Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

23. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Green) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, January 30, 1964.

SUBJECT

• The New Vietnamese Coup

Situation. Major General Nguyen Khanh has seized complete control in a bloodless coup. In a public statement carried over Saigon Radio Khanh stated that the coup is directed against the inefficiency of the “administrative organ” of the displaced government and against a “number of people” who are neutralists paving the way for a Communist victory. Khanh has made no public charges against the French but his denunciation of “colonialists” obviously refers to the French.²

Khanh told Ambassador Lodge (7 hours after coup) that he has tried to persuade General Minh to remain as chief of state, but will not accede to Minh’s conditions that all generals arrested be released. He expressed determination to get on with the war, and promised a prompt public announcement to province chiefs and the army to carry on. He raised questions with Lodge about U.S. recognition (we preparing reply).³

A subsequent Saigon Radio broadcast names Gen. Khanh as Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council, and drops Minh, Don, Kim, Xuan, and Dinh from Council membership.⁴

Lodge comments that Gen. Khanh is cool, clear-headed, realistic planner; has good record; is tough, ruthless, farsighted.⁵

Assessment. Khanh’s main reason for seizure of power is undoubtedly his personal ambition. His allegations about efficiency and neutralism on the part of elements of the displaced government are a cloak for his own desire for power.

He is unquestionably pro-U.S and may carry on the war more efficiently and energetically than the preceding government. But there will probably be a new period of confusion during Khanh’s settling-in. Part of the aura of mistrust which surrounded the Diem regime may return because Khanh will probably feel the necessity of protecting his rear with security forces in Saigon. This means fewer troops available for use against the Viet Cong.

Khanh does not have the qualities of popular appeal which “Big” Minh has, and was beginning to use. Conceivably, as a young, attractive figure, he might develop a style of his own for winning the people. In the domestic political picture he seems to have two options: either to restore many of the Can Lao like Thuan, Tuyen, etc., to positions in the government, or to push for “total revolution” against ex-Diem elements as many students, Buddhists, and others in Saigon have been demanding. We suspect he will choose the latter path.

Public Posture. Our public position is going to be difficult because this is a second coup within three months in war-torn Viet-Nam. We believe we should use publicly the two elements which Khanh has used in his public statement: improved efficiency and anti-neutralism. These two points should evoke a somewhat favorable response in the U.S. in view of recent press stories on how badly the war has been going, and in the light of the recent French actions in the Far East.

1. Source: Library of Congress, Harriman Papers, Vietnam 1964. Secret. Drafted by Mendenhall. Copies were sent to Forrestal, Ball, and Harriman. Hilsman was in Australia.
2. Reported in telegram 1446 from Saigon, January 30. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 VIET S)
3. The Khanh-Lodge conversation of 11 a.m., January 30, is reported in telegram 1443 from Saigon, January 30, 8:30 p.m. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S) Specifically, Khanh asked what would be established diplomatic practice concerning recognition if Vietnam changed presidents and also whether the United States would recognize the new government. In telegram 1154 to Saigon, January 30, the Department informed Lodge that from a legal standpoint the United States had the option of extending formal recognition or handling the matter as a continuation of normal relations. In a number of recent cases, the United States had continued relations after coupe, which was the preferred course in Vietnam. If Lodge agreed, the Department suggested telling Khanh to inform the United States officially that there had been a change in the chairmanship and composition of the MRC and to make no reference to the matter of recognition. (Ibid., POL 16 VIET S)
4. No record of this broadcast has been found.
5. This assessment is taken from telegram 1443 from Saigon.