Appendix
OVER-ALL US CONCEPT FOR VIETNAM (U)
Introduction
1. (S) The RVN is a politico/military
keystone in Southeast Asia and is symbolic of US determination in
Asia—as Berlin is in Europe—to prevent communist expansion. The
United States is committed to the defense of the RVN in order to assist a free people to
remain free. In addition to the freedom of the RVN, US national prestige, credibility,
and honor with respect to world-wide pledges, and declared national
policy are at stake. Further, it is incumbent upon the United States
at this stage to invalidate the communist concept of “wars of
national liberation.”
2. (S) The military operations envisioned in this concept paper must:
- a.
- Conform to the over-all US strategy and guidelines for
Southeast Asia as a whole, including the RVN, DRV, Laos, and Thailand.
- b.
- Be conducted in concert with appropriate US/GVN political, economic, and
social programs in order to guide and to expedite the
correlated achievement of US objectives.
- c.
- Be conceived and evaluated in terms of how much and how
well they will contribute to the above.
Factors Bearing on the Development of a US Military
Strategy for Vietnam
3. (S) The Viet Cong are directed, controlled, and supported
(including heavy military support and encadrement) by their sponsor,
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the DRV. Viet Cong activities in the RVN are characterized by persuasion
through propaganda, intimidation, and terror. Whenever possible,
through armed assault and coercion, the Viet Cong destroy the
capability of GVN authority to
govern, thus progressively reducing the ability of the GVN to bring the population and
resources base to bear on the problem. Having assumed control over
an area, the Viet Cong install their own political organization and
infrastructure. Then, using local manpower and logistics, the Viet
Cong organize, equip, and train military units to resist GVN attempts to establish its authority
and to expand Viet Cong control and influence into other areas.
4. (S) For the most part, the Viet Cong have sought to avoid a
large-scale sustained battle with US/GVN forces. Instead, their tactics have been to
maximize the advantages of initiative and surprise and to strike at
weakness with overwhelming strength, “fading away” when the combat
strength ratio is unfavorable to them. Currently, one of their major
objectives appears to be the destruction, through both attrition and
demoralization, of the RVNAF.
5. (TS) At present, the Viet Cong and DRV leaders appear confident that their course in the
RVN promises ultimate and
possibly early success without important concessions on their part.
This apparent confidence may have been fostered in part by the
current quest for some negotiating arrangement. They seem to believe
that they can achieve a series of local military successes which,
sooner or later, will bring victory through a combination of a
deteriorating South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) morale and effectiveness, a collapse of
anti-communist government in Saigon, and an exhaustion of the United
States will to persist.
6. (TS) In coping with larger US forces employed in a more aggressive
fashion, the Viet Cong would seek to avoid the kind of engagements
which risked a serious communist defeat. Instead, they would
probably concentrate on harassments intended to bleed and humiliate
US forces, attempting to trap and destroy isolated units where
possible. At a minimum, the Viet Cong would almost certainly
continue present efforts to cut land communications lines and would
step up the dispatch of small, expendable teams on sabotage and
assassination missions designed to gain propaganda advantages. The
communists might also seek to increase their activities in Laos.
7. (TS) Additionally, there is the possibility of ChiCom overt commitment of major
combat forces in Southeast Asia and other areas in the Western
Pacific. With the greater US involvement in the war in Vietnam, US
military posture must be so oriented as to deter ChiCom intervention and defeat this
intervention should it occur.
8. (S) The war in Vietnam is the single
most critical international problem facing the United States today,
and it portends the most serious immediate threat to continued US
world leadership and national security.
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The development of a US strategy for Vietnam is
necessarily influenced in varying degrees by the desirability to
maintain amicable relations with certain other nations; by the
desirability to receive from third countries a degree of support for
US policy; by US objectives and alliances elsewhere; by the fact of
the sovereignty of the GVN; and, by
the necessity to provide an effective Free World counter or answer
to “wars of national liberation.”
9. (S) The situation in the RVN has deteriorated to the point where
US national objectives are endangered and may not be achieved unless
GVN forces are bolstered,
adequate security for the South Vietnamese people is provided, and
the DRV is persuaded that the risks
of further involvement on their part outweigh the gains.
10. (TS) Our strategy for Vietnam should not allow the communists to
keep pace with or more than match our military efforts. A program of
slowly rising intensity with both sides in step carries with it the
danger that it will lead to less flexibility of choice, creeping
intervention by the Soviets and Chinese, first with materiel and
later with troops, and the eventual engulfing of both camps
unwillingly into an expanded war.
11. (TS) Briefly, the major problems to be dealt with in the conduct
of the war are:
- a.
- The continued direction and support of Viet Cong
operations by the DRV,
including infiltration from the North, and the apparent
attendant Viet Cong capability to provide materiel support
and to replace heavy personnel losses.
- b.
- The continued existence of a major Viet Cong
infrastructure, both political and military, in the RVN.
- c.
- The greater growth rate of Viet Cong strength as compared
to that of the South Vietnamese ground forces.
- d.
- The continued loss of LOCs, food-producing areas, and population to Viet
Cong control.
- e.
- The lack of a viable politico/economic structure in the
RVN.
- f.
- The threat of ChiCom
intervention or aggression in Southeast Asia and elsewhere
in the Western Pacific.
US Objectives, Tasks, and Basic Strategy
12. (TS) US national policy3 includes as an objective
in the RVN a stable and independent
noncommunist government. Implicit in this objective is the
containment of Communist China insofar as expansion into Southeast
Asia or elsewhere in the Western Pacific is concerned. Basic
military tasks, of equal priority, in support of this objective are:
- a.
