90. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Acting Secretary of State Ball1
SUBJECT
- Varying Estimates of Consequences for US Courses of Action in Vietnam
You may be interested in certain differences comparing the White House memorandum of February 7, “The Situation in Vietnam”2 with the unanimously agreed interagency intelligence assessments contained in DIA-CIA-State memorandum “Probable Communist Reactions to US Option C or C-Prime Measures” of November 26, 1964,3 and SNIE 10–65 “Communist Military Capabilities and Near-Term Intentions in Laos and South Vietnam” of February 4, 1965.4
[Page 200]Incomprehensibly to me, the White House memorandum discusses the risks of sustained US air strikes against North Vietnam without examining Chinese Communist responses. However, the two intelligence community products estimate Chinese Communist air intervention to be quite likely at some stage in this very process.
Again in a reversal of our hitherto conventional rationale on this subject, the White House memorandum posits these strikes as primarily directed toward improving morale in South Vietnam, and only secondarily and eventually affecting North Vietnam’s support for the war. The intelligence community estimate of November 26 anticipates an initial elation in South Vietnam followed by a further let-down if the attacks against North Vietnam do not lead quickly to successes over the Viet Cong. Finally, the White House memorandum tends to minimize Free World reaction to US escalation whereas the November 26 estimate sees it as overwhelmingly opposed to escalation once that threatens to engage Chinese Communist forces.
A textual comparison of relevant excerpts follows:
What Are The Risks?
White House Memorandum, Annex A, page 2: “We should be ready…for energetic flak suppression and if necessary for the destruction of Communist air power… It remains quite possible that this reprisal policy would get us quickly into the level of military activity contemplated in the so-called Phase II of our December planning. It may even get us beyond this level with both Hanoi and Peiping, if there is Communist counter-action.”
SNIE 10–65, page 2: “The addition of air strength to the already formidable ground strength in the China/Indochina border area is also intended to strengthen Chinese/DRV defenses against the contingency that the US might ignore Communist warnings and take the war to North Vietnam and even to China.”
Ibid., page 4: “They (China) would almost certainly attempt to use fighters against air strikes on North Vietnam and would certainly do so in the case of an attack on China”:
DIA-CIA-State Memo, page 6: “At this point [attacks on the balance of the 94-List targets]5 Chinese Communist aircraft operating from Chinese bases would probably assist in defending North Vietnam against the US attacks.”
Ibid. page 5, INR footnote: “The increasingly severe US air strikes contemplated against DRV targets north of the 19th parallel would probably evoke the employment over North Vietnam of Chinese air from Chinese bases. The Chinese decision to construct the new Ning Ming airstrip, [Page 201] carefully located just over the DRV border and operationally ready in early 1965, already strongly suggests Chinese preparation to test US adherence to the privileged sanctuary concept.”
What Are The Gains?
White House Memorandum, Annex A, page 3: “Action against the North is usually urged as a means of affecting the will of Hanoi to direct and support the VC. We consider this an important but longer-range purpose. The immediate and critical targets are in the South—in the minds of the South Vietnamese and in the minds of the Viet Cong cadres… The Vietnamese increase in hope could well increase the readiness of Vietnamese factions themselves to join together in forming a more effective government. Effective and sustained reprisals, even in a low key, would have a substantial depressing effect upon the morale of Viet Cong cadres in South Vietnam. The determination of Hanoi and the apparent timidity of the mighty United States are both major items in Viet Cong confidence.”
DIA-CIA-State Memo, page 9: “Initial South Vietnamese elation and support would almost certainly quickly wane if the war seemed to drag on despite the new US moves, and especially if the Viet Cong were able to increase their military and terrorist pressures.”
Ibid., page 7: “In the event Hanoi felt assured of Chinese Communist rescue, it would probably fight on.” INR footnote “believes that the Chinese Communists, despite their reluctance to become involved in fighting the US, would feel it necessary to assure Hanoi of its support and to come to Hanoi’s assistance as the situation required.”
How Will The Free World React?
White House Memorandum, Annex A, page 5: “A program of sustained reprisal, with its direct link to Hanoi’s continuing aggressive actions in the South, will not involve us in nearly the level of international recrimination which would be precipitated by a go-North program which was not so connected. For this reason the international pressures for negotiation should be quite manageable.”
DIA-CIA-State Memo, page 12: “The US would probably find itself progressively isolated in the event the US sanctions did not soon achieve either a Communist reduction of pressures in South Vietnam or some progress toward meaningful negotiations, and would almost certainly find itself substantially alone in the event that the crisis developed to the point where a US-Communist Chinese war seemed imminent.”