GVN and SVN reactions of significance to more extensive US ground operations. Government leaders have made clear their support for our efforts and their desire that we continue. While personal, psychological and economic frictions can arise, there is no evidence that these negative factors now outweigh the positive factors. Our buildup and activity have convinced the Vietnamese that we do not intend to pull out, which has been a nagging fear. Our efforts have contributed to the belief that the VC cannot win and have raised national morale and confidence in the success of the anti-Communist struggle. There are many variables at work and it is hard to predict how long this favorable attitude will continue or whether CQ [VC?] may possibly diminish. In the near future we do not expect unfavorable attitudes of any great significance. We are keeping our collective ears to the ground.

Para 3

We have under evaluation the use of the increased air strike capacity. Westmoreland recently appointed a board of officers to study this matter in depth so as to assure that this available firepower is used effectively, efficiently, and with discretion. This measure by Westmoreland is an extension of the policy directive concerning minimizing battlefield non-combatant casualties.⁵ Westmoreland feels and I agree that an outsider survey group is not needed at this time. He believes that he is able to translate recent experience into improved methods. He has in his J-3 office a Requirements and Analysis Division which is manned with well qualified officers who devote their entire time to operational studies and analysis of force utilization and requirements. They consult with the civilian elements of the Mission. He will be quick to ask for help when he feels the need.

Para 4

A. I have directed the US Mission Liaison Group to grapple with needed actions in this whole area, which it is starting to do most actively. Also, fine early progress by the staff was made through informal liaison with Minister Ung, Secretary-General of the Council of Rural Construction (Pacification), with the Prime Minister’s staff, and with key technicians in GVN Ministries participation in pacification. The unexpected death of Minister Ung in an Air Vietnam crash Thursday⁶ suddenly has imposed a whole new set of circumstances. Meanwhile, the improvement of Hop Tac operations is receiving priority attention now, including my discussing this with General Ky and making a personal visit to the Hop Tac area on Thursday morning.⁷

B. I am not ready to say, “what areas would be chosen for pacification, when could the plan be started, what objectives would be set,” but hope to be able to do so soon. I am now encouraging General Ky to concentrate GVN efforts and enthusiasm on pacification so that this can have sustained, wholehearted GVN participation. This will permit development of realistic requirements for our planning.

C. On the military side of the questions raised in para 4, Westmoreland informs me that a campaign plan is being refined by his staff in coordination with the JCS. A first phase schedule of operations has been agreed to between himself and General Co. Further, a study by MACV and JGS is now in progress for the purpose of reviewing AB 139 of 25 December 1964⁸ (this concerns the roles and missions of the various elements of the RVNAF) and the Chien Thang plan (GVN pacification plan) to bring them in line with the campaign plan. I believe these efforts areresponsive to what you have in mind; however this can be better determined after you are briefed on MACV’s plans. In this connection, Westmoreland’s J-3, Brigadier General Depuy, is going to CINCPAC for a conference the last week of this month and thence to Washington for two weeks leave. Westmoreland states that he will be available with appropriate charts and maps to brief the JCS if such is agreed to by CINCPAC following the Honolulu meeting. In this connection the main purpose of the Honolulu military meeting is to allow Westmoreland to present his Phase II troop deployment concept. The Mission Council is being briefed on this subject by MACV on Sept 21.

Para 5

Development of popular electoral processes from the rice roots up is part of all our current planning for counter subversion/terrorism in “rural construction” (pacification). For example, this has been taken into account in developing temporary refugee status within rural communities which have fled to safe zones pending their return home. I have also been talking with General Ky about making use of provincial councils elected last May 30 in their further election of delegates to Consultative National Council which also will be given further task of commencing draft of new Constitution. GVN has made progress on land reform and is giving increased emphasis to Chieu Hoi. But in this connection I cannot believe it would be prudent to call a halt to military operations anywhere.

Para 6

Appreciate what you say about the “negotiating front”.

Para 7

On the internal political front, we have had a period of relative quiet ever since my arrival. I am studying extraordinary measures to protect ourselves from a coup and hope that with the passage of time and with our advice plus his own natural aptitude, General Ky can become a really effective political leader. The present leadership is sufficiently “young and energetic”, but I agree that the problem is to maintain its cohesion and gain more positive popular support.

Para 8

Hope you will keep Honolulu date open for a while, as it may be that late October would be bad from the standpoint of the work here and that mid-November would be better.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 6:08 a.m.
2. Document 141.
3. Not identified.
4. The MACV Concept Paper, August 30, is in CINCPAC Command History, 1965, Annex A, MACV, pp. 141-153.
5. See footnote 3, Document 141.
6. September 16.
7. September 23.
8. Not further identified.