Office of the Historian

53. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1

Saigon, January 31, 1965, 4 p.m.

2359. Ref: JCS 004244 to CINCPAC, CINCPAC 301845Z.2 From the point of view of the deteriorating situation in SVN, a DRV attack on a DeSoto patrol followed by immediate strong and effective U.S. retaliation would offer a priceless advantage to our cause here. I hope that in approving the February 3 mission that this thought is uppermost in our minds and that there is no doubt as to the decision which will follow a DRV act of provocation.

With regard to VNAF inclusion in retaliation plans, we have never discussed retaliation with GVN leaders except in context of reaction to [Page 116] VC actions in SVN. In view of the present turmoil in Saigon, I would recommend not considering inclusion of VNAF in possible retaliatory action arising from next DeSoto patrol. It may be desirable to take VNAF into our planning at a later date.

Taylor
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC.↩
  2. Regarding JCS 004244 to CINCPAC, see footnote 3, Document 43. CINCPAC 301845Z provided operational details for retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam (to be codenamed Flaming Dart) in the event the planned DeSoto patrol was attacked. (Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 219,DESOTO)↩