Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

51. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara¹

Washington, January 29, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Reprisal to Significant Incidents in the RVS

JCSM–70–65

1. US reprisals for Viet Cong (VC)/Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) significant incidents have been the subject of national policy deliberations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to review past actions on the subject and to provide their current views and recommendations. Initially, the concept of reprisal against the DRV appeared in NSAM 288, dated 17 March 1964.² That NSAM recognized the DRV as the instigator, the motivating and sustaining force behind the VC and considered reprisals only by Government of Vietnam (GVN) forces against North Vietnam.

2. VC/DRV deliberate actions against US personnel and forces have increased. For a compilation of the 1964 incidents, see Appendix A.³

3. Subsequent to attacks against US Navy destroyers in the Tonkin Gulf,NSAM 314, dated 10 September 1964,⁴ ordered preparedness to respond against the DRV in the event of any attack on US units or any special DRV/VC action against South Vietnam (SVN). On 1 November 1964, a mortar attack against the Bien Hoa Airfield resulted in the loss of a portion of a USAF B–57 squadron and the death of four US military personnel and the wounding of 72. A recent act—the bombing of the Brink BOQ in Saigon on 24 December—killed two US personnel and wounded 64 US and 43 Vietnamese.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff by JCSM–933–64, dated 4 November 1964,⁵ recommended strong reprisal actions be taken against the DRV for the attack on the Bien Hoa Airfield. In addition, by JCSM–955–64, dated 14 November 1964,⁶ the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised that they considered the reprisals recommended for the Bien Hoa incident equally applicable for any subsequent provocation of a similar nature in Southeast Asia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff on 28 December 1964, by JCSM–1076–64,⁷ again recommended an air attack be conducted against the DRV as a reprisal for the Brink BOQ bombing incident.

5. The lack of US response to major VC/DRV attacks against US personnel and forces in the RVN could be misconstrued, with the result that further anti-US incidents could take place, to include attacks against US dependents. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted Ambassador Taylor’s views and agree with him that reprisal actions should be taken to dampen further terrorist acts.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the next such significant provocation should be met with a positive, timely, and appropriate response in order to demonstrate to the DRV that these provocations will bring prompt and destructive response from the United States. Reprisals should be undertaken, preferably within twenty-four hours, against selected targets in the DRV. GVN forces should be used to the extent feasible.

7. As you are aware, US military forces can respond to provocations on short notice. To apprise you of military planning actions, a resume of possible reprisal actions of varying intensities for which US plans are available for execution in a minimum of time is contained in Appendix B.⁸ This resume sets forth strike forces available for reprisal actions in both Laos and North Vietnam, together with the target designations and sorties required for four preplanned actions.

8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

a. A US reprisal with VNAF participation as feasible be taken for the next significant provocative act.

b. This action be initiated promptly, preferably within twenty-four hours.

In order to reduce the time involved in the decision-making process, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will, insofar as practicable, recommend reprisal actions based upon the actions contained in Appendix B.⁹

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1265, Viet 381. Top Secret; Sensitive.
2. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, Document 87.
3. Attached but not printed.
4. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, Document 345.
5. Ibid., footnote 3, Document 395.
6. Ibid., Document 411.
7. Ibid., footnote 3, Document 472.
8. Attached but not printed.
9. In a February 4 memorandum to Wheeler, Vance replied that he had noted the Joint Chiefs’ comments and indicated that copies of this memorandum had been given to the Department of State and to McGeorge Bundy. Vance concluded by stating that the Joint Chiefs’ views “will be given the fullest consideration in determining future courses of action.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 6489, Vietnam 381)