Office of the Historian

275. Memorandum for the Record1

Washington, April 27, 1965, 8:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

  • Discussion with Secretary Rusk—Admiral Raborn attended
1.

Rusk raised the question of a recent TDCS from Saigon2 indicating that “the Viet Cong were going north” in withdrawal paralleling that [Page 608] of 1954. He raised the question whether this meant the south to the north part of South Vietnam, or north to North Vietnam. I have not seen this cable, nor could I express an opinion on its credibility.

Note: I should look at this report immediately and report to Rusk.

2.
I raised the question of the policy of the April 21st paper3 on the strikes against North Vietnam and reiterated the views expressed in my letter to Rusk, McNamara and Bundy on April 2nd4 and the new draft of April 27th5 which I intend to send to the President. I pointed out that the philosophy of the April 21st paper changed the purposes of the bombing and that I felt the DRV could ride out this kind of bombing and if we wanted to bring them to the conference table, we better “tighten the tourniquet”. I said there were no indications they were seriously interested in negotiating on terms acceptable to us and this had been our estimate. Rusk said that we could not be sure that carrying the bombing north would bring them to the conference table. I pointed out that the existing extimate6 was that when the industrial north was threatened, they very probably would seek some form of negotiation. My point was that the April 21st paper brought in a new approach to the war and that adequate estimates of Communist reactions had not been prepared; that the estimate of April 23rd7 was a hurried one and was made after the fact. Rusk replied that the polices of the April 21st paper were not made hurriedly, that my letter of April 2nd had been thoughtfully considered, and the decision to pursue the war on the basis outlined in the April 21st paper was deliberately make after extended discussions between McNamara, Rusk and Bundy. I said it would be necessary for me to express my views to the President and I did not think my letter of April 2 had been presented to him.
3.
Rusk raised the question of Mr. Joe Kraft, newspaperman going to Hanoi. Kraft received a visa; I strongly suggested he be given a passport.

Action:DDP should study whether there could be an operational opportunity here.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Vietnam.]

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80 BO 1265A, Memos for the Record, 1 Mar-28 Apr 65. Secret; Eyes Only. Apparently dictated by McCone and transcribed in his office. The time of the meeting is taken from Rusk’s Appointment Book at the Johnson Library. The meeting was held at the Department of State. (Ibid.)↩
  2. Not further identified.↩
  3. Document 265.↩
  4. See the attachment to Document 234.↩
  5. Apparently a reference to Document 279.↩
  6. Document 139.↩
  7. Apparently the final version of Document 268.↩