276. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
3552. From Ambassador Taylor. Although Quat had not summoned us to resume the discussions reported in reference telegram,2 Alex Johnson and I went to see him this afternoon to find out the current status of his thinking on the introduction of international forces. We found that he was full of the subject, having discussed many aspects of the military manpower shortage with Generals Thieu and Minh over the weekend.
He is particularly impressed with the need and possibility of increasing the national effort beyond the present program of 31 additional ARVN battalions between July 1965 and March 1966 (the so-called second alternative). He sees numerous possibilities of utilizing certain specially trained regional force soldiers, ex-non-coms dismissed by Diem in the late 1950’s, and officers presently assigned to civilian ministries. He also considers that the Nungs and Hoa Hao are capable of producing many more soliders and units than at present. He has charged General Minh with looking into these possibilities and of formulating a new program to superimpose on the second alternative. Knowing something of the problem of raising additional forces, I have doubts as to the feasibility of most of Quat’s ideas, but his enthusiasm is certainly laudable.
With regard to additional US forces, we agreed that General Westmoreland should contact Generals Thieu and Minh and work out plans for the following movements: (a) three battalion equivalents to move into Bien Hoa-Vung Tau in early May; (b) three battalion equivalents, followed by three air squadrons, to move into Chu Lai early May; (c) three battalion equivalents to move into Qui Nhon-Nhatrang in mid-June. It is understood that in addition to these US combat forces, there will be substantial numbers of logistic troops brought in to add to the logistic support presently in-country, to provide support for the additional combat forces, and to improve the logistic facilities in the three areas mentioned above.
With regard to publicity, it was agreed that, as combat units are about to enter the country, as in the case of the Marines, there will be a [Page 610] simple announcement made, indicating that the additional forces come at the invitation of the Government of Vietnam.
We then passed to a discussion of third country forces. Quat made a fuzzy introduction which led me to believe for a moment that he was going to raise obstacles to non-US foreign troops. However, in a circumlocution which was difficult to follow, he concluded that since it was the position of his Government that the cause of South Vietnam is really the cause of the Free World, it would be entirely consistent for him to accept third country units. He noted in passing that he was aware of our US domestic problem and that the presence of other flags would be of assistance to us.
I told him that I felt sure the Australians were prepared to offer a battalion and that Ambassador Anderson would no doubt be seeking an appointment with him shortly. He replied that Anderson was already on his list for callers for tomorrow. He showed some interest in the possibility of a Korean reinforcement but was markedly cool to the thought of additional Philippine forces. We left both matters open with the agreement to obtain Ambassador Lodge’s impressions of his visits to Seoul and Manila when Lodge calls tomorrow.3 Also, Quat authorized Alex Johnson to discuss the matter of these foreign contingents with Foreign Minister Tran Van Do who we find is abreast of these matters.
General Westmoreland is undertaking planning at once with Thieu and Minh on the approved subjects.4 As these matters were presented to Quat as being what I would recommend to Washington if he concurred, I now request approval of the introduction of the US Combat and Logistic Forces on the general schedule indicated above.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. X. Top Secret;Nodis. The source text is a typed unsigned transcript that McGeorge Bundy forwarded to the President under an April 27 memorandum stating: “Max now recommends a 9-battalion decision. My own view is that we ought to decide something more limited—perhaps the items (a) and (b) in his third paragraph (6 battalions).”↩
- Telegram 3511 from Saigon, April 24. (Ibid., Country File, Vietnam, NODIS-LOR, Vol. IIA)↩
- See footnote 3, Document 270.↩
- Westmoreland’s follow-up meeting with Generals Minh and Thieu on April 28 is summarized in his memorandum of conversation that day. (Johnson Library, Westmoreland Papers, History Backup)↩