Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

99. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, May 27, 1961, 8 p.m.

Confe 65. Eyes Only for the Secretary from Harriman.

At meeting this afternoon, including French, MacDonald supplies us with copies of message from Frank Roberts after his talks with Kuznetsov. This was repeated British Embassy Washington and you have undoubtedly been given substance of message reporting Soviet response. It appears that while Kuznetsov said that he agreed that ICC should investigate on the spot, he later largely nullified this by saying that British draft instructions were too complicated, that everyone knew that cease-fire in fact existed, and in short made no commitment to do anything.

This Soviet attitude appears a continuation of stalling tactics which they have effectively used throughout April right up to eve of conference opening. We now find ourselves in the unhappy position two weeks later of being subject to their same maneuvers with cease-fire blatantly violated with same inhibiting tactics being used to deny exercise of control by ICC.

Today’s intelligence indicates that Pa Dong is under heavy attack, supplemented by UPI correspondent eye-witness story from Pa Dong on May 26, appearing Paris edition New York Times on 27th. Also A.P. story from Pa Dong of May 27 by Inigaki which reports heavy fighting has made mockery of cease-fire agreement.

Soviet maneuvers have placed us in exact position we earlier declined to accept, namely, attending conference before cease-fire effective. Believe that this issue of cease-fire and ICC instructions should be first order of business when conference reconvenes Monday afternoon. If debate delayed, issue will lose much of its urgency, particularly should Pa Dong fall before we have recorded our position.

I am sure you understand the vital bearing of this issue on our relations with our good friends the Thais and South Vietnamese, as well as its contribution to increasing arrogance of Soviets and other Communists.

I hope you will agree that I should bring pressure on MacDonald to carry out his original proposal for debate Monday.

Am confident of French support.

Request instructions urgently.¹

Martin

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–2761. Top Secret.
1. Telegram 37 to Geneva, May 28, informed Harriman that Document 101 made clear the Department’s strong concurrence with his views in this telegram. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–2861)