Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

49. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, January 29, 1965, 7 p.m.

2342. Ref: A. Embtel 2308.² B. Embtel 2326.³ C. Embtel 2292.⁴ Alex Johnson and I called on Gen Khanh this morning, January 29, at the General Staff building primarily to find out what his plans really are with respect to the government. He had with him Admiral Cang, the CNO, and General Cao, the Secretary General of the Armed Forces Council. He asked if these two officers could be present and we readily agreed. This is a new development and probably reflects the desire of the other generals to have a third party account of Khanh’s interviews with the Americans.

We opened the discussion by asking Khanh how we were to understand his statements on governmental procedure contained in Ref A with those made at his press conference, Reference B. In the ensuing discussion, the following facts were established:

Khanh says that his statements at the press conference were deliberately made to veil his ultimate intention which is to carry out the procedures outlined in Reference A. However, to have announced this fact at yesterday’s press conference would have had the effect of labeling the ensuing government as Khanh’s project. Hence, he preferred to outline the governmental organization which actually exists today without referring to what he hopes it will become later.

He says that he is on the following schedule. By the end of this week, he will have chosen the members of the Civilian-Military Council. This is the 20-man body which will include representation from what he calls the five pressure groups—the armed forces, the Buddhists, the Catholics, the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai. Additionally, there will be six “Notables”, two chosen from the north, center and south of Viet-Nam. Once this body is formed as a consultative organ of the AFC, he expects the members to recommend to him the procedure contained in Ref A. Thus, the new government will come about at the recommendation of this body broadly representative of the principal national groupings. Once this recommendation is made to the AFC, it will be quickly accepted and the procedure will be carried out whereby the Civilian-Military Council will pick a Chief of State who in turn will pick a Prime Minister who will then present a new government to the Civilian-Military Council for approval. In short, the Civilian-Military Council will act as a reconstituted High National Council.

Khanh believes that all this can be done by the end of next week even though the Tet holidays intervene.

Johnson alluded to the obvious difficulty of getting good men to come into a government which the public understands will last only until elections. Khanh thinks this difficulty can be overcome, pointing out that the Civilian-Military Council may recommend a postponement of elections. In this case, the new government might continue indefinitely, even if elections are held, since the provisions of the old charter still govern which require a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly in order to remove the existing government.

I asked about the Buddhist attitude toward this program—were they satisfied? Khanh seems to be sure that they will be, although it is far from clear to us why the Institute would be satisfied with only two representatives in the total of 20 of the Civilian-Military Council. I asked further about the status of the “treaty” between the armed forces and the institute (Reference C). Khanh says that the treaty is still valid although certainly the government which it is discussing looks nothing like the all-military dictatorship referred to in the “treaty”. Khanh says that this was the extreme case and since the Buddhists had indicated a willingness to support such a military dictatorship, they certainly would be satisfied with a government considerably less drastic in form. He repeated that he expects Tri Quang and Ho Giac to leave the country and Thich Tam Chau to go into a remote pagoda. Prior to these actions, the Institute would presumably choose new leadership.

Khanh talked at some length about the need to eliminate the Buddhist chaplains from the armed forces since they were a source of subversion. He has in mind removing all chaplains of all faiths, at least for a period of some months. He anticipates difficulties with the Catholics in getting agreement, but by appealing to their patriotism he is hopeful.

We then talked at some length about the problems in the Hue-Danang area. Khanh is clearly concerned about the situation there which results, he says, from the traditional spirit of regionalism which dominates the provinces around Hue. I told him that we had viewed very seriously the anti-American demonstrations in that area and that I felt I had probably made a mistake in not withdrawing all Americans during that period. Even now although tranquillity had been restored for the moment, the same disruptive factors are present in Hue. Hence, I felt obliged to give continued consideration to the need to evacuate at least U.S. dependents from that part of Viet-Nam.

Khanh tried to explain away the anti-U.S. demonstrations as of limited importance and reacted strongly to the suggestion of withdrawing dependents. He urged me not to be precipitate and at least to wait until after Tet, thus providing a pause for the calming of emotions. After Tet, he suggested that we consult together again on the matter.

I agreed that it was important to move slowly but undertook no commitment to act one way or another.

We then talked about the public attitude which the Embassy should take toward the government. I told him that it was impossible to be more explicit at this time than to say that we were continuing routine operations with the interim government. Meanwhile we were waiting to see what government would emerge in a more permanent form. He agreed that this attitude was reasonable but showed concern that the public understand that we were in contact with him again. I told him that it was routine for us to inform the press at the end of the day whom I had visited in the government and that such an announcement would be made today. We would not indicate, however, the discussion of any specific items. Khanh agreed to this proceeding.

Khanh then talked somewhat about the future form which he had in mind for the government. He is thinking of forming the ministries into three groups, one including Defense, Information and Interior to constitute the war-making bloc; a second, a Finance and Economics bloc; and the remaining ministries (less Foreign Affairs and Justice) categorized as the development bloc. Foreign Affairs and Justice would report directly to the Prime Minister. We made no particular comment upon this proposed organization other than to mention the desirability of keeping the Bureau of the Budget directly under the Prime Minister.

In general, Khanh tried to paint to us a picture of the armed forces thoroughly in control of the situation and ready to deal with the Buddhist Institute as one of several power groups which must be taken into account in the formation of a government. I told him that the situation was being viewed quite differently abroad where the overthrow of the Huong government is being interpreted as a Buddhist Institute victory over a government supported by the United States. Since no one believes that the Buddhist Institute could have done this alone, it is a natural inference that the armed forces were allied with the Buddhist Institute in sabotaging Huong. Khanh insists that coming events will soon disprove this theory and that the Buddhist leaders will be shelved, as was Huong. I told him that this would be all to the good when it occurred but meanwhile we should all be thinking about ways and means of dispelling the impression of a Buddhist Institute victory which may be the first step toward a neutralist government.

We are not at all sure whether Khanh really believes that he can carry out the program which he has outlined to us. Even if sincerely committed to it, he is going to encounter difficulties in setting up the Civilian-Military Council, in getting it to act in accordance with his behest, and finally in obtaining suitable ministers for the new government.

It may be that he recognizes these facts but wants to make the visible effort. If he fails he can always say that he tried and continue to live with present interim government. The composition of the latter must be particularly appealing to him, with vague old man Suu and Chief of State and pliable “Jack” Oanh as acting Prime Minister. We can think of no better lineup from his point of view to allow indirect control of the government by Khanh and his generals.

Taylor

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to the Department of Defense, the White House, CIA, Bangkok, Vientiane, and CINCPAC for POLAD. Received in the Department of State at 10:27 a.m.
2. In telegram 2308, January 27, Taylor reported on a meeting with Khanh in which Khanh summarized the decisions of the Armed Forces Council, and Taylor made several follow-up comments. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXVI)
3. In telegram 2326, January 28, Taylor reported on General Khanh’s press conference at 9:30 a.m. that morning, in which Khanh talked about the previous day’s coup and outlined the organization, goals, and personnel of the new government. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S)
4. In telegram 2292, January 26, U. Alexis Johnson reported on his 45-minute meeting with General Khanh earlier that day, during which Johnson expressed his opposition to a change in government, contending that the present government could deal with the current crisis if given loyal military support. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)