25. Telegram From the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) and the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Harkins)1
[document number not declassified]. Joint State/Defense message. For Amb Lodge and Gen Harkins. After the coup in November, South Vietnamese military operations were neglected. A period of uncertainty ensued and the Viet Cong took advantage of the confusion in [Page 48] government and the weakness in administration of both political and military affairs. Serious setbacks to the counterinsurgency program resulted, particularly in the Delta. We fear similar results from yesterday’s coup. Therefore, you and General Harkins are instructed to state to Khanh that there must be no opportunity for the Viet Cong to benefit from the events of the past few days—it is essential that he and his government demonstrate to the people of South Vietnam, the people of the United States and the people of the world their unity and strength. To do so, the tempo of South Vietnamese military operations must be stepped up immediately and visibly so. The President would like to be able to announce tomorrow (Saturday am) that he has been informed by General Khanh that General Khanh has instructed the corps commanders to step up the pace of military operations immediately and has directed certain specific operations.2
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Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret. Sent over CIA channels. The source text is a copy the CIA sent the Department of State Exclusive for Rusk. Also sent to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Exclusive for McNamara. In an undated memorandum which bears a handwritten note indicating that it was taken from the President’s bedroom on February 1, Moyers made the following recommendations to the President:
- “(1) After the last coup in Vietnam, the Communists waited about ten days before launching an aggressive attack which caught Vietnamese and Americans off-guard.”
- “(2) They will probably try it again now.”
- “(3) Therefore, Rusk and McNamara should be instructed to inform Lodge and Harkins to take the initiative now—to get the Vietnamese moving against the Viet Cong—to launch an offensive before the Communists launch one.”
- “(4) This could then be leaked, if desirable, in an effort to show that you are determined to push the war at a faster pace.” (Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, CO 312 Vietnam)
At 9:59 a.m., January 31, McNamara telephoned Rusk concerning the need for such initiative in Saigon. The transcript of the call reads as follows:
“M said re South Vietnam, President asked what to do. M said his only suggestion was to step up South Vietnamese operations; if that seemed good, he would have a cable developed on it and would get his people to work with Sec’s people. Sec said it was a very good idea. M will get the cable drafted and get it over for clearance.” (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations)
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On the afternoon of February 1, President Johnson read the text of a personal letter to General Khanh at a press conference. The letter reads:
“I am glad to know that we see eye to eye on the necessity of stepping up the pace of military operations against the VietCong. I particularly appreciate your warm and immediate response to my message as conveyed by Ambassador Lodge and General Harkins. We shall continue to be available to help you carry the war to the enemy and to increase the confidence of the Vietnamese people in their Government.” (Telegram 1168 to Saigon, February 1, 4:41 p.m.; ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
According to telegram 1464 from Saigon, February 1, 10 a.m., Lodge had received assurances from Khanh the previous day that he would get on with the struggle against the Viet Cong. This apparently constitutes Khanh’s “warm and immediate response” to the President’s message. (Ibid.)
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