131. Letter From the Ambassador to Vietnam (Lodge) to President Johnson1

Dear Mr. President:

Herewith are some of my innermost preoccupations, which I have sent to no one else, and which I send to you in the hope that they may prevent reverses in the future. I will, of course, be glad to have this letter go to Dean Rusk, Bob McNamara and MacBundy—and anyone else whom you may choose.

I am concerned about the current U.S. stress on a “settlement” and on “negotiations” to the neglect of the concept of a satisfactory “outcome” or “result”.

I believe that with great and sustained effort we can get a satisfactory “outcome”, but it is hard for me to visualize a satisfactory “settlement”. [Page 364] In other words, we can succeed in warding off the communist aggression, but we will not get them to admit it. If we do get a satisfactory “outcome”, it will be a real achievement in which we will all be able to take pride.

You should probably make an announcement about it. It must look like the true success which it most certainly would be, and it must not look like a failure because we have not achieved a “settlement”—or because General De Gaulle doesn’t enthuse.

We should therefore stress the need for warding off the aggression, for getting a satisfactory “outcome”, and not lay so much stress on diplomatic settlements which we probably are not going to be able to get. The attempt to do so would probably make Ho Chi Minh lose face, thus causing him to fight harder, thus lengthening the war and increasing the bloodshed.

If I am wrong, and we do get a neat diplomatic document in which the communists admit that they have been beaten, then we have lost nothing by following my advice—although it is hard to understand the value of such a document given the worthlessness of such a communist commitment.

Let me give two illustrations:

Illustration No. 1

The heartland of Viet-Nam, as is shown on a population map which I recently sent to Mac Bundy, consists of the coastal plain plus the Delta (of which I class Saigon as a part). About 65 per cent of the population is in those areas.

Suppose that we and the Vietnamese:

—really control the coastal plain (as we appear to be on the way to doing);

—eliminate the Viet Cong from the Saigon-Delta area (which we have not done, but which could be done); and

—continue to hold the 43 provincial capitals which we now hold as well as the 240-odd district towns; and

Then suppose that:

we are strong enough in all these places so that with our air, sea and ground power we can force the Viet Cong to stay back in the hills—or the Camau peninsula—with the snakes and the tigers because they get such a bloody nose every time they try to attack.

If all these things happen, we will be in a very strong position indeed and everything else after that will be mopping up. We will be in control of areas with a total population of about 11 million out of a national total of about 15 million. (Source: Statistics Branch-USOM Public Administration Division)

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Neither in the Philippines nor in Malaya was every last communist guerrilla apprehended. Some of them became farmers and some of them went into the hills where they still are—and where they do no harm.

Illustration No. 2

Another possibility is that the Viet Cong suddenly decides to stop fighting and that a silence falls. This has happened in other oriental countries.

We would consider either of the above illustrations as a satisfactory outcome, and you would be entitled to put it out to the public as an effective warding off of the aggression—something in which all Americans could take pride.

But if you make a “settlement” and diplomatic “negotiations” as a symbol of success, you are really reaching for the moon. The communists do not like to sign papers in which they admit that they were defeated. They prefer always to leave these situations hanging, with the implication that a few years later they may be back. The fact that they don’t come back forcefully (as they didn’t in the Philippines and in Malaya) doesn’t alter the fact that they don’t like to look as though they have given up.

I understand fully the inestimable value of making it clear to public opinion at home that you are willing to go anywhere and try anything for the sake of peace. It is your willingness to do this which has been a major factor in the extremely skillful job which you have done in unifying American public opinion behind U.S. policy in Viet-Nam—a remarkable performance in every way. But I hope that you can keep U.S. opinion united without at the same time getting yourself into a position where you can’t get credit for a satisfactory outcome once it is achieved.

It is surely possible, as we have done so far, to handle U Thant carefully without over-praising him. Surely the aggression can be successfully warded off without at the same time stipulating a re-affirmation of the Geneva agreement, a guarantee of free elections, and undertakings concerning reunification of North and South Viet-Nam—which are not worth much when signed.

With warm and respectful regards,

Faithfully yours,

Cabot L.
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Lodge Letters to the President. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Received in the White House and delivered to the President on September 2. (Telegram 614 to Saigon, September 2; ibid.)