Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

24. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, January 31, 1964—7 p.m.

1451. CINCPAC for POLAD.

1. Called on Gen Khanh and gave him gist of the pertinent parts of your 1154.² He is instructing FonMin Lam to work out a text of the note with DCM along lines your last part.³ At 4 pm press conference will announce there has been a change in the chairmanship and composition of the Military Revolutionary Council, and that the Council continues to respect Vietnam’s international obligations.⁴ He also plans to invite all the diplomats to a reception tomorrow, Saturday afternoon.

2. With this out of the way, I told him that the purpose of my call was to make him understand clearly that he would rise or fall, as far as American opinion was concerned, on the results which he obtained in the effort against Viet Cong. Nothing could be more fatal as far as US confidence was concerned than another 6 weeks interregnum, or a period of any length devoted to fumbling around and to so-called “reorganization”. It was utterly vital that the commanders and the province chiefs in the field understand that all existing orders are still in force and are confirmed, and that he actually gave vigorous impetus, including a few kicks in the rear end where necessary, to see that the whole effort against the Viet Cong went ahead in all phases—military, political, psychological, economic and social; that what I hoped for was not rhetoric, but concrete results in Long An, Dinh Tuong, Kien Tuang and other provinces where the situation is so critical. I wanted news of specific hamlets which had been cleared, I hoped for reports showing that corrupt district officials who had been extorting and oppressing the people were being removed.

3. Gen Khanh agreed emphatically with all of this and repeated what he said to me yesterday—that competent people were to be kept on the job.

4. I said I was glad to hear this because unless he conveyed a strong, hard focused picture of a thoroughly aggressive and capable leader, there was going to be tremendous disappointment not only in the US, but throughout free world.

5. He said that he would announce in his press conference that he was determined to get on with the war effort in the above way.

6. He then said he wanted to ask my advice. He was thinking of forming a “govt of national union” of all responsible parties, 5 or 6 in number, and what did I think? I said I did not know the details of Vietnam well enough to give him specific advice, but that certainly one good rule of politics in any country was to include rather than to exclude, and to give all elements in the community a sense of participation. I asked him whether, in addition to the 5 or 6 major political parties, he was planning to include persons who adhered to the Catholic religion and whether he had considered the Buddhists, the Hoa Haos, and the Cao Dais. He said that he would.

7. He then said he would like to ask my advice on whom he should name as PriMin—who did I think was the best man? PriMin Tho was leaving and he had to find someone else. I said I did not feel I knew the personalities in Vietnam well enough to give him a worthwhile answer, as I had not yet been here seven months, but that I would consult people who knew this country much better than I did, and that if I had a valuable suggestion, I would let him know.

8. He then said that “within 7 to 10 days” he would be obliged to take some very “clear positions” regarding France and wanted to know whether we would help if this action were to lead to blockage of funds, elimination of French financial aid, or other retaliatory measures.

9. I asked him just what he meant by “clear positions”. If he meant total rupture, that was one thing. If he meant merely rupture of diplomatic relations, with consuls still present, that was something else. I asked him whether he was seriously contemplating expelling all of the 450 French schoolteachers and all of the French doctors? Did he seriously contemplate closing down the Grall Hospital which had given a million cholera shots free in the last 10 days—because if he did, he was taking on a very big proposition indeed, and one which would cause a great deal of suffering. It was not realistic to think that all these services which had been built up over a long period of time could suddenly be replaced. The US certainly had no ambition to substitute English for French in this country, and perhaps it would be possible to recruit French-speaking teachers in Quebec, Belgium and Switzerland, but that this would be a long process and it seemed to me a very imprudent thing to do without careful study.

10. He seemed impressed. He obviously feels strongly the need of some very vigorous gesture against France, in order to justify his seizure of power and in order to prevent it from looking like a naked power grab. Perhaps the outcome will be breaking diplomatic relations, but leaving consuls.

11. Question: Is there anything I can tell him in reply to his question on helping Vietnam against possible French retaliation to a breach of relations? (see Embtel 1416)⁵

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC. Received at 2:07 p.m. and passed to the White House, Office of the Secretary of Defense, CIA, and JCS. The White House copy is published in Declassified Documents, 1975, 214E.
2. See footnote 3, Document 23.
3. Text of the Vietnamese note, January 31, and the Embassy’s reply, January 31, acknowledging it, are in telegram 1460 from Saigon. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 VIET S) The U.S. note is printed in Department of State Bulletin, February 17, 1964, p. 239.
4. A summary of the press conference, held at 5:31 p.m., January 31, is in telegram 1452 from Saigon, January 31. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 VIET S)
5. In telegram 1416, January 29, the Embassy warned that deterioration of French-Vietnamese relations could result in the withdrawal or departure of the French technical and managerial community in Vietnam as well as the withdrawal of French aid. The Embassy concluded that while a break in relations between France and Vietnam would not eliminate much of the French private investment in Vietnam, the United States would find it costly to replace even a portion of the official French commitment. (Ibid., POL FR–VIET S)