Office of the Historian

143. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1

Saigon, September 15, 1965.

Unnumbered. For the President.

1. Refugees—an opportunity.

Am developing program on crash basis to make refugee situation an opportunity for spearheading a national political revolution against Communist-subversion/terrorism instead of treating it as a social and economic liability. New approach now being studied prior to my discussing with GVN.

Program envisages providing adequate care, temporary housing to refugees who will be immediately organized into self-governing units (essentially their own former village organization) and trained in processes of democracy while undergoing rehabilitation. Men of military age will receive paramilitary training for village defense with maximum effort through Chieu Hoi surrenderee program to secure return of those men (often the majority of those villages in refugee areas) still under Viet Cong control. Military civic action personnel expected play important role in all aspects of refugee program in zones of American influence.

Objective of program (in coordination with military progress) is to send village groups, like pilgrim fathers, well trained and organized, back to their original villages wherever economically desirable, inspired and equipped to build new lives, and able and willing to defend themselves against Communist marauders in same way Texas pioneers fought Comanches and Apaches.

Proposal should not be released prior to coordination here with GVN.

2. U.S. troops.

I made my first visit to US ground troops—the Third Marine Division at Danang and the First Cavalry Division at Qui Nhon.2 I wish I could describe the feelings of confidence which they inspire—both as to the understanding of the mixed political and military nature of their mission and as to the confidence which they create among Vietnamese.

3. Political.

The Convention of the Armed Forces met in a day-long closed session in a Saigon movie theater on September 11, with more than 1600 officers [Page 392] from all services. They adopted resolutions rejecting any negotiations with or coalition with North Viet-Nam and denunciation of maneuvers tending to create disorder and division. Purpose of the meeting was to put pressure on the students, the intellectuals and the provincial councils by presenting an image of monolithic solidarity within the armed [forces].

4. Military.

The lull in large-scale Viet Cong activity continued with the Viet Cong apparently going through a period of realignment of their units and re-evaluation of their plans.

5. Economic.

End of the month rice stores in both Saigon and the Delta dipped to lower levels and the previous favorable decline in Saigon rice price was arrested. Since recent rice arrivals have been delivered to Danang, the supply situation in Saigon remains a matter of concern. Expected rice shipment in the next fortnight should relieve the situation.

6. Psychological.

Editorials in the Vietnamese language press were marked by optimism on the course of the war.

7. Negotiations.

(1)
Ambassador Goldberg is quoted by the Associated Press under a September 12 dateline as saying that an honorable peace “can only be achieved by negotiation premised on the principles of self-determination”.
(2)
If Ambassador Goldberg is correctly quoted, then I would like respectfully to disagree for reasons set forth in my letter to you of August 31.3 I am positive that negotiation is certainly not the “only way”, and I believe that under certain circumstances it may not be the best way.
(3)
To the points of my letter of August 31, let me add the following thoughts which have occurred to me upon further reflection:
(A)
To maintain that the purpose of our military operations is to bring about “unconditional negotiations” puts a floor under the risks which the Communists run. If they know that they can always get to the conference table they have the initiative in setting the time and the terms for negotiations and thus they will have every incentive to continue military operations.
(B)
When considering the word “negotiations”, one must never forget that the Communists will not enter negotiations with any intention of “settling” anything, but with the aim of winning at the conference table the prize which eluded them on the battlefield. One thing is absolutely certain: there can be no hope of negotiating them out of anything that [Page 393] they hold on the ground. They will strive not for stability, but for victory, and by then the contest will be largely psychological.
(C)
I am, of course, not opposed to negotiations in principle, provided we have a clear and sagacious program, but we must recognize that negotiations begin a new phase of the struggle rather than mark the end of the old phase. Stakes remain extremely high and the conduct of affairs grows more complicated, because it depends on so many intangibles. Negotiations, therefore, require as careful and thoughtful preparation as do our military campaigns.
Lodge
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 6:36 a.m. Lodge sent this unnumbered telegram to the Department of State with instructions to pass it to the White House, but a note on the source text indicates that it was not.↩
  2. Lodge’s full report on his visit is in telegram 888 from Saigon, September 14. (Ibid.)↩
  3. Document 131.↩