Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

50. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, January 29, 1965, 7:55 p.m.

1565. Embtel 2345.²

1. From here analysis reftel indicates our problem is to deal with Khanh in manner which neither increases his prestige nor consolidates his power but leaves us in position to continue effective relationships with him should he make his coup stick. At same time it appears we must maintain flexible position in regard to potential opposition among other military leaders and useful contacts with Buddhists pending clarification Khanh’s intentions and prospects.

2. To this end we propose take line in response press questions January 30 which corresponds to public attitude you discussed with Khanh in reftel i.e.:

a. We continuing routine operations with interim government.

b. Meanwhile we are waiting to see what government will emerge in more permanent form.

c. Question of recognition will not arise, if it does arise, until government structure further clarified.

d. We continuing to deal with Vietnamese Government at appropriate levels on subject of aid.

e. U.S. not taking positions on basis of individuals or on details internal Vietnamese affairs but hoping only for effective government exercising full sovereignty and based on support all significant elements of country.

f. If queried on Thich Tri Quang January 29 interview with Saigon Daily News and Saigon Post we should reply we have read this expression of views with interest.

g. If queried about your meeting with Khanh we would reply that you had a useful exchange on subject shape of future govt, but, as already noted, this remains unclear.

Ball

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. In telegram 2345, January 29, Taylor analyzed the political prospects of the new government following the coup, emphasizing the likelihood of continuing political instability given Khanh’s precarious alliance with the Buddhists, potential opposition within the military, and Khanh’s concern with personal power rather than national interests. (Ibid.)