Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

241. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense McNamara¹

Washington, April 6, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Over-all Appraisal of Air Strikes Against North Vietnam 7 February 1965 to 4 April 1965²

CM-534–65

1. Since 7 February United States forces have conducted 34 air strikes and South Vietnamese forces have conducted 10 air strikes in North Vietnam. These strikes used conventional weapons including napalm with the heaviest bomb being 1000 pounds. The targets included one naval base, two army supply depots, three ammunition depots, two army barracks areas, one airfield, nine radar sites, and three highway/railroad bridges and associated routes.

2. Until 3 April when a MIG damaged a U.S. aircraft, and 4 April, when two North Vietnamese MIGs shot down two U.S. planes, enemy reaction had been limited to antiaircraft fire from weapons up to 57-mm caliber. The South Vietnamese have lost six planes with one pilot believed killed, and two missing. U.S. losses have been 25 planes with one pilot killed, two pilots captured, and nine missing.

3. The air strikes have not reduced in any major way the over-all military capabilities of the DRV. Damage inflicted on the Army supply depots and ammunition depots has, of course, reduced available supplies of certain military items, but these losses should not be critical to North Vietnamese military operations. Damage to the naval base, army barracks, the air fields and radar sites was not such as to hamper in a serious way DRV capabilities. We have no estimate of NVN casualties. I believe that the destruction of the railroad/highway bridges at Thanh Hoa and Dong Phuong and the Dong Hoi highway bridge is the most damaging military blow delivered to date. The loss of these bridges will slow down logistical support to the southern portion of the DRV. If we follow up as planned with additional strikes against railroad and highway bridges, railroad rolling stock trapped south of Thanh Hoa, and armed reconnaissance missions along the key highways south of the 20th parallel, we should be able to apply a serious stricture to DRV logistical support to the south, including that to Laos and to the VC in South Vietnam.

4. Prior to the recent strikes on the bridges, the economic effects of our attacks were minimal. No doubt the fishing industry has been harassed by maritime operations and armed reconnaissance flights along the coast. The line of communications strikes referred to above should apply increasing economic pressures as well as military logistic problems.

5. The air strikes have caused a build-up of AAA defenses and, coupled with the shore defenses including beach watcher units established by the North Vietnamese Government because of maritime operations, have the effect of increasing the number of regular military and para-military forces. In other words, manpower resources devoted to military activities have been increased at the expense of those available to the economy.

6. Any assessment of the impact of our air strikes on the attitudes of the North Vietnamese Government and people must be deduced from the small evidence available to the outside world from a closed Communist society. I believe that the following estimates are reasonable conclusions in the light of the evidence we have:

a. The military are keenly aware of the destructive potential of our forces. They are attempting to establish ground defenses to make us pay a good price for every target struck. The DRV Air Force exhibited considerable daring in its two clashes with our aircraft. The DRV Navy has dispersed and has issued instructions to its vessels not to open fire on hostile aircraft unless the aircraft actually initiate an attack against them.

b. There are indications that the North Vietnamese people are apprehensive of the future. One report highlights the difference in public attitude in Haiphong in January—described as “exultant”—and that in March described as “depressed and fearful.”

c. Outwardly, the North Vietnamese Government appears to be uninfluenced by our air strikes. The degree to which this official attitude is based upon a desire to reassure its own people, to influence world attitudes against the United States and to discourage us from continuing offensive actions is imponderable. Moreover, the North Vietnamese Government may believe that, with the support of Communist China and the USSR, VC successes in South Vietnam and world opinion will eventually give them the victory. In other words, they are willing to pay a price for South Vietnam. On the other hand, intercepted messages reveal that certain population centers have been partially evacuated, air raid shelters have been prepared and air raid drills conducted, and the government has increased military defenses.

7. In summary, I think it fair to state that our strikes to date, while damaging, have not curtailed DRV military capabilities in any major way. The same is true as regards the North Vietnamese economy. The North Vietnamese people exhibit an understandable degree of apprehension for the future. The Hanoi Government continues to maintain, at least publicly, stoical determination.

8. At tabs A through F are more detailed discussions of specific areas.³

Earle G. Wheeler

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, JCS Memos, Vol. I. Top Secret. The source text bears the following handwritten marginal note: “Retd from President 4/9/65.”
2. In an April 3 memorandum to Wheeler, McNamara wrote that the President wanted to receive by noon April 6 an appraisal of the current bombing program against North Vietnam, including “comments on the effects of the strikes on North Vietnam’s military capability and its economy, and indications of the degree to which the attacks have affected the attitudes of the people and their political authorities.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Vietnam 381)
3. None printed.