- To cause the DRV to cease
its direction and support of the Viet Cong
insurgency.
- b.
- To defeat the Viet Cong and to extend GVN control over all of the
RVN.
- c.
- To deter Communist China from direct intervention and to
defeat such intervention if it occurs.
13. (TS) Friendly control of population and resources is essential to
success in countering guerrilla warfare. In this regard, the RVN areas of major military
significance are: the Saigon area and the Mekong Delta; the coastal
plain; and the central highlands. It is imperative that the
US/GVN have the support of the
people and the control of resources in those areas. Elimination of
the Viet Cong from these areas must be vigorously undertaken in
order to provide adequate security for the people. Of particular
importance is the need for friendly control of the main
food-producing areas in order that the GVN may gain control of rice, feed the people under its
control, enable exports of rice to bolster the economy, and cause
the Viet Cong to import or to fight for food. A paramount
requirement under this concept is the building and maintaining of a
series of secure bases and secure supporting LOCs at key localities along the sea coast, and
elsewhere as necessary, from which offensive operations can be
launched and sustained, with the subsequent enlargement and
expansion of the secure areas.
14. (TS) The US basic strategy for accomplishing the above tasks
should be: to intensify military pressure on the DRV by air and naval power; to destroy
significant DRV military targets,
including the base of supplies; to interdict supporting LOCs in the DRV; to interdict the infiltration and supply routes
into the RVN; to improve the combat
effectiveness of the RVNAF; to
build and protect bases; to reduce enemy reinforcements; to defeat
the Viet Cong in concert with RVN
and third country forces; and, to maintain adequate forces in the
Western Pacific and elsewhere in readiness to deter and to deal with
ChiCom aggression. By
aggressive and sustained exploitation of superior military force,
the United States/GVN would seize
and hold the initiative in both the DRV and the RVN,
keeping the DRV, the Viet Cong, and
the PL/VM at a disadvantage, progressively destroying the
DRV war-supporting power and
defeating the Viet Cong. The physical capability of the DRV to move men and supplies through
the Lao Corridor, down the coastline, across the DMZ, and through Cambodia, must be
reduced to the maximum practical extent by land, naval, and air
actions in these areas and against infiltration-connected targets.
Finally, included within the basic US military strategy must be a
build-up in Thailand to ensure attainment of the proper US-Thai
posture to deter ChiCom
aggression and to facilitate placing US forces in an advantageous
logistic position if such aggression occurs.
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Principal Measures for Executing the Basic Strategy and
for Achieving US Objectives
15. (TS) In order to gain the offensive and to seize and hold the
initiative in the RVN, a major
effort must be made not only in terms of direct combat action to
expand the areas under US/GVN
control but also to support the GVN
in its rural reconstruction program and to assist that government in
the creation of new military units and the rehabilitation of its
depleted units as rapidly as possible. A psychological climate must
be created that will foster RVN
rural reconstruction progress. It will be noted in paragraph 13
above that, along with the Saigon area, the Mekong Delta is
considered of primary importance. While no US land operations are
currently envisaged in the Mekong Delta (IV Corps Tactical Zone)
because of the comparatively inactive enemy situation now existing
there, increased Viet Cong activity could later necessitate US/Third
Country operations in that important area.
16. (TS) The intensification of military pressures on the DRV, PL/VM, and the Viet
Cong, the destruction of military stocks, supporting facilities, and
the interdiction of communist infiltration and supply routes into
the RVN will necessarily require:
- a.
- An immediate acceleration and increase in the scale,
scope, and intensity of air and naval actions against the
DRV. These actions
should be directed against key military and economic
targets, the destruction of which should dissuade the DRV from supporting the Viet
Cong insurgency; this would include mining of DRV ports. Targets would
include these main groupings:POL, LOCs,
mines (including coal), military installations, port
facilities, and power stations. Attacks against population
centers as such would continue to be avoided.
- b.
- Intensified land, naval, and air actions to reduce
infiltration into the RVN.
Such actions would include a stepped-up land, sea, and air
campaign against infiltration routes, designed to minimize
the flow into the RVN of
personnel and materiel.
17. (TS) During the build-up phase US/Third Country and GVN forces should strengthen military
and civilian control in present areas of the RVN while intensifying air and naval attacks against
the DRV and communist infiltration
and supply routes into the RVN. As
the force build-up is achieved, a principal offensive effort within
the RVN of US/Third Country forces
should be to participate with the RVNAF in search and destroy operations while assisting
the RVNAF in clearing and securing
operations in support of the rural reconstruction effort. US/Third
Country air and ground operations should be conducted on a sustained
basis; attack and destruction of base areas should be directed at
applying continuous pressure on the VC to keep them off balance.
18. (TS) To deter ChiCom direct
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intervention or aggression
in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in the Western Pacific, and to deal
with such intervention or aggression if it occurs would, in addition
to the measures above, require:
- a.
- A credible strategic force posture in Southeast Asia and
elsewhere to meet the ChiCom threat.
- b.
- A suitable build-up in Thailand to enable the expeditious
deployment there of major US forces. This build-up would
include logistic support bases, new airfields, improvement
of existing airbases to increase their capacity,
improvements to LOCs, and
measures to increase the readiness of the Thai armed
forces.
Execution
19. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, as a matter of
principle, CINCPAC should be
given as wide latitude as possible under the circumstances in
executing the above measures in consonance with the forces, support,
and general policy guidance provided to CINCPAC by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
