Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

103. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Prime Minister Wilson¹

February 10, 1965, 10:15 p.m.

1. The Prime Minister placed the call to the President to propose that he should visit Washington immediately for discussion of the crisis in Viet-Nam. I had already informed the British Ambassador, first on my own and then later at the President’s direct insistence, that such a visit would be untimely and unhelpful. Lord Harlech obviously agreed, but his replies made it clear that the Prime Minister was insistent. I tried a further delay by suggesting that the call be deferred until Thursday a.m.,² but the Prime Minister continued to insist that he needed to have a position before he faced his own Cabinet Thursday noon London time. The President agreed to receive the call and, after considerable delay in a vain effort to get the classified circuit going, I completed an open circuit with the Prime Minister, and the President went on the line about 10:15 p.m. My notes cover only the President’s side of the conversation.

2. The Prime Minister evidently opened with his proposal, and apparently indicated that there was a high level of concern in London, and that he would like to come to Washington to put himself in a better position to deal with that concern.

3. The President said he thought it would be a very serious mistake for the Prime Minister to come over; that he thought there was nothing to get upset about, any more than it would be right for him to get upset about Malaysia; and that any visit would be misunderstood here. The President said that our response had been very measured and very reasonable, and that it was not going to be very different whether the Prime Minister came here or not—that it would be a great mistake for us to jump up and down and fly the Atlantic every time there was an issue of this sort. Next week we might be arguing about Sukarno, and another week there might be a threat or two from some Communist. We have telephones and we can always talk.

4. The President went on to make the point that he had tried to be helpful to the Prime Minister on monetary matters and on Malaysia, and that he would be glad to send the Prime Minister an account of the exact situation by classified cable so that he could tell his colleagues just what the U.S. position was.

5. The Prime Minister then evidently said something about his problems in the House of Commons. The President said he had plenty of problems with his own Congress, and he thought it would be a mistake for the Prime Minister to try to use the President as an instrument in the House of Commons, just as he would not wish to use the Prime Minister as an instrument with the Congress. He had to deal with the Congress every day, but he did not pull the Prime Minister into it. He thought the Prime Minister would have to decide what side he was on. The Prime Minister evidently said something about the hazards of escalation, and the President replied he was afraid of escalation, too, but he did not see what was to be gained by flapping around the Atlantic with our coattails out. He thought that such activity would make everybody even more concerned and, instead, he proposed again that he should send the Prime Minister an exact account of the situation and he would be glad to have the Prime Minister’s comments as a true ally.

6. The President reminded the Prime Minister that the U.S. did not have the company of many allies in Vietnam. He had spoken to the Prime Minister about the need for British support there and the Prime Minister had told him about his troubles in other areas. The President told the Prime Minister that he was with him in Malaysia with men, money, marbles, and chalk, all the way. Now in Vietnam it looks a little dark and he didn’t see what help would come from talk. If the Prime Minister had any men to spare, he would be glad to have them. The Prime Minister apparently returned to the charge, and the President asked him bluntly, “Why don’t you run Malaysia and let me run Vietnam?” Would the Prime Minister think it would be good for the President to announce to the American press tomorrow that he was going over to London to try to stop the British in Malaysia? The Prime Minister apparently answered back in some fashion, and the President repeated his comments about the British in Malaysia and our own role in Vietnam.

7. At this point the Prime Minister apparently gave way and reassured the President of his own basic support for our policy in Vietnam. The President replied that that was all right and fine—that we would stand on that—that we understood the British problem—the monetary problem, and the MLF problem, too. [Here follows discussion of the multilateral force.]

8. The conversation evidently moved back to Vietnam. The President said that Ambassador Bruce was here, and that he had talked with him for two hours today³ and he would be seeing him further. He would have Ambassador Bruce bring a detailed memorandum on the exact situation to the Prime Minister.⁴ The President repeated that he would be glad to share all this information with the Prime Minister and if the Prime Minister had any troops to spare, the President would be glad to have them.

9. The President reaffirmed his basic position: Wherever they murder our people, we are going to react promptly, adequately, and measuredly. The President knew the Prime Minister was going to do the same thing—in Malaysia or anywhere else.

10. The Prime Minister then apparently spoke about the concerns of some other countries. The President replied that he had never considered any of these countries great allies. France was a problem to us, and India had never taken up arms for us. I passed the President a note that our information was that the Indians wanted us to stand firm. The President repeated this comment to the Prime Minister.

11. The Prime Minister then apparently gave further assurances. The President said that he was glad to hear of them, and repeated his view that we ought not to run back and forth across the Atlantic with our shirttails hanging out.

12. The Prime Minister then apparently said something about the difficulty he would have in explaining what he was doing and not doing, and all that he would have to talk about was a call in the middle of the night. The President replied with some sharpness that it was the Prime Minister and not he who placed the call in the middle of the night. The President was just answering it. The President then repeated that the U.S. position was not provocative, not belligerent, not domineering, and that we were not throwing our weight around. But if people came in and killed our men—20 or 30 or 40 of them—our response would be prompt, adequate, and measured. And that’s what the President would expect the Prime Minister to do in similar circumstances, and he would have our full support.

13. At this point the Prime Minister apparently gave new assurances of his support and friendship, and the President said that that was fine, and he appreciated it, and that was friendship, and that was the way it ought to be—and he reciprocated.

14. There was then some further talk about what could be said about being in communication, and the President said he surely would keep in touch. The conversation then came to an end, and the President instructed me to send off a message summarizing the current situation to the Prime Minister’s office. This I later did.⁵

McG. B.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. VIII. Secret. Prepared by Bundy on February 15. For Prime Minister Wilson’s account of this conversation, along with extracts from a transcript apparently made in London, see Harold Wilson, The Labour Government, 1964–1970: A Personal Record (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1971), pp. 79–80.
2. February 11.
3. See Document 96.
4. No copy of such a memorandum has been found, nor is there any indication in Bruce’s Diary that he was given such a memorandum for Prime Minister Wilson.
5. Telegram CAP 65037 to Wright of the British Foreign Office, February 11. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)