274. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
3539. For Greenfield. Pass USIA for Bunce, DOD for Sylvester. We have been giving some thought to press problems which will arise as Marines or other U.S. troops move to more active role against Viet Cong.
Officially and on the record mission spokesmen have restricted themselves to language used in DOD release of March 7, 1965, specifying that “limited mission of Marines will be to relieve GVN forces now engaged in security duties for action in the pacification program and in offensive role against Communist guerrilla forces.”
On background spokesmen have answered affirmatively questions as to whether Marines would (a) fight if attacked and (b) engage in “patrolling in depth” to deepen Danang perimeter defense. With respect to (b) it has been explained that such patrolling in depth is necessary part of Marine primary defensive mission.
Speculative stories have appeared here on eventual combat role for Marines. Any additional input of U.S. combat troops will doubtless feed this speculation.
(An AP “news analysis” for example, datelined Saigon, April 22, speaks of the eventuality that involvement of U.S. ground troops in combat would raise the question of a joint command. While conceding that such a command “would have little practical effect on relations between the allies”, the article states that it “would be a major diplomatic development [Page 607] that could spark powerful international reaction.” Further, according to a statement attributed to “Vietnamese civilian and military leaders”, the Vietnamese people would have to be “conditioned” to accept such a situation, and efforts would need to be made to counteract Communist propaganda to the effect that the South Vietnamese Government is the “lackey of American imperialists.”
Under these circumstances we believe that the most useful approach to press problem is to make no special public announcement to the effect that U.S. ground troops are now engaged in offensive combat operations, but to announce such actions routinely as they occur. As the Marines move from their present posture of securing the Danang airbase “in depth” to actions which can be related only indirectly to Danang, military spokesman will be queried on whether Marine mission has changed and he will answer that, while we never discuss future, current operations speak for themselves. Eventually, of course, fact that Marines or other ground troops are engaged in offensive combat will be officially confirmed. This low-key treatment will not obviate the political and psychological problems mentioned above, but will allow us to handle them undramatically, as a natural consequence of our determination to meet our commitments here.
Our treatment, in short, should be patterned on the manner in which we presented the application of U.S. air power against the Viet Cong.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC, Bangkok, and Vientiane.↩