Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

28. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, February 1,1964—1:53 p.m.

1165. CINCPAC for POLAD. Saigon pass COMUSMACV for Harkins. Priority Actions Vis-a-vis New GVN.

We are sure you agree it important to move in rapidly to furnish advice to General Khanh in order to reduce to minimum loss of momentum resulting from change in government and prevent Viet Cong from capitalizing on change. In addition message on military operations sent other channel,² we consider following as high priority matters to urge on Khanh which we know you consider encompassed in general approach to Khanh outlined Para 2, your 1451:³

1. He should retain all those civilian ministers whom he and Country Team consider capable. This plus your earlier urging of retention of provincial and district chiefs should provide maximum continuity.

2. He should make prompt announcement of government’s intention to maintain and continue Strategic Hamlet program. Announcement should make it clear to both local officials and populace importance government attaches to this program as central element in counterinsurgency concept and should be designed prevent Viet Cong from again making kind of inroads against Strategic Hamlets which they achieved after November coup.

Also important for Khanh to designate single vigorous, energetic administrator for this program and see that this administrator gets out directives soonest on all important aspects of this program-security, economic and social, political, population and resources control, etc.-to provincial and district officials.

3. Khanh should see to it that immediate steps are taken to assure that farmer will get as good price for rice during current harvest as last year. Separate cable being forwarded on this.⁴

4. He should also be urged carry on and expand previous government’s efforts to use land reform in manner attract peasant support. Septel on this also will be sent.⁵

5. He should revitalize amnesty program. Imminent approach of lunar new year holiday should provide good occasion for such announcement.

6. He should pay particular attention to desirability attracting support all religious groups including continuation previous government’s special efforts directed at Hoa Hao and Cao Dai.

7. He should treat deposed members of preceding government humanely in order preserve his international image.

You may have additional thoughts on high priority items to press on Khanh. Would welcome your views.⁶

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted on January 31 by Mendenhall; cleared by Koren, Green, and in draft with Poats and Blouin; and approved by Harriman.
2. Document 25.
3. Document 24.
4. In telegram 1167 to Saigon, February 1, the Department suggested that the Embassy encourage the Khanh government to maintain the guaranteed price of rice. While this would mean a rise in the price of rice to consumers in the cities, it would help the new government win support of the peasants in the countryside. (Department of State, Central Files, INCO–RICE 14 VIET S)
5. Telegram 1171 to Saigon, February 3, in which the Department noted that the present land tenure system, in which many tenants not having paid rent or taxes for 20 years and squatters taking over land, created “major disincentives” to peasant support of the government. Return of government control might bring return of demands on the peasants for rent, taxes, or displacement by owners. The Embassy was instructed to encourage the government to promote land reform which would negate these “disincentives.” (Ibid., E 12 VIET S)
6. In telegram 1473 from Saigon, February 3, Lodge responded that he “had already made the points which needed to be made immediately,” and at the first opportunity, he would work on paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)