Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

104. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, February 11, 1965, noon.

2495. Embtel 2445.² In the event it is decided to embark upon graduated reprisals program as described reftel it will be necessary as noted therein to engage in more detailed discussions with the GVN at an early date to develop firm arrangements for joint GVN actions and to begin a process of education by which GVN would begin to formulate its war objectives and ultimately reach agreement with us on the framework of demands to be made on the DRV as well as the general negotiating procedures. This education process will take some time. We would hope to bring the GVN along to the point where they would accept a formulation along the lines of our proposal set forth in Embtel 2235,³ assuming of course that Washington sees merit in this approach.

In light of the above discussions with GVN and effectiveness of the graduated reprisal program, if adopted, it will also be necessary at some stage to disclose to selected allies and possibly the USSR, US/GVN terms for cessation of our reprisal attacks. (It will be most important to assure that these terms be communicated accurately and fully to Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow.)

The following comprises in broad outline our tentative thinking on how these terms for cessation of our reprisal attacks might be stated. They are implicit in and should be considered in conjunction with Embtel 2235 but are restated in this form for convenience of the Department.

A. Demands

1. DRV return to strict observance of 1954 Accords with respect SVN and the 1962 agreement with respect to Laos—that is, stop infiltration and bring about a cessation of VC armed insurgency. (With respect to Laos strictly observe the 1962 Accords, including the withdrawal of all Viet Minh forces and personnel from Laos and recognize that the freedom of movement granted therein in Laos under those Accords is not subject to veto or interference by any of the parties in Laos.)

B. In return and subject in each instance to a judgement that DRV is complying faithfully and effectively:

1. US will return to 1954 Accords with respect to military personnel in GVN and GVN would be willing to enter into trade talks looking toward normalization of economic relations between DRV and GVN.

2. Subject to faithful compliances by DRV with 1954 Accords, US and GVN would give assurances that they would not use force or support the use of force by any other party to upset the Accords with respect to the DRV.

3. Within the framework of the 1954 Accords, the GVN would permit VC desiring to do so to return to the DRV without their arms and would grant amnesty to those peacefully laying down their arms and desiring to remain in SVN.

C. If and when Hanoi indicates its acceptance of foregoing conditions, careful consideration must be given to immediate subsequent procedures which will avoid danger of: (a) becoming involved in a cease-fire vis-à-vis the DRV and/or the VC accompanied by strung-out negotiations; (b) making conditions so stringent as to be unworkable from practical point of view. Probably best procedure would be to have the GVN and DRV meet in the DMZ at the military level under ICC auspices with US observers to reach agreement mechanics of carrying out understanding while action against the VC and DRV continues, at least in principle.RLG would have to be associated with these negotiations at some point.

We recognize that one of the most difficult aspects as we proceed with the graduated reprisal program, if approved, will be how to establish communications with Hanoi and at the same time not to become involved in direct negotiations with the DRV. One possible formula might be for the US to talk with GVN while USSR talks with Hanoi and with the US and the USSR talking together. Other possibilities will undoubtedly suggest themselves to the Department. Another difficult problem should we reach the stage of GVN/DRV negotiations will be how we can maintain the threat of continued reprisals in order to prevent DRV stalling and achieving a de facto cease-fire and to permit us to verify that DRV is acting in good faith and that VC have not merely gone underground only to arise again. We have no sure fire formulae at the moment but wish to flag these problems for intensive study.⁴

Taylor

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Received in the Department of State at 12:52 a.m.
2. Document 93.
3. Document 32.
4. The Embassy offered further comments on a graduated reprisal program in telegram 2350 from Saigon, February 12. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)