Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

52. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, January 30, 1965, 7:41 p.m.

1570. For Ambassador Taylor from McGeorge Bundy.

1. Thanks for your 2348² confirming plans for visit. This message deals with preliminary thoughts for our talks.

2. I hope we can avoid extended organized briefings. I do not learn well that way, and in any case the point of this visit is to get a chance to exchange thoughts with you on hard fundamental future problems. The more time we can spend in very small groups on these central problems the better.

3. Nevertheless I think we need to compare our pictures of the existing situation and especially of two basic elements of it. First, how is the struggle against the Viet Cong going? In this we need to look (1) at Viet Cong capabilities now and in the future, (2) at present and future prospects for our pacification efforts, and (3) at state of Vietnamese morale, civil and military. Washington is assuming that the course of this contest has been generally unfavorable for more than a year and that in the absence of major changes it is likely to get worse. If in your view this assumption is wrong, we need to work hard on this specific question.

4. The other central aspect of current situation is the present and future prospect for “stable government.” Present directives make such a government an essential prerequisite for important additional U.S. major action, but we now wonder whether this requirement is either realistic or necessary. If not, then we need to consider what actions are possible both within SVN and against the North while GVN lacks desired stability. We also need to consider what positive or negative effect additional U.S. action may have on this problem. Sample questions are, whether Phase II actions could be used to strengthen GVN and whether U.S. could organize its own efforts at all levels within SVN detached from political problems of central government.

5. These questions lead away from estimate of present situation to discussion of U.S. courses of action, and in this area we see particular importance in the following:

(1) Review of our existing efforts within SVN. One recurrent question here is that of size and shape of U.S. presence, both military and civilian. We sense possible differences of judgment on wisdom of more Americans in different fields.

(2) Review of planning for reprisals and discussion of relation of reprisal planning to Phase II.

(3) Possible value in SVN of stronger and clearer U.S policy statements.

(4) Shape of U.S. negotiating posture, going forward from analysis in your 2235.³

6. In addition to these broad aspects of present situation and U.S. policy, we see urgent need to discuss immediate problems, of which the most important are:

(1) The ways and means of evacuation of dependents, to include both timing and means of preventing misunderstanding.

(2) The third country programs.

(3) Contingency planning against unpleasant political or military developments in the near future.

Ball

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; LOR. Drafted in the White House; cleared by William Bundy, McNaughton, and Unger; and approved by McGeorge Bundy.
2. Dated January 29. (Ibid.)
3. Document 32.