Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

240. Memorandum for the Record¹

Honolulu, April 4, 1965, 9 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Admiral Sharp, CINCPAC
• General Barnes, C/S—CINCPAC
• General Milton, J-5—CINCPAC
• Admiral Heintz, CINCPAC
• Minister Norman Hannah,POLAD, CINCPAC
• Ambassador Taylor
• General DePuy
• Mr. H.F. Matthews, Jr.

Ambassador Taylor showed Admiral Sharp and his officers a number of key papers dealing with his Washington consultations. The Ambassador emphasized that none of the material dealing with political matters (the Political Track) should be discussed with staff. Copies of the draft NSAM² and Ambassador Unger’s Memorandum for the Record of April 3³ were left with Admiral Sharp. The following topics were discussed:

1) Leaflet Drops in NVN. The Ambassador reported that the concept had been approved and that a cable on the subject was in preparation,⁴ but Secretary McNamara wanted to approve each specific operational aspect. The Secretary of Defense was particularly dubious about the “warning” type of leaflet.

2) Expanded Mission for the Marines. Ambassador Taylor said he had expected a message from DOD giving language for the expanded mission. He sent a telegram on this subject to the Department and DOD.⁵

3) The Tempo of Rolling Thunder. Admiral Sharp said he felt the attacks on radar sites were a waste of time and that we had lost a week trying to take them out. On the other hand, the armed road reconnaissance was worthwhile and should be very worrisome and damaging to the DRV. Ambassador Taylor said Secretary McNamara had directed the preparation of a three-month program which would cover targets in NVN except those in the Hanoi area. There was discussion of the opposing points of view represented by Mr. McCone that we were not really hurting NVN and should step up our attacks heavily if we are also taking the step of introducing U.S. combat forces, and that of Ambassador Thompson which favored a slowly rising tempo of attacks on the North and the introduction of as many troops in the South as we felt necessary. Ambassador Thompson felt troop additions would not bother the Soviets at all, while too fast an escalation of targets carried the danger of forcing the Soviets and Chinese together. Ambassador Taylor said the Washington talks had unfortunately not really focused on the opposing viewpoints. Admiral Sharp said he did not agree with Mr. McCone’s view. Ambassador Taylor said Secretary McNamara expressed interest in an economic blockage and in the idea of mining NVN harbors and destroying railway bridges. Admiral Sharp said if we are going to do that, we should do it before the Soviet ships which are en route arrive, warning them in advance that we are doing so.

4) Ambassador Taylor then turned to the list of items emerging from his Washington consultations for discussion with Prime Minister Quat. He said he had already discussed with him in general terms the 21-point Johnson program. He said that Secretary McNamara was willing to see an increase in logistics and preparation of logistic enclaves to be ready for the introduction of combat forces. However, neither he nor any other civilian leaders, from the President down, were convinced of the need for divisions. There was fear that American troops might be trapped inland and would have to fight their way out to the sea through mutinous South Vietnamese troops in a civil war situation.

5) To sum up his Washington talks, the Ambassador said he had gone there hoping to clarify three chief problems: (1) the tempo of Rolling Thunder, (2) the introduction of U.S. combat forces to close the manpower gap, and (3) the Political Track or how do we end the war. On the first two, the Ambassador felt he had obtained relatively clear guidance; on the third, it was evident our thinking had not been refined. We had two top cards to play: 1) stop bombing the North and 2) withdraw our forces from the South. With them, we wanted to obtain 1) a cessation of infiltration of arms, men and direction from NVN; and 2) the end of VC attacks in the South and withdrawal or surfacing under amnesty of VC units in the South. There was some inclination to play the two cards separately in isolation against the Communist cards, but the Ambassador did not agree with this idea and thought the President also did not, from remarks he had made. We had also thought of ways to permit the Communists a way out without abject surrender; and we had considered such matters as political (recognition, admission to the UN, assurance of security) and economic (trade, SEA development programs) carrots.

6) Finally, there was brief discussion of command organizations. Ambassador Taylor said he thought there were two contingencies involved: (1) the counterinsurgency effort in its larger dimensions in VN and (2) general war with China. While we should be thinking about and prepared for the latter, we should not let our plans for such an eventuality hamper our best efforts in organizing ourselves to deal with the former. Admiral Sharp agreed.

1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 52, Folder D. Top Secret. Drafted by Matthews on April 6. The meeting was held at CINCPAC headquarters.
2. Apparently a draft of NSAM 328, Document 242.
3. Document 238.
4. Not further identified.
5. Taylor’s request for clarification was sent as CINCPAC 042058Z to the Department of State, April 4, which replied in telegram 2197 to Saigon, April 5. Both telegrams are in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. The Taylor party arrived back in Saigon on April 6.