Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

141. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, September 14, 1965, 7:44 p.m.

753. Eyes only Ambassador.

1. Informal high-level review over weekend of Vietnam situation leaves us with feeling situation has more major uncertainties, variables, and possibly occasions for changes in our actions than for some time past. Purpose this message is to give you feel of our thinking and of questions we see becoming acute.

2. Seems likely increasing US ground strength is driving Hanoi/VC to avoid major unit actions and in effect revert to pattern of placing primary emphasis on small-scale actions. Quite possibly we may be faced with VC tactics of prolonged small-scale struggle in which they will rely on international pressures and their doubtless exaggerated view of our internal political opposition to bring about eventual reduction in our effort, while they also hope and work for adverse internal political developments in GVN. In combating such prolonged tactics we need to consider just how we propose to use our greatly increased ground and airstrength, especially the degree to which it can and should be employed in any wider countryside efforts beyond necessarily slow securing efforts close to our base areas.² (We also question whether and how we can move from patrolling to real pacification in these areas—can ARVN and GVN police take advantage of our nearby strength for this purpose in these areas?) There is even a residual question whether further increases in strength at presently planned pace are wise, or whether we should in some small degree defer further increases. Obviously one crucial element in this is GVN and SVN popular reaction to more extensive US ground operations, and on this subject we would welcome your over-all and up-to-date assessment. In short, if we move rapidly up in force strength, question is bound to arise of effective employment these forces and exactly what concept and strategy we should follow against VC lie-low tactics.

3. Related question concerns scale and effective employment and continuing evaluation of results of presently planned massive further increase in air strike capacity. On this we have noted Westmoreland’s excellent directive concerning civilian implications of operations,³ but still feel there is need for better over-all analysis of operations and for some mechanism to evaluate operations currently from all standpoints. One possibility would be to find civilian and military people akin to those who did operations analysis in World War II to act as survey group either on one-shot or continuing basis. Obviously, this too is matter you have under continuing close study, and we need to know your thoughts.⁴

4. As to pacification/reconstruction effort, we wonder whether time is not fast approaching, or already here, when GVN forces freed by US deployments could put far more steam into Hop Tac and perhaps other key pacification areas where efforts have been pretty much stalled because of force shortage and general security situation. This might involve selecting provinces for really planned and systematic extension of GVN control with firm allotment of necessary military forces, plus police and all other elements of effort. In this connection, we would like for you to develop specific plan for our joint consideration involving concentration of GVN forces on pacification and reliance on US forces to handle large VC actions. What areas would be chosen for pacification; when could the plan be started and what objectives would be set; how many GVN forces would be required, where and when; how many US forces would be required, where and when; etc?⁵

5. Still further possibility, which we know you have thoroughly in mind, would be extended GVN application of key elements in Acheson plan⁶ (land reform, Chieu Hoi, etc.) on over-all basis. Moreover, we wonder if it may not become possible to select one or more areas (perhaps in IV Corps area) for application of all elements Acheson plan including local electoral process.

6. On negotiating front we share your view that there is no need to stress our basic position further and that additional stress runs considerable risk misunderstanding in both Hanoi and Saigon. Believe we have taken it far enough to make abundantly clear in all reasonable quarters that it is Hanoi, and especially Peiping, who are the obstacles to peace. Obviously, we shall have to reiterate our position in UN debate, and may have to respond to further third country initiatives, although the field is happily fairly clear at the moment. But we agree we do not need to add to the record or to state our position further except in response to clear need.

7. GVN internal political progress naturally remains basic to any lasting solution whether by negotiation or by course of events without any “settlement”. We have impression Ky Government settling down somewhat and generally acting wisely, with your advice, to deal with possible threats from various quarters. We have no particular suggestions in this area, but look forward to your continuing reports especially directed to the prospects for generating younger, more energetic, and more cohesive leadership group, and winning more positive popular support.⁷

8. Above are general thoughts on which we would welcome your comment. Some of these areas require continuing decisions and action, but we are inclined to think also that over-all complexity of situation may make it desirable to set up conference—perhaps in Honolulu and perhaps in late October for intensive discussion all these problems. By that time Porter should be in harness and time right for such stock-taking.⁸

9. Although we have slugged this message for your eyes only, you may of course discuss it with your top people if and to the degree you see fit.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by William Bundy, approved in draft by McGeorge Bundy and McNamara, and approved by Ball. A September 12 draft of this telegram with handwritten revisions by McGeorge Bundy is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XL, Memos. The substantive changes by McGeorge Bundy are indicated in footnotes below.
2. In the September 12 draft, McGeorge Bundy changed the phrase “extending perhaps eventually up to 30-50 miles from our base areas” to read as it does at this point. He also added the subsequent sentence in the parentheses.
3. On September 7, Westmoreland issued MACV Directive 525-3 prescribing guidelines designed to minimize non-combatant battle casualties. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XL)
4. In the draft, the phrase originally read: “exchange our thoughts.”

5. Not marked as excised in the September 12 draft, but excised by McGeorge Bundy from the final text of the telegram, was the following paragraph 4:

   “Content of bombing program against DRV is next military question. Our inclination is to extend strike program very gradually into area northeast of Hanoi, stressing key targets on northeast rail line and limited number other valid military targets. This would be without stepping up over-all number of strikes per week, but might be accompanied by some intensification armed recce particularly designed to keep key transportation links out of action in area roughly up to 20th parallel. We are still inclined not to hit Hanoi/Haiphong targets or to take actions that would have major chance altering ChiCom posture.”

6. See vol. II, Document 287.
7. McGeorge Bundy added the last phrase to this sentence.
8. McGeorge Bundy suggested deleting the last two sentences of paragraph 8 for the time being. In telegram 1062 from Saigon, September 27, Lodge stated that the Embassy would prefer a Honolulu meeting after November 9 because it wanted time to get pacification and refugee programs started in areas of small guerrilla concentrations and because of the number of official visitors to South Vietnam. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)