Office of the Historian

102. Memorandum From James C. Thomson, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to Chester Cooper of the National Security Council Staff1

Washington, February 10, 1965.

SUBJECT

  • Some Queries on Our Proposed Reprisal Track

In reflecting on Mac’s report and its Annex,2 I am troubled by some far-reaching questions. Let me be clear that I am not questioning the need for a response to “spectaculars” like Pleiku: my doubts focus on the suggested policy of systematic and continuous reprisals against the North.

1.

Have we faced—and has the President faced—the full shape of the risk of Chinese intervention?

As I read them, the estimates3 already point to the probability of a Chinese MIG response to U.S. air attacks north of the 19th parallel. Under present DoD rules of engagement our planes are authorized hot pursuit across the Chinese border to the jet bases in South China and suppressive fire against these bases. (The estimates also deem as likely Chinese use of these bases.) Such strikes in South China would very probably bring Chinese ground forces into Southeast Asia. Needless to say, any strikes against Chinese nuclear centers—if perchance such a side-benefit is lurking in anyone’s mind—would unquestionably bring a Chinese ground force response.

2.

This raises a further question: Are we willing—and is the President willing—to face a ground war in Southeast Asia against the combined armies of North Vietnam and China?

This is an old question I know, but it is one that must be faced anew in terms of the systematic reprisal track. It would be folly for the sheer momentum of events (or of actions taken to bolster the morale of our friends in Saigon) to lead us into a land war with China in which our air and naval power would be relatively ineffective.

3.
Perhaps more significantly, are the American people willing to face a ground war in Vietnam—a conflict already fuzzed by national doubts far exceeding any that attached to the relatively clear-cut Korean conflict (invasion and “UN” response)?
4.
Finally, what has happened to the concept of “negotiation” so earnestly pursued by our more thoughtful journalistic and Congressional [Page 229] critics, and previously pursued by many thoughtful people here and at State? Are we ruling it out, as the Annex suggests? If so, for how long?

In sum, I fear we must very soon face the fundamental question of whether the kind of South Vietnam we would like to see emerge is really worth the high probability of a land war with China, a war in which Soviet neutrality simply cannot be assumed.

I know that these are not new questions; but I would feel utterly negligent if I did not raise them again at this time. It is instructive to remember that the bright promise of our predecessor Administration was early removed by a combination of accumulated momentum and events that led us into the first Cuban episode. I know that Cuba was not worth that price at the time; and I seriously question the higher price we may be forced to pay for Vietnam in Asia and in our relations with most of the rest of the world over the next decade.

James C. Thomson, Jr.4
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Reprisal Program, Vol. I. Top Secret; Sensitive.↩
  2. Document 84.↩
  3. See the section entitled “What Are The Risks?” in Document 90.↩
  4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