105. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
2501. Deptel 1677.2 We believe we detect in reftel certain variations from our thinking on recent political events which are worth discussing as they involve an evaluation of the relative weight of important factors entering into the political scene here.
We agree that two predominant elements in the political picture are the military and the Buddhist Institute leaders (not Buddhists in general), but would stress that they are by no means of equal importance. The Institute leaders have limited ability to stir up trouble and raise mobs, particularly in the Hue area. The armed forces, on the other hand, have the physical means to put down any such demonstrations and to maintain law and order if their senior generals are determined to do so. During the recent period of demonstrations, we have found no signs of deep grassroots support for the Buddhist Institute and continue to believe that except in Hue area their strength essentially superficial. Huong had them on the ropes and would probably have survived their attacks had the military stood by him.
Nonetheless, we entirely concur that any govt here must reflect power realities. While military and Buddhist Institute are, as Khanh has called them, “most turbulent elements;” Catholics, particularly northern elements, who have thus far remained quiet, cannot be ignored. We also should not ignore the larger mass of Vietnamese people who, while thus far have not been organized and who do not yet have an articulate spokesman, are stoutly opposed to the increasingly neutralist trend of the Buddhist Institute. As we have previously pointed out no formula will be entirely acceptable to the Institute that does not give de facto control over the govt. Such control is entirely incompatible with effective prosecution of this war. A govt acceptable to both military and Buddhists, as well as to Catholics and other non-Communist elements, is hardly possible for it means the reconciling of virtual opposites. Nevertheless we of course entirely agree that we should not encourage the formation of a govt which is unnecessarily provocative to the Buddhist Institute. Given Khanh’s predominant role in the formation of the govt and his predilection for seeking deals with the Buddhist Institute, we [Page 236] have simply been seeking to assure that a reasonable balance be maintained.
Vien’s present slate (FVS 11,341)3 offers considerable [?] to the Buddhist Institute. It will be noted that Tran Van Do, Phan Huy Quat and Pham Quan Dan are all being considered for Minister of Cultural and Social Affairs which is important to Buddhist Institute. Generals Thi, Ky and Nghiem are also all acceptable to the Buddhist Institute. Buddhist Institute likely to oppose Vien himself and General Thieu. However, regardless of attitude Institute takes toward govt, it is certain they will press hard for removal of Colonel Ben, Head of Police and Colonel Dong of Capital Military District simply because both have effectively kept order in Saigon. Removal of Colonel Ben would destroy morale of police and much of progress that we have been able to make in building up police structure. It seems to us that we must continue to resist such moves even though it incurs the wrath of the Institute.
In closing, we do not feel that this Embassy has ever tried “to shore up a govt besieged by both military and Buddhists.” We did support the Huong govt which, until Jan 26, successfully resisted the Buddhists with the support of the armed forces. When, between Jan 25 and Jan 26, Khanh and company pulled the rug from under Huong, there was no shoring up to be done since his govt or any other would necessarily fall with the withdrawal of military support. The latter is indespensable for the continued existence of any govt in South Vietnam; the support of the Institute leaders is not, as long as the military are willing to stand up against them.
Thus we feel that our primary objective should be to encourage the formation of a govt headed by a resolute PriMin, civilian or military, who has the full support of the armed forces and the will to maintain order against all comers. Our efforts should be discrete and invisible to the naked eye since no VN official will thrive long who can be accused of being a U.S. puppet.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Received in the Department of State at 4:25 a.m.↩
- In telegram 1677, February 10, the Department of State contended that any South Vietnamese Government that did not take into account the power of both the military and the Buddhists was not likely to last very long. (Ibid.)↩
- Not found.↩